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ABSTRACT
EFFECTS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS ON THE PRICE OF INSURANCE
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. PROPERTY-LIABILITY
INSURANCE INDUSTRY
By
JEUNG BO SHIM
August 7, 2007

Committee Chair: Dr. Richard D. Phillips
Major Department: Risk Management and Insurance

Although the economic motivation and efficiency effects of mergers and
acquisitions (M & As) in the insurance industry have been discussed, none of the prior
studies have addressed the relationship between M & A activity and insurance price
change. In addition, little is known about the effect of diversification on the differences in
insurance price across lines. The main objective of the dissertation is to provide evidence
on these issues. A secondary objective is to investigate the relationship between M & A
activity and insurer’s efficiency and financial performance. We also examine various firm
characteristics that affect insurance price differences across lines and that influence
insurer’s efficiency and performance. We conduct fixed effects model regressions to test
our hypotheses using unbalanced panel data over the sample period 1989-2004.
The empirical tests indicate that the price of insurance for newly formed insurers
decreases following the M & As and diversified insurers charge lower prices than less
diversified firms. Our result is consistent with one possible explanation that acquiring
insurers reduce overall underwriting risks and more efficiently manage the frictional
costs of capital through geographic and/or product line diversification by engaging in the
M & As and therefore gain a competitive advantage in pricing. Our analysis also reveals
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a number of other interesting results. We find that insurance price is positively related to
marginal capital allocation and inversely related to firm insolvency put value, suggesting
the importance of incorporating insolvency risk and marginal capital costs in pricing lines
of insurance business. We also find that the price of insurance is inversely related to cost
efficiency, consistent with the efficiency structure hypothesis. However, the market share
variable is not significant, implying that market power that can arise from M & A activity
may not be a big concern for insurance regulators. In the analysis of efficiency and
financial performance, we provide evidence that acquirers’ overall cost and revenue
efficiency and financial performances decrease following M & As. We also find that
more focused insurers outperform the diversified insurers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Since the early 1990s, the U.S. property-liability insurance industry has
experienced significant changes of market structure owing to rapidly changing
technologies, particularly advances in computing and communications, the increasing
convergence of the financial marketplace, coupled with intense competition, and the
increased catastrophic risk. The intensification of competition brought on by
technological progress and increased exposure to catastrophic risk have constricted profit
margins and put pressure on insurers to seek ways to reduce costs and improve efficiency.
Moreover, in response to periods of dynamic structural changes, insurance firms have
attempted to enhance their performance and attract new customers by increasing their
geographical access and the range of products they offer through M & A activity.
The U.S. insurance industry has witnessed an increasing wave of merger and
acquisition (M & A) activity in the 1990s, which draw widespread attention for
commentators to investigate economic justifications and consequences of M & A activity.
Among them, BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) find that mergers serve as an alternative form
of market exit for insurers that are financially distressed. Chamberlain and Tennyson
(1998) suggest M & A activity may be a reaction by the industry to fundamental shocks
such as industry-wide depletions of capital due to large catastrophes, unanticipated
inflation or even adverse asset returns. Cummins, Tennyson and Weiss (1999) suggest
technological advances and increasing financial sophistication provide insurance firms
with incentives to seek improvements in X-efficiency and economies of scale through M
& As. They also find that M & As improve the efficiency of target insurers in the US life
insurance industry.
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Although the economic motivation and efficiency effects of M & As in the
insurance industry have been discussed, none of the studies have addressed the impact
that M & As activity will have on the changes in the price of insurance across lines of
business. In addition, little is known about the effect of diversification on the differences
in insurance price across lines. This is the first study that analyzes the direct relationship
between insurer’s M & A activity and the price of insurance in the U.S. property-liability
insurance industry. Since U.S. antitrust policy is primarily concerned with the potential
for collusive behavior (e.g., significantly increased market power due to M & As) within
the industry, the findings of the relationship between M & As and insurance price
changes are critical for anti-trust regulators in determining whether to strengthen or
weaken existing anti-trust laws.
Our analysis is guided by the theoretical propositions set forth in Froot and Stein
(1998) and in the capital allocation literature (Myers and Read, 2001) which predicts the
prices of illiquid and intermediated risks depend upon the firm’s capital structure and also
on the covariance of an individual line of insurance relative to the riskiness of firm’s
entire portfolio. As Froot and Stein point out in their capital budgeting model, given the
capital market frictions that make raising external funds costly, financial institutions will
behave in a risk-averse fashion and care about risk management. More specifically, Froot
and Stein suggest that a business segment’s contribution to the overall variability of the
cash flows of the bank is an important factor in assessing the risk of a specific segment
and in the capital budgeting decision. This implies that firm capital structure, risk
management, and capital budgeting are related.
Myers and Read (2001) argue the costs of holding equity capital should be
allocated to the individual lines of insurance such that the marginal contribution to firm’s
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overall default risk is equal across all lines of insurance.1 Using this assumption, they
develop a capital allocation rule where the capital allocated to the individual lines of
business “adds up” to the overall capital of the insurer where prices then reflect these
marginal allocations.
In addition to the adding up property, a second important implication of the Myers
and Read formulation relates to the portfolio of businesses supported by the capital of the
insurer. For example, Myers and Read demonstrate theoretically that diversification by
adding more lines of business with low covariability with the insurer’s current loss
portfolio (or high covariability of loss portfolio with asset portfolio) can decrease the
overall capital requirements of the insurer. 2 This implies that firms that engage in M & A
activity in an attempt to acquire a portfolio of businesses utilize the capital of the firm
more efficiently and thus, the price of insurance across lines in the newly formed insurer
reflect not only the lower overall capital costs but also new capital allocation by lines of
business.
The capital allocation theory argues that competitive insurance price should
reflect total capital requirements and their line-by-line allocations (Myers and Read,
2001). The recent empirical study by Cummins, Lin, Phillips (2006) provides evidence
that insurance prices are directly related to the marginal capital allocations suggested by
the Myers and Read (2001) model and also related to the covariability of losses across
lines of insurance predicted by Froot and Stein (1998).
The economic literature suggests other hypotheses in observing the setting of
prices. For example, the market power (MP) hypothesis states that merging firms can
increase prices by acquiring varying degrees of market power, earning higher profits (e.g.,

1

Capital is defined as the net of total assets over liabilities. Capital is also called surplus in the insurance
industry.
2
Capital requirement is measured by capital-to-liability ratio (Myers and Read, 2001).
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Berger and Hannan, 1989). The efficient-structure (ES) hypothesis posits that costefficiency and scale efficiency are driving forces for price and profit. Berger (1995), and
Goldberg and Rai (1996) argue that prices may be relatively favorable for consumers of
firms in concentrated markets or with large shares under the ES hypothesis because
efficient firms with lower costs can set lower prices than other firms to attract more
customers from competitors.
Such tests that exclude efficiency and market power variables in observing the
determinants of insurance price differences across lines of business may be problematic if
insurance price, efficiency and market power variables are jointly determined and omitted
variables affect significantly the differences in insurance prices across lines. Thus, we
attempt to identify a number of possible determinants of insurance price differences
across lines of business by incorporating efficiency, and market power variables into the
existing empirical literature of insurance price. In this dissertation, we focus on testing
three specific hypotheses (capital allocation, efficient-structure, and market power
hypothesis) to indicate whether these hypotheses are valid in determining insurance price
differences across lines of business.
The economic premium ratio is used to proxy for the price of insurance. The
economic premium ratio for a line of insurance is defined as premiums written net of
dividends to policyholders and underwriting expenses scaled by the estimated present
value of losses. To examine whether the marginal capital allocated across lines are
reflected in the differences of line-by-line insurance price, we employ Myers-Read
methodology to implement marginal capital allocation by line of business. Myers and
Read (2001) use the Black-Scholes option pricing model to estimate insurer’s insolvency
put value and then allocate capital marginally by taking partial derivatives of firm’s
insolvency put value with respect to the present value of loss liabilities for each line. We
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incorporate cost efficiency into the regression model to examine whether ES hypothesis
is valid. The market share variable is also included to control for the market power
hypothesis. We also include geographical and/or product line diversification measured by
Herfindahl index as explanatory variables to provide further evidence on the related
hypothesis that diversified insurers charge lower prices.
Another important objective of the dissertation is to investigate the relationship
between M & A activity and insurer’s performance change. Although M & A activity
impacts significantly the economic performance of insurance companies and their
efficiency, limited evidence exists on the relationship between M & A activity and
insurers’ efficiency and financial performance in the U.S. property-liability insurance
industry in the current changing environmental context. In particular, there have been no
significant studies of direct relationship between M & A activity and differences in
performance across lines of insurance. Hence, this dissertation seeks to provide further
information on whether the efficiency and performance of acquiring insurers are
consistently enhancing or reducing following M & As using more recent and much larger
sample data. In addition, we examine the relationship between M & A activity and line
by line performance change by considering underwriting performance (measured by
combined ratio and expense ratio) in each line.
Prior studies investigate the performance effects of diversification based on two
alternative hypotheses- the strategic focus hypothesis and the conglomeration hypothesis.
Pro-focus arguments state that firms can maximize value by focusing on core businesses
and core competencies where the firm has a comparative advantage. It is also argued that
conglomeration may aggravate agency problems by allowing cross-subsidization to poor
subsidiaries (Jensen, 1986; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Scharfstein,
1998). In contrast, pro-conglomeration hypothesis asserts that operating multiple lines of
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business can add value from taking advantage of cost scope economies that can arise
from the shared use of resources such as information technology, customer database, and
marketing distribution systems (e.g., Teece, 1980), or from revenue scope economies in
offering “one-stop shopping” to customers who are willing to pay more (e.g., Gallo,
Apilado, and Kolari, 1996). Conglomeration may also improve financial efficiency by
creating internal capital markets which is less affected by capital market frictions
(Gertner, et al., 1994; Stein, 1997).
Despite substantial empirical research on the validity of the strategic focus and
conglomeration hypotheses, there is little consensus on which hypothesis dominates in
the insurance industry. Cummins and Nini (2002) find a positive relation between returns
on equity and product line Herfindahl index in the property-liability insurance industry,
consistent with the strategic focus hypothesis. Meador, Ryan, and Schellhorn (2000)
conducted efficiency analysis to investigate the effects of product diversification for U.S.
life insurers. Their results suggest that diversified life insurers are more X-efficient than
their more focused counterparts. Cummins, Tennyson and Weiss (1999) suggest
technological advances and increasing financial sophistication provide insurance firms
with incentives to seek improvements in X-efficiency and economies of scale through M
& As. They find that M & As improve the efficiency of target insurers in the US life
insurance industry. Berger, et al.(2000) provide evidence that conglomeration hypothesis
holds more for large personal lines insurers, while strategic focus hypothesis may apply
more to small insurers that emphasize commercial lines. Their results suggest that the
strategic focus hypothesis dominates for some types of insurers and the conglomeration
hypothesis dominates for other types. Cummins, et al.(2003) examine whether it is
advantageous for insurers to offer both property-liability and life-health insurance or to
focus on one or a few specialized area by estimating efficiency scores using data
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envelopment analysis. Their results provide evidence that strategic focus is a better
strategy than conglomeration, consistent with the findings of most of the recent literature
on diversification.
The recent study by Cummins and Xie (2005b) investigates scale economies in
the US property-liability insurance industry. They find that most small insurers operate
with increasing returns to scale, thus gaining scale economies, while most large firms
operate with decreasing returns to scale, indicating scale diseconomies. Their results
imply that large insurers with decreasing returns to scale are already too large to be scale
efficient. Cummins and Xie (2005a) provide evidence that larger insurers are more likely
to be acquirers. They also argue that scale economies were not a predominant motive for
M & As since non-decreasing returns to scale is unrelated to being an acquirer.
Accordingly, we hypothesize that the efficiency of acquiring insurers is likely to decrease
following M & A perhaps due to scale diseconomies and increased frictional costs
associated with managerial conflict and agency costs.
It has been argued that there is no single dominating hypothesis or theory that
justifies M & A activity (e.g., Trautwein, 1990). In any given case, more than one motive
may underlie the decision to merge. For example, the agency theory states that M & A
activity is driven by the manager’s incentive to grow firm beyond its optimal size and the
motive for M & A transaction may not be stockholder wealth maximization, but
managerial self-interests that pursue manager’s private benefits (Jensen, 1986). The
managerial hubris hypothesis suggests that M & As may not create value or even destroy
value because they may be the result of poor decisions by overconfident managers (Roll,
1986). Bidding firm managers motivated by managerial hubris are likely to overestimate
their own ability to manage an acquisition and overvalue the target, leading to
overbidding. As a result, the hubris hypothesis predicts a negative gain for bidders. Other
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things being equal, the level of a firm’s earnings depends on the efficiency and skill of its
management. Thus, we hypothesize that the financial performance of acquiring insurers
is also likely to decrease following an M & A if the agency theory and the managerial
hubris hypothesis are predominant motives for M & As.
To examine the relationship between M & A activity and efficiency change, we
estimate the cost, revenue, pure technical, scale and allocative efficiency of firms using
data envelopment analysis (DEA). DEA is a mathematical programming (nonparametric) approach that compares each firm to a “best-practice” cost and production
frontiers formed by convex combination of the most efficient firms in the sample (Cooper,
Seiford, and Tone, 2006). 3 The frontier efficiency method summarizes the overall
performance of a firm into one score by taking account of the multi-dimensional
production process of the firm. A firm is considered fully efficient if it operates on the
frontiers, while any departure from the frontiers is measured as inefficiency. An
advantage of DEA is that it is expected to yield more accurate results if the objective is to
study the performance of specific units of observation, because the optimization is
conducted separately for each decision making unit (DMU) (Cummins and Weiss, 1998).
We also estimate the return on equity and on assets on the basis of balance sheet ratios as
a measurement of firm performance.4
The primary data source for the study is from annual regulatory statements filed
with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The samples of M &
A are identified through list of Best’s Insurance Reports-Property/Casualty. We also
utilize the NAIC by-line quarterly data (1991-2004) to estimate underwriting returns
3

While the econometric frontier efficiency methodology requires the specification of functional form such
as the translog to estimate the frontier and requires the distributional assumptions about error term, DEA
method avoids this type of the specification error since it is not necessary to specify a functional form or
distributional assumptions (Cummins and Weiss, 1998)
4
A number of previous studies on M & As have been characterized by the use of stock price performance
using event study methodology. We do not possess information on share price for the available data, since
the majority of firms are not listed on the stock exchange.
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which are used to obtain estimates of industry-wide volatilities and correlation matrix
between the asset and liability portfolios. Data for the input prices used to estimate
efficiency are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The quarterly time
series of returns of asset classes are obtained from the standard rate of return series. Our
analysis is based on merging or acquiring groups and unaffiliated insurers over the
sample period 1989-2004 in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry because
corporate strategies such as M & A decisions and investment strategies are likely
performed at the group level (Berger, et al. 2000; Cummins and Xie, 2005).
By way of preview, the results of empirical tests provide support for the
hypothesis that the price of insurance for newly formed insurers decreases following the
M & As and diversified insurers charge lower prices then less diversified firms. We find
that the price of insurance is inversely related to cost efficiency, consistent with the
efficiency structure hypothesis. However, the negative and/or insignificant signs for the
market share variable indicate that market power hypothesis is not valid with our sample
data. We also find that the price of insurance across lines are inversely related to the firm
insolvency risk and are positively related to the marginal capital allocation. These
findings have some implications that show the importance of incorporating insolvency
risk and marginal capital costs in pricing lines of insurance business.
The analysis on insurer’s performance generally supports for the hypotheses that
acquirers’ overall cost and revenue efficiency and financial performances decrease
following M & As. This implies that the benefits of risk diversification through M & As
tend to be offset by the additional costs associated with management governance and
integration, allocation of resources, and administrative and regulatory issues. These
results are consistent with the findings of recent empirical studies for the relationship
between diversification and firm performance (e.g., Liebenberg and Sommer, 2005).
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The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews prior literature on the
determinants of the insurance price. Chapter 3 provides an overview of various theories
that explains M & As. Chapter 4 specifies hypotheses about the relationship between M
& A activity and the price of insurance and insurers’ efficiency and financial
performance. Chapter 5 discusses the rationale of capital allocation, and capital allocation
methodology. Chapter 6 reviews DEA efficiency methodology. Chapter 7 describes the
data and sample selection criteria. Summary statistics are also described in chapter 7.
Chapter 8 explains the regression methodology for examining the relationship between M
& A activity and price of insurance and presents the results of that analysis. Chapter 9
discusses efficiency regression methodology and analyzes those results. Chapter 10
discusses the regression methodology to investigate the relationship between M & As and
insurers’ financial performance. Chapter 11 concludes the dissertation by summarizing
the results and by discussing future extensions.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
-DETERMINANTS OF INSURANCE PRICES
How should insurance companies determine premium rates for insurance
policies? Traditional actuarial approaches to pricing property-liability insurance contracts
reflect a supply (insurer)-side perspective, relying on retrospective data to estimate the
timing and level of future cash flows. Insurance prices are determined by a complex set
of supply and demand relationships. Although more modern actuarial models (e.g., Borch,
1974; Buhlmann, 1984) recognize the role of supply and demand in determining
insurance price by modeling a market where buyers and sellers of insurance contracts are
risk-averse utility maximizers, they have valued insurance apart from any financial
market considerations.
The insurance pricing models have developed continually in conformity with
changes in tax laws, price regulation, and financial theories. Financial economists use
financial theory to address the deficiencies of actuarial pricing models, incorporating the
time value of money, investment income and surplus commitments. Financial theory
views insurance policies as financial instruments that are traded in markets where prices
also take into account the forces of supply and demand (Cummins, 1990b). The financial
pricing approaches reflect equilibrium relationships between return and risk and
competitive market constraints.
The earliest financial insurance models are based on the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM) (Cooper, 1974; Biger and Kahane, 1978; Fairley, 1979). The CAPM
indicates that the invested assets earn the risk free rate of interest plus a risk premium;
this implies that investors are rewarded for bearing systematic (beta) risk but not for
taking unsystematic risk, i.e., risk that is uncorrelated with the market return. Because the
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CAPM assumes that investors hold efficient asset portfolios, the market does not reward
investors for risk that can be diversified away by holding a properly structured asset
portfolio. The CAPM is used to derive the equilibrium rate of underwriting return called
the insurance CAPM (Biger and Kahane ,1978; Fairley, 1979; Hill, 1979). Later, the
arbitrage pricing model has been applied to insurance pricing (Kraus and Ross, 1982).
Myers and Cohn (1987) develop the discounted cash flow model. A significant drawback
of these models mentioned above is the lack of recognition of firm default risk. This issue
is addressed through option pricing models. Several authors, including Smith (1977),
Brennan and Schwartz (1979), Doherty and Garven (1986), Cummins (1988), Cummins
and Danzon (1997), and Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998), have applied option
pricing technology to insurance pricing. Both Cummins (1988) and Doherty and Garven
(1986) use a more general form of the options relationship where both assets and the
exercise price are random. Doherty and Garven (1986) use discrete-time risk-neutral
valuation methods while Cummins (1988) employs the continuous time method
underlying the Black-Scholes option pricing formula. Cummins and Danzon (1997) and
Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998) extend the insurance option model to the multipleline business. Descriptions and analyses of financial pricing models are presented in
Cummins and Phillips (2001).
This section first describes the insurance pricing characteristics and insurance
risks that should be taken into account in pricing models. We then outline financial
pricing models such as insurance CAPM, discounted cash flow model (DCF), option
pricing model. We also discuss the issue of pricing of the intermediated risks under
imperfect capital market.
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2.1 INSURANCE PRICING CHARATERISTICS AND INSURANCE RISKS
Financial theory views insurance companies as liability-driven financial
intermediaries with equity capital and debt. As corporations issue bonds to raise debt
capital, insurers issue debt capital (premiums) in the form of insurance policies. Insurance
contracts are roughly analogous to the non-financial corporate bonds. This view suggests
that financial theory often used to value traditional corporate debt can be applied to
insurance pricing (e.g., Doherty and Garven, 1986; Cummins, 1988).
However, there are some unique characteristics of insurance debt that differ from
conventional corporate bonds. For example, when most corporate bonds are issued, the
maturity date and coupon payments are known in advance. In contrast, both the payment
time and amount on a given contract for property-liability insurance are uncertain and
stochastic due to contingent events such as the occurrence of fire and hurricane
(Cummins, 1990b). Furthermore, although insurance pricing models often assume that
premium is collected at the inception of the policy, it is possible in practice to spread
premium payments over the policy period. For example, large commercial insurance lines
may pay monthly premiums or may spread premium payments over the first three
quarters of the policy year (Feldblum, 1992). In long-tail lines of business like product
liability or workers’ compensation, losses are not paid until long after the accident has
occurred due to several factors such as loss adjustment procedures and litigated claims.5
Thus, insurance pricing that should incorporate both premium collection and loss
payment patterns confronts some different problems that are not present in conventional
financial instruments.
The owners of the insurance company provide equity capital to support their
insurance writings. When an insurer writes a policy, part of premium is used to pay
5

Industry-wide loss payment patterns are available from Schedule P of the Annual Statement, but industrywide premium payment patterns are not available.
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acquisition, underwriting and administrative expenses. The remaining premiums along
with equity capital committed to the firm by shareholders are invested in financial
securities such as stocks and bonds to support the unearned premium reserve and the loss
reserve. During the time lag between premium payment and loss settlement dates,
insurers earn investment income. The shareholders’ investment is subject to a layer of
taxes. The insurance company has to recover these tax costs when pricing. Investment
income is one stimulus for insurance pricing models that account for time value of money.
Because insurance cash flows exchanged at different times have different time value of
money and investment income is considered in the price-setting process, the risks of
economic inflation and fluctuating interest rates should be taken into account in pricing
insurance contracts (Cummins and Phillips, 2001).
Timing differences between premium payments and loss settlements and the
resulting investment income were not considered in the earliest accounting pricing
methods (Cummins, 1990). The most serious deficiencies of accounting models are that
they use retrospective method rather than prospective to estimate cash flows. They
typically measure policyholder funds (insurance premium) in proportion to loss reserves
and unearned premiums. Reserves are not a perfect proxy for the amount and timing of
future cash flow since reserves may be considered sunk costs which are irrelevant in
pricing future policies.6 In addition, accounting models use embedded yields to obtain the
rate of return on policyholder funds. The embedded yield is also unrelated to pricing
insurance contracts since policyholder funds (net of expenses) will be invested at current
market rates, not at the embedded yield. Most of the pricing errors of accounting models,
which reflect the insurer’s retrospective data, can easily be corrected by following the
basic principles of capital budgeting set forth in finance texts (e.g., Brealey and Myers,

6

See Cummins and Chang (1983) for detailed discussion.
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2000). The recognition of these defects of the earliest pricing methods has led to
development of more appropriate insurance financial pricing models.
2.2 INSURANCE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL (CAPM)
The insurance CAPM was developed in Biger and Kahane (1978), Fairley (1979),
and Hill (1979) to calculate a fair premium rate. The derivation begins with following
formula:7
~

~

~

~

~

Y = I + Π u = ra A + r u P
~

(1)

~

Where Y , I = net income and investment income, respectively
~

Π u = underwriting profit = premium income less expenses and losses
A

= invested asset of the firm

P

= premiums collected from policyholders

~

ra

= rate of investment return on assets

~

r u = rate of return on underwriting

Tildes indicate stochastic variables. We obtain return on equity by dividing both sides of
(1) by equity (G), since invested assets (A) of the firm consists of liability (R) plus equity
(G).
~
~
~
⎛R ⎞ ~ P ~
r e = r a ⎜ + 1⎟ + r u = r a (ks + 1) + r u s
G
⎝G ⎠

(2)

Where s = P / G = the premium-to-equity (or premiums-to-surplus) ratio

k = R / P = the liabilities-to-premiums ratio (funds generating factor)
The insurance CAPM can be determined by equating the CAPM rate of return on
the insurer’s equity with the expected return given by equation (2) and solving for the
expected underwriting profit. The resultant formula of the underwriting profit margin is:
7

Notations are taken from Cummins and Phillips (2001).

26

~

~

E (r u ) = −krf + βu [ E (r m ) − rf ]
~

~

(3)

~

Where β u = Cov( r u , r m ) / Var (r m ) = the beta of underwriting profits. The first component
of equation (3), − krf represents an implicit interest payment to the policyholders for the
use of their funds during the period between premium payment and loss settlement. The
interest payment will reduce required profits on underwriting depending on the size, k ,
of the policyholder funds and the risk-free interest rate, rf . The second term is to
compensate the insurance company for the systematic risks of underwriting. One of the
limitations for this model is that they did not take into account default risk.
2.3 DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL
The most prominent discounted cash flow (DCF) models developed by Myers and
Cohn (1987) and by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) are based
on concepts of capital budgeting. In capital budgeting, decision rules such as the net
present value (NPV) or internal rate of return (IRR) method are utilized to accept or
reject projects (Brealey and Myers, 2000). A fundamental principle of finance is that the
value of any asset is equivalent to the present value of its cash flows. Because insurance
cash flows on a given contract occur at different times, the DCF models provide an
accepted approach to pricing insurance contracts.
Under DCF models,8 all of the cash flows that include premiums, expenses, taxes
and loss payments are projected, period by period and are then discounted to the
beginning of the policy period by the appropriate discount rate. Myers and Cohn (1987)
use a risk-adjusted discount rate, whereas the NCCI model uses an internal rate of return

8

Cummins (1990) documents that accounting numbers are irrelevant in a DCF analysis except as they
directly impact cash flows, implying that loss reserves and loss development factors are not related to DCF
models.
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to obtain a fair and competitive premium.9 Both Myers and Cohn and NCCI models are
widely used. The former are discussed in this section. Myers and Cohn (1987) determine
the fair premium (P) as the present value of (1) loss and expense payments (L), (2) taxes
on the investment balance (IBT), and (3) taxes on underwriting profits (UPT):10
PV ( P ) = PV ( L ) + PV ( IBT ) + PV (UPT )

(4)

Premium flows are discounted at the risk-free rate since they are assumed to be riskless.
However, loss flows are uncertain and risky, and thus are discounted at the risk-adjusted
discount rate. An important feature of Myers and Cohn model is the concept of the
surplus flow. Surplus is committed when the policy is written and it is released when the
losses are paid. The insurance contract is a promise that compensates policyholders if
contingent events occur. The worth of the promise depends on the financial strength of
the insurer. The surplus committed by the shareholders supports its promise. The surplus
committed to written policies and premiums paid in advance (investment balance) are
invested and a tax on the investment income is paid at the end of the time. It is assumed
that the funds (surplus plus premium) are invested at the risk-free rate, and therefore the
tax on investment income is discounted at that rate. Tax shields that generated from
underwriting losses are used to offset taxes on investment income or taxes on insurer’s
underwriting profits. Assuming that loss and expense payments (L), taxes on the
investment balance (IBT), and taxes on underwriting profits (UPT) are paid at the end of
the time period, simplified premium formula in a two-period model is:11
P=

( P + E ) rf τ
L
Pτ
Lτ
+
−
+
(1 + rL ) (1 + rf ) (1 + rL )
1 + rf

9

See Cummins (1990) for detailed comparison between Myers and Cohn and NCCI models
The premium is defined as fair if insurer is indifferent between selling the policy and not selling it in
terms of the market value of the insurer’s equity.
11
The model generalizes directly to multiple periods with assumption that claims payouts are
proportionally separated each period (Myers and Cohn, 1987)
10
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=

τ Srf
L
+
(1 + rL ) (1 − τ )(1 + rf )

(5)

Where S = surplus committed by shareholders at the beginning of the time period
rL = risk-adjusted discounted rate
rf = risk-free rate

τ = corporate income tax rate
The Myers and Cohn model is consistent with financial theory. However, how to
estimate the risk-adjusted discount rate by line of business and the possibility of firm’s
default are not considered. In addition, the question of the appropriate level of surplus
commitment remains unanswered.
2.4 OPTION PRICING MODEL
The option pricing models have been applied to insurance pricing by several
authors (e.g., Doherty and Garven, 1986; Cummins, 1988; Cummins and Danzon, 1992;
Cummins, Phillips, and Allen, 1998). These option pricing models not only incorporate
insurer’s default risk but also estimate key parameters more accurately than the previous
pricing models like Myers and Cohn (1987) model.
The basic insurance option pricing models view insurance pricing as analogous to
the pricing of risky corporate debt (e.g., Doherty and Garven, 1986; Cummins, 1988).
The value of an insurer’s promise to policyholders can be considered equivalent to the
value of the riskless bond minus a put option written on the value of the firm. Although
these option models (single period) studied by Doherty and Garven (1986) and Cummins
(1988) provide important insights into insurance pricing, they have some limitations. For
example, although most property-liability policies have multiple cash flows, basic option
models assume a single payoff. These models also assume that insurers produce only one
type of insurance, whereas most real-world insurers write multiple types of coverage such
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as homeowner’s insurance, auto insurance, medical malpractice insurance, and workers’
compensation (Cummins and Phillips, 2001).
To remedy these defects, Cummins and Danzon (1997) and Phillips, Cummins
and Allen (1998) extend the basic insurance option model to the case of multiple lines of
business. The model developed by Phillips, Cummins and Allen (PCA) is discussed in
this section.12 PCA assume that financial markets are competitive and perfect, and there
are two groups of potential insurance buyers. It is also assumed that premium, equity, and
liabilities follow geometric Brownian motion process:

dPi = µ Pi Pdt
+ σ Pi Pdz
i
i
pi
dG = µG Gdt + σ G GdzG

dLi = µ Li Li dt + σ Li Li dzLi

(6)

Where Pi , G, Li = premium, equity, market values of liabilities for i=1, 2

µ Pi , µG , µLi = drift parameters for premium, equity and liabilities for i=1, 2
σ Pi , σ G , σ Li =diffusion parameters for premium, equity and liabilities for i=1, 2
dz Pi , dzG , dzLi = increments of the Brownian motion processes
for premium, equity and liabilities for i=1, 2
The Brownian processes of liabilities and assets are correlated each other as follows:
dz L1 dz L2 = ρ L1L2 dt , dz Li dzG = ρ LiG dt , dz Pi dz L j = ρ Pi L j dt for i=1, 2 and j=1, 2. The premium,
surplus and liabilities are presumed to be priced according to the intertemporal capital
asset pricing model (ICAPM), implying the following expected rates of return
relationship:

µ Pi = rf + π Pi , for premium i=1, 2

12

Notations are taken from PCA (1998)

30

µ G = rf + π G

µ Li = rLi + π Li , for liability class i=1,2

(7)

Where rf = risk free rate, rLi = inflation rate for liability class i, i=1, 2 and π j = the
market risk premium for process j = Pi , Li , and G , i=1, 2.
If ICAPM is applied to the pricing of assets and liabilities, the risk premium is:

π j = ρ jm (σ j / σ m )( µ m − rf )

(8)

Where µm , σ m = drift and diffusion parameters for the Brownian motion process for the
market portfolio and ρ jm = the correlation coefficient between the Brownian motion
process for the market portfolio and asset class j, where j = Pi , Li , and G , and i=1, 2.
Given these premises of the pricing model and assuming that shareholders of the
insurer have limited liability, the insurer has an option at the end of period when the
payments of liability are due. The insurer can pay off the liabilities (L) if the premium
account (or assets, A) exceeds the losses payable to policyholders; shareholders will then
receive the residual value. The value of the shareholders’ claim on the insurer at the end
of period is Max [A-L, 0]. The shareholders’ claim can be viewed as a call option on the
insurer’s assets (A) with exercise price (L). If the insurer’s assets are not sufficient to
cover the liabilities, the insurer with limited liability can declare bankruptcy and turn its
asset over to the policyholders. The policyholders’ claim at the end of period is directly
analogous of the claim of the bondholders in a levered firm, i.e., Min [L, A] = L-Max [LA, 0]. Thus, the policyholders’ claim is equal to the value of liabilities less the value of a
put option known as the insolvency put.
Assuming that there are no frictional costs in the insurance markets, PCA derive
the market value of line i’s claim on the insurer as follows:
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Pi = Li e

− ( r f − rL )τ
i

− wLi I ( A, L,τ )

(9)

Where Pi = the market value of line i’s claim on the firm
Li = the nominal losses owed to line i

rf , rLi = the risk-free rate and the liability inflation rate of line i

τ = time of expiration of the option
wLi = Li / L
I ( A, L,τ ) = the insurer’s overall insolvency put

Equation (9) means that the market value of the policyholder’ claim for line i is equal to
the nominal expected value of loss liabilities at the expiration period, discounted at the
risk-free rate, minus the line i’s share of the insurer’s overall insolvency put option. PCA
state that insolvency risk in line i’s claim depends on the firm’s overall insolvency risk,
not just on the line-specific levels of risk since an insurer’ entire equity capital is
available to any line of business where the losses are larger than expected. Thus, the
market value of the line-specific claims on the insurer are not expected to vary after
controlling for different liability growth rates by line and controlling for insurer’s overall
default risk. PCA investigate empirically their theoretical model by using data on the
publicly traded property-liability insurance companies. They find that the price measure
for the short and long-tail lines within a given firm does not vary after adjusting for linespecific liability growth rates. PCA also provide evidence that the price of insurance is
inversely related to firm default risk, consistent with the results of Sommer (1996), and
Cummins and Danzon (1997).
Cummins and Phillips (2001) document that option pricing models often depend
on the assumptions of no-arbitrage and market completeness which are difficult to justify
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for some insurance products. Additional research is needed to develop more realistic
pricing models in imperfect capital markets with frictions.
2.5 CAPITAL ALLOCAITON AND PRICNG OF THE INTERMEDIATED RISKS
UNDER IMPERFECT CAPITAL MARKET
Froot and Stein (1998) model the interaction between the capital budgeting and
risk management functions of financial intermediaries under imperfect capital market
situations where it is costly for financial intermediaries to raise new external funds on
short notice and it is also costly to hold sufficient capital as a cushion for uncertain events.
In their model, it is assumed that firms invest in liquid assets that can be frictionlessly
hedged in the capital market as well as illiquid assets that can not be easily hedged. The
costs associated with raising new external capital are also assumed to be a convex
function of the size of the equity capital. The firm has an initial portfolio and chooses its
capital structure at time 0. At time 1, the firm can invest in new risky products and makes
hedging decisions for both initial portfolio and new risky products. The investment can
be financed out of external sources. Uncertain payoffs at time 2 not only affect firm’s
need to raise costly external funds, but also give an incentive for the firm to care about
risk management.
Based on their capital budgeting model, Froot and Stein (1998) demonstrate that
the hurdle rate for illiquid, intermediated risks depends on the covariance of business
segment with the market portfolio (systematic risk) as well as on the covariance with the
firm’s pre-existing portfolio of non-tradable risks (unsystematic risk).13 Intuitively, the
price of illiquid assets such as insurance policies reflects the covariance of an individual
line of business with the riskiness of an insurer’s entire portfolio and an insurer’s capital
structure, implying that prices across lines of business may vary.
13

Froot (2003) recently extends their valuation function model incorporating asymmetrically distributed
risks in formal corporate pricing and allocation metrics
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The capital allocation literature (e.g., Merton and Perold; 1993, Myers and Read;
2001, Perold; 2001, and Zanjani, 2002) is also related to the pricing of intermediated
risks (The details of capital allocation are discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3). Capital
allocation literatures posit that customers of financial intermediaries are strongly riskaverse to firm default risk and thus financial intermediaries have an incentive to reduce
insolvency risk by holding more capital, investing in safer assets, obtaining high quality
reinsurance, diminishing interest rate risk and diversifying across lines of insurance.
Assuming that insolvency risk mostly depends on the amount of capital retained by
financial firms, additional capital may benefit financial intermediaries such as banks and
insurance companies by increasing the demand for firm’s products by consumers who are
averse to insolvency risk (Cummins and Danzon, 1997) and by reducing the likelihood
that firms lose franchise value(Cagle and Harrington,1995). However, maintaining
financial capital is costly due to financial market imperfections such as corporate taxation
and agency costs. Thus, because of these costly risk management methods, safer
insurance companies may require high price for their products (e.g., Cummins,
Harrington and Niehaus, 1994).
In summary, the implication from the brief review of risk management and capital
allocation literatures is that the price of given line of business reflects firm capital
structure, costly surplus requirements and their allocation to individual lines of business,
and the covariability among lines of insurance and between firm’s overall assets and
liability portfolio.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW-THEORIES OF M & A MOTIVES
The literature identifies several economic and financial theories that justify M &
A activity. In this chapter, we provide an overview of the literature that we use to guide
our empirical work.
3.1 EFFICIENCY THEORY
Efficiency theory suggests that M & As can be motivated to achieve synergies.
Synergy is the additional value that is generated by combining two firms, creating
opportunities that would not have been available to the firms operating independently. A
synergy exists if the combined firm is able to operate better or more efficiently than
before, even if the separate firms were efficiently managed.
Efficiency is a broad concept that can be applied to many dimensions of a firm’s
activities. According to narrow technical definitions of the most commonly used
indicators of efficiency, a firm is cost efficient if it minimizes costs for a given quantity
of output and profit efficient if it maximizes profits for a given combination of inputs and
outputs. These definitions focus on how production factors are combined by comparing
actual costs or profits of a firm with the costs or profits of the best performed firm. A
broader concept of efficiency considers synergies, scale and scope economies. We
categorize the potential sources of synergy into two types which are operating synergies
and financial synergies.
Operating Synergies: Economies of Scale and Scope
M & As might be explained by the existence of operational synergies. Operational
synergies stem from factors such as economies of scale or scope. In some cases,
economies of scale are obtained through advanced production technologies which are
subject to increasing returns to scale. If scale of the firm is raised, outputs can increase
proportionately. Other things equal, this reduces the unit costs of production. A change to
35

such a technology in an industry provides motivation for firms to build additional
capacity, resulting in higher outputs, greater profits where lower prices are economically
feasible. The efficient-structure (ES) hypothesis suggested by Demsetz (1973, 1974) and
Peltzman (1977) states that efficient firms increase in size and market share owing to
their ability to yield higher profits, leading to higher market concentration. The ES
hypothesis predicts that firm profitability is positively related to concentration, and
efficient firms charge lower price than competitors because either superior management
or production processes can achieve lower costs.
In the case that market demand in the industry may not large enough to support a
large number of the higher scale firms, even at lower unit output prices, the advantages of
scale economy can still be achieved through M & As. Firms operating at below-optimal
scale may also be able to achieve scale gains more quickly through M & As than through
organic growth.
Economies of scale may arise from the development of distribution networks,
branding, and IT systems. Large scale also provides insurers with more resources and
flexibility to adjust to changing market conditions. Scale economies might be present in
the insurance industry because fixed costs are spread over a lager base and thus average
costs are reduced as the size of firm increases. Fixed costs are present since insurance
firms need for relatively fixed factors of production such as computer systems,
managerial expertise and financial capital. Another source of scale efficiency is earnings
diversification (Cummins, Tennyson and Weiss, 1999). Operating at larger scale can lead
to decrease in firm’s cost of capital if earnings volatility is inversely related to firm size.
Studies for US insurance industry have found some evidence in favor of
exploiting scale economies. Cummins and Weiss (1993) and Hanweck and Hogan (1996)
provide evidence of scale economies for small and intermediate-size firms in the
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property-liability insurance industry, suggesting that consolidation reduces average costs.
Scale economies are also found in the life insurance industry (e.g., Grace and Timme,
1992; Cummins and Zi, 1998).
On the other hand, the argument for economies of scale as a major driver of
insurance M & As may be criticized if frictional costs arising from post-merger
integration problems outweigh any potential scale efficiency gains due to the
organizational diseconomies of operating larger institutions. Larger organizations may be
more complex to manage and may not be able to react quickly to changing market
conditions, creating the possibility of inefficiency. Studies of US banks find that mergers
produce no improvement in cost efficiency, especially for the transactions that involve
very large banks (e.g., Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Berger, 2000).
Economies of scope provide another important production theory rationale for M
& As. Scope economies can be present for costs or revenues (Berger, et al. 2000). Cost
scope economies can arise from the shared use of resources such as information
technology, customer databases, managerial expertise, marketing distribution systems,
and brand names (e.g., Teece, 1980). Revenue economies of scope are often said to arise
from the opportunities of “one-stop shopping” that can reduce consumer search costs and
improve service quality (e.g., Gallo, Apilado, and Kolari, 1996).
Financial Synergies
Takeovers occur in order to reap the benefits of financial synergies. Myers and
Majluf (1984) assume that management knows more about the firm's value than potential
investors. Asymmetric information between firms and capital markets can raise the cost
of external funds relative to that of internally generated funds. The assumptions of
information asymmetry make the form of financing important, predicting a disadvantage
to equity financing and a value to internal financing.
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The financial synergy theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that value may
be created in mergers when firms rich in financial slack acquire slack-poor firms. Such
gains can be realized if the information asymmetry between potential acquirers and slackpoor firms is lower than that between outside investors and slack-poor firms. More
specifically, a combination of a firm with excess cash and limited investment
opportunities with a firm that has limited cash and high-return investment opportunities
can yield higher value for both slack-rich firms and slack-poor firms. The slack-poor firm
could gain from the merger by implementing positive net present value projects that
might otherwise have been passed up due to costly external financing. The slack-rich firm
can also create value by the investment opportunities brought about by the merger. Since
takeovers can increase the values of both acquirers and targets by financing positive net
present value projects that cannot be financed as stand-alone entities, M & As can be
efficient way to achieve financial synergies. Hubbard and Pahlia (1999) find strong
support for the financial synergy hypothesis, where diversifying acquisitions involve
target firms that are financially constrained.
Financial synergy is likely to show up by establishing an internal capital market
through M & A activity. Weston (1970) states that resource allocation is more efficient in
internal than in external capital markets, and thus merging firms lead to a more efficient
resource allocation by creating a lager internal capital market. This work was extended by
Gertner et al., (1994) and Stein (1997), emphasizing the potential efficiency-enhancing
role of internal capital markets. Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994) argue that
takeovers may be value enhancing. In their study of external versus internal capital
markets, the authors suggest that takeovers have an advantage in the efficient
redeployment of the assets that are performing poorly under existing management.
Because internal markets provide senior managers with the residual right of control of the
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firm’s assets, these control rights offer increased monitoring incentives for the firm’s
senior management as they receive more gains from monitoring. Stein (1997) also
documents that firm takeover activities may improve financial efficiency by creating
internal capital markets that is less affected by capital market frictions. Houston et al.
(1997) state that bank holding companies create internal capital markets to allocate
insufficient capital among subsidiaries. They find that the benefits of internal capital
markets exceed the additional agency costs involved in coordinating actions within the
holding company.
Because insurance companies are required to report transactions with affiliates in
mandatory filings to state insurance regulators, the U.S. property-liability insurance
industry provides a particularly interesting environment where to analyze internal capital
markets. It is very common for insurers to be affiliates of an insurance group and capital
transfers are active among affiliated insurers. 14 Powell and Sommer (2004) provide
evidence that internal capital markets are more active and play a larger role within groups
of insurance companies than in non-financial firms. For example, affiliated insurers can
exchange capital by assuming and ceding reinsurance. Because reinsurer pays for some
portion of assumed liability shifted from ceding company, reinsurance can be used to
increase a ceding insurer’s underwriting capacity and thus, increase the insurer’s surplus
position. 15 Therefore, the ceding company is basically using the reinsurer’s capital
(surplus) to guarantee unexpected larger payments for such catastrophic losses due to
natural disasters and industrial explosions. Eckles et al. (2005) explore the efficiency of
internal capital market in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry. They provide
evidence that capital is allocated to subsidiaries with best expected performance,

14

Insurers report capital transfers among affiliates in Schedule Y (Part 2: Summary of the Insurer’s
Transactions with any Affiliates) of the annual statement.
15
Insurer can also increase its surplus by selling its assets to affiliates for a price above book value or at the
current market value (Eckles et al., 2005).
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consistent with efficient internal capital markets. They also find that reinsurance among
affiliates is the most common form of internal capital market transfer and dividend
payment to affiliates and capital contributions are second most common transactions.16
On the other hand, other authors suggest some deficiencies associated with
internal capital markets (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995; Shin and Stulz, 1998; and
Scharfstein, 1998). These studies suggest that M & A activity may lead to inefficient
cross-subsidization across segments that allow poor segments to drain resources from
better-performing segments.

17

Shin and Stulz (1998) find some evidence of cross-

subsidization in diversified conglomerates. They argue that this diversification may be
inefficient because it does not appear to depend on the investment opportunities of the
subsidized segment. Scharfstein (1998) argues that M & A activities destroy value
because management in merging firms does a poor job allocating capital-underinvesting
in divisions with relatively good investment opportunities and overinvesting in divisions
with relatively poor investment opportunities. Rajan et al., (2000), and Scharfstein and
Stein (2000) argue that internal capital markets established by M & A activity can hinder
investment efficiency because of agency problem that may generate inefficient
subsidization across business segments. Campello (2002) examines the function of
internal capital markets in the investment allocation process of financial conglomerates,
using data from bank holding companies and produces some of mixed results. He finds
that internal capital market result in inefficient cross-subsidization within small bank
holding companies, but internal capital markets tend to play an efficiency-enhancing role

16

Shareholder dividends are dividends paid to affiliates if they own a portion of the reporting insurer’s
shares. Capital contributions are capital transfers from one affiliate to another in the form of cash, securities,
real estate and surplus notes.
17
Furthermore, Lang and Stulz (1994), and Berger and Ofek (1995) document that merging firms trade at
an average discount in U.S. stock markets relative to stand-alone firms.
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in large bank holding companies. Despite substantial studies, there is no consensus on
whether or not internal capital market is efficient.
3.2 MARKET POWER THEORY
In economic theory, market power is defined as the capability of a firm to raise
the price of a good or service without losing all consumers to its competitors. The market
power theory suggests that merging firms can increase prices by acquiring varying
degrees of market power, allowing firms to increase profits. This rationale is particularly
true when the merging firms are direct competitors and their combination results in a
substantial increase in market concentration within specified geographical or product
markets (e.g., Shepherd, 1982).
The market power theory is associated with the traditional structure-conductperformance (SCP) hypothesis. The SCP hypothesis suggests a positive relationship
between profitability (or price) and concentration. Empirical studies examining bank
performance and market concentration argue that banks are able to extract monopolistic
rents in concentrated markets by their ability to offer lower deposit rates and to charge
higher loan rates (e.g., Berger and Hannan, 1989; Berger, 1995). This reflects the setting
of prices that are less favorable to customers in more concentrated markets. This
hypothesis derived from the model of the oligopolistic behavior of firms implies that
higher market concentration may facilitate collusion arrangements among firms (Stigler,
1964). Collusive synergies represent no efficiency gains but wealth transfers from the
firm’s customers (Trautwein, 1990).
When direct competitors merge, especially when they already operate in a fairly
concentrated market environment, increased market power is likely to be one of the
factors motivating the consolidation. M & As that aims at achieving market power may
be beneficial from the firm’s point of view, but are less favorable to customers due to
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decreased pricing competition. This is often viewed as socially undesirable; as a result,
antitrust policy is introduced with the aim of limiting the ability of firms to accrue market
power. A primary goal of US antitrust legislation is to prevent a significant increase in
market power by regulating M & A activity.
A few studies have examined the effects of financial sector M & As on prices.
The findings of these studies are inconsistent. In a study that examines the market power
effects of bank megamergers, Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) find no evidence
of significant price effects attributable to these bank mergers. Their measures of prices
are the aggregate of bank loans and deposits from balance sheets. Prager and Hannan
(1998) examined the pricing effects of horizontal mergers in the local banking industry.
Using deposit interest rates that banks offer their customers as a price measure, they find
that banks operating in markets where substantial horizontal mergers took place exhibited
greater declines in deposit interest rates than did banks operating only in markets where
no such mergers took place. This finding is consistent with market power theory that
bank mergers which substantially increase concentration lead to increased market power,
resulting in price changes that are not beneficial to customers.
3.3 INDUSTRY SHOCK HYPOTHESIS
Industry shock hypothesis suggests that the extensive M & A and restructuring
activity within an industry can occur as the result of industry shocks. Examples of
industry shocks include changes in regulation, input price volatility, increased
competition, and technological innovations (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). To support
the proposition that industry shocks play an important role in a firm takeover and in
restructuring activity,18 Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) assume that the structure of an
industry, including the number and size of firms, is a function of fundamental factors

18

The term “Takeover” is used to refer to all types of mergers and acquisitions.
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such as technology, government policy, and demand and supply conditions. Thus, major
changes in any of these factors cause alterations in industry structure. For example, a
shock-driven reduction in demand can induce firms to abandon unprofitable lines of
business, but it can also force firms to merge other business lines in order to react to the
post-shock optimal size. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) assert that M & As can be the
least-cost method for industry restructuring in response to economic shocks. Andrade and
Stafford (2004) find a strong positive relation between industry shocks and own-industry
mergers in the 1990s, consistent with recent findings by Mulherin and Boone (2000) and
Andrade et al. (2001).
Jensen (1993) documents that most M & As since the mid-1970s has been
triggered by technological and supply shocks that improve productivity and create
overcapacity. Jensen argues that firm takeover activities are efficient way of eliminating
excess capacity since the solution of removing overcapacity by product market forces
generates large, unnecessary costs. Andrade and Stafford (2004) provide evidence that
excess capacity drives industry consolidation through mergers. The evidence of Andrade
and Stafford (2004) suggests that industries restructured and consolidated by M & As as
the economy adjusted to a variety of shocks to capacity and competition. In addition,
Coase (1937) identified technological change as a major determinant of firm size. Coase
predicted, “Changes like the telephone and the telegraph which tend to reduce the cost of
organizing spatially will tend to increase the size of the firm.” An implication of Coase’s
prediction is that M & A activity is related to technological change. Technological
change has occurred at an explosive pace. Computer software applications and internet
development have not only impacted all aspects of business, but also have changed the
forms and nature of competitive relationships between firms.
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Golbe and White (1988) document that M & A movements have occurred when
the economy experienced high rates of growth and coincided with particular
developments in business environments. They argue that M & As are characterized by
resource allocation and reallocation processes in the economy, with firms responding to
new investment and profit opportunities arising out of changes in economic conditions
and technological innovations.
3.4. THE AGENCY THEORY
The agency theory of M & As, proposed by Jensen (1986), suggests that valuedestroying M & A activity is driven by the manager’s incentive to grow firm beyond its
optimal size. Some managers’ interests seem to lie in making their firms the largest and
most dominant firms in their industry or even in the entire market. In most acquisition, it
is the managers of the acquiring firm who decide whether to carry out the acquisition and
how much to pay for it, rather than stockholders of the firm. Given these circumstances,
the motive for acquisitions may not be stockholder wealth maximization, but managerial
self-interests that pursue manager’s private benefits.
In some cases, M & As can result in the rewriting of management compensation
contracts. Managers may be motivated to increase their compensation by increasing the
size of the firm through non-value maximizing mergers (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). If
the potential private gains to the managers from the transaction are large, it might blind
them to the costs created for their stockholders.
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that takeovers can be viewed as managerial
strategies to achieve entrenchment. Managers choose manager-specific acquisitions so as
to make themselves indispensable to their firm at the expense of shareholders. Managers
benefit from value-destroying takeovers because of power and prestige associated with
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managing a larger firm (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990) and because takeovers may reduce the
risk of the mangers’ undiversified personal portfolio (Amihud and Lev, 1981)
3.5 MARKET TIMING THEORY
The market timing theory demonstrates that firm takeover activity can occur
because of stock market valuation issues (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan, 2004). The market timing theory does not imply that M & As could not be
triggered by technological innovations, changes in regulation, or corporate governance
issues, etc. Rather, the market timing theory suggests that stock market misvaluation
impacts merger waves regardless of the underlying motivations for the mergers.
The market timing theory assumes that the stock market valuation for potential
acquirers and potential targets can deviate from true values. The merging firm employs
its relatively overvalued stock as currency to purchase the target firm’s stock. Such stock
market driven M & As may have poor long-run stock performance due to the correction
of misvaluation. Market timing theory predicts that stock deal acquirers underperform
cash deal acquirers in the long run and that firms with overvalued equity might be able to
make acquisitions while firms with undervalued or relatively less overvalued equity
become takeover targets.
A few recent papers model M & A activity as a result of stock market valuation.
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) theoretically model the impact of market valuations on the
decision to acquire and the occurrence of merger waves. They argue that managers
understand stock market inefficiencies and take advantage of them by engaging in
takeover activity. Stock is used to pay for acquisitions by overvalued acquirers who
expect to see negative long-run returns on their shares, but are attempting to make these
returns less negative. The model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) also predicts that merger
waves where managers will make stock-based acquisitions occur in high market
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valuation periods. An implication of this prediction is that M & A activity will be higher
in industries and markets with a large variation in stock valuation.
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) develop a theoretical model where market
values for acquirers and targets may deviate from true value. They argue that firmspecific and market-wide misvaluation can cause merger waves in the absence of any
underlying reasons for the acquisition, such as synergy. Their model suggests the
possibility of mergers increases with market overvaluation. Dong, Hirshleifer,
Richardson and Teoh (2003) find that market misvaluation impacts the volume of
takeovers and overvaluation for both acquirers and targets influences virtually every
aspect of the acquisitions including method of payment and bidder and target
announcement period return.
3.6 MANAGERIAL HUBRIS HYPOTHESIS
The managerial hubris hypothesis suggests that M & As may not create value or
even destroy value because they may be the result of poor decisions by overconfident
managers (Roll, 1986). Roll (1986) argues that acquisitions are motivated by managerial
hubris. Managers are more likely to overestimate their own ability to manage an
acquisition. Bidding firm managers make mistakes in evaluating target firms but
undertake acquisitions presuming that their valuations are correct. They may overvalue
the target firm, leading to overbidding, i.e., they will be infected by hubris. Out of over
optimism, the bidder pays too much for the target causing a positive gain for target
shareholders, but a negative gain for bidders. Each dollar paid to the target shareholders
represents a dollar lost to the acquirers’ shareholders. The shareholder wealth of
acquiring firm declines, while the wealth of target firm rises. Thus, the gains to the
target’s and bidder’s shareholders should be inversely related.
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Consistent with managerial hubris hypothesis, Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2003)
find that during periods of high stock market valuation, managers are more likely to
suffer from hubris and make poor acquisition decisions. Although the market initially
welcomes acquisition announcements during stock market booms, the hubris-driven
acquisitions undertaken during high market valuation periods earn negative abnormal
returns in the long run. This suggests that the market learns over time as the true quality
of the acquisition is revealed.
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) investigate the relationship between firm-level
valuation and the long-run firm performance of acquiring shareholders. It is hypothesized
that the market overextrapolates the past performance of the bidder when it assesses the
value of an acquisition. They find empirically that in “glamour firm” with low book to
market ratios, managers are more likely to overestimate their abilities to deal with an
acquisition, i.e., they are more likely to be infected by hubris. Such hubris-driven
acquisitions destroy shareholder value, and bidders underperform during the three years
following the acquisition. On the other hand, in firms with high book to market ratios,
managers are more prudent in their acquisition plans. Because these acquisitions are not
motivated by hubris, they tend to create shareholder value rather than destroy it.
3.7 CORPORATE CONTROL THEORY
Corporate control theory argues that M & As can be an effective means to replace
inefficient managers of the target firm and thereby improve the performance of the assets
under its control (e.g., Jensen, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). In the absence of any
internal method of control, or where such methods are not successfully implemented, the
market for corporate control facilitates the dismissal of non-value-maximizing managers
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). In these takeover contracts, the bidder deals directly with the
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target’s shareholders, rather than with its management. A bidder who gains the required
votes assumes control and then gets rid of the incumbent managers.
Other things being equal, the level of a firm’s earnings depends on the efficiency
and skill of its management. If the present and expected future earnings are below their
potential amount due to relatively inefficient or lackadaisical management, the market
will underestimate the firm value below the level that the firm’s asset would have under a
more efficient management. An opportunity then exists for more competent and skillful
firm to purchase this underperformed firm at a price below its potential value and make a
profit by removing incompetent target management and operating the firm efficiently.
Such takeover attempts represent what Manne (1965) termed the “market for corporate
control,” If the market operates in this fashion, it is socially beneficial because it tends to
shift control of corporate assets from less to more efficient management.
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CHAPTER 4
HYPOTHESES
4.1 THE IMPACT OF M & A ON INSURANCE PRICES
One primary implication of the option pricing model for insurance is that the price
of insurance is inversely related to firm default risk (e.g., Cummins and Danzon, 1997;
Phillips, Cummins and Allen, 1998). As capital allocation literatures (e.g., Merton and
Perold; 1993, Myers and Read; 2001, Perold; 2001, and Zanjani, 2002) point out,
customers of financial intermediaries are strongly risk-averse to firm default risk and thus
customers are willing to pay higher premium for safer firms. Given that the firm default
risk generally depends on the amount of capital retained by insurers relative to liabilities,
financial intermediaries have an incentive to reduce insolvency risk by holding more
capital. As the amount of capital held increases, the frictional costs of holding capital
increase due to capital market imperfections. Thus, insurers that properly manage the
frictional costs of capital will have a competitive advantage in pricing. Insurers have a
motivation to manage capital costs through M & A activity by engaging in a portfolio of
businesses that more efficiently utilizes the capital of the firm.
A frequently stated motive for mergers and acquisition activity is a desire to
diversify the firm by pooling uncorrelated risks. Most property-liability companies write
multiple lines of insurance. The multi-line insurer may reduce insolvency risk by
diversifying its exposures across lines of business or geographic locations since the
businesses in the portfolio coinsure one another. For instance, risk characteristics and loss
variability of property insurance are likely to differ from those of liability insurance. Both
property and liability insurance may have a function of offsetting underwriting risks.
Therefore, diversification enables firms to reduce its overall underwriting risk and thus
can lower the amount of capital that insurer should hold to support insurance risks if the
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lines of businesses are not perfectly correlated with one another (Merton and Perold,
1993).
An important implication of diversification effect is that the risk of the portfolio
of businesses will be less than the sum of the stand-alone risks of the businesses; firms,
then, would be required to hold less capital to support uncertain events since a particular
line that may have high capital requirement on a stand-alone basis but has offsetting risks
with other lines of business in the context of portfolio of businesses (Merton and Perold,
1993). Myers and Read (2001) show that if each line of business is assumed to be
organized as a stand-alone firm, total surplus requirements for those lines increase
because of loss of diversification. If we do not consider the effect of diversification when
allocating capital by lines of business, we may overestimate the cost of capital for that
specific line, leading to overpricing of that risk. Perold (2001) argues that diversification
across business segments diminishes the firm’s deadweight cost of risk capital. The
marginal capital allocation formula proposed by Myers and Read (2001) illustrate that
diversification by adding more lines of business with low covariability with the insurer’s
current loss portfolio (or high covariability of loss portfolio with asset portfolio) can
decrease the overall capital requirements of the insurer. This implies that firms that
engage in M & A activity in an attempt to acquire a portfolio of businesses utilize the
capital of the firm more efficiently. Thus we hypothesize that the price of insurance for
newly formed insurers decreases following the M & As since the price of insurance
across lines in the newly formed insurer reflects the lower capital costs. Diversified firms
across lines of business or geographic locations can reduce its overall underwriting risk
and, thus, can lower the amount of capital that the insurer is required to hold to support
insurance risks if the businesses in the portfolio coinsure one another. Accordingly, we
predict that diversified firms will charge lower prices than less diversified insurers.
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In the classical theoretical paradigm of the perfect capital market with perfect
information and without taxes, transaction costs and bankruptcy costs, the pricing of
specific risks should be constant across all financial institutions and should not depend on
the characteristics of an individual financial firm’s portfolio. In reality, financial markets
do not operate without frictions such as taxation, regulatory environment and asymmetric
information between managers and outside investors. Because holding capital is costly
due to these market frictions, financial institutions may not hold sufficient capital to
eliminate all insolvency risk. When financial intermediaries have to raise capital
externally, imperfect capital markets impose deadweight costs that must be covered by
the cash flows of a business line. Therefore, in order for insurers to survive in imperfect
capital markets with frictions, insurance price by line of business should reflect firm
capital structure, the covariance among lines of business and between asset and liability
portfolios as well as the amount of marginal capital allocated to each line of business.
The recent empirical study by Cummins, Lin, Phillips (2006) provides evidence that
insurance prices are directly related to the marginal capital allocations suggested by the
Myers and Read (2001) model and also related to the covariability of losses across lines
of insurance predicted by Froot and Stein (1998).
The economic literature suggests other hypotheses in observing the setting of
prices. For example, the market power (MP) hypothesis states that mergers may be
motivated by the firm’s desire to set prices that are less favorable to consumers, earning
higher profits.19 Berger and Hannan (1989), and Hannan (1991) provide evidence that
support the market power hypothesis by examining the relationship between price and

19

A related hypothesis is the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis. The SCP hypothesis asserts
that consumers are treated less favorably in more concentrated markets as a result of anti-competitive price
settings in these markets (Berger, 1995). In many of these studies, profitability is regressed against
concentration and/or market share. Some argue that the finding of a positive, dominating coefficient
estimate for market share and an insignificant coefficient for concentration explains the market power (MP)
hypothesis, which relates market share to market power (Shepherd, 1982; Kurtz and Rhoades, 1991).
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concentration or market share. They find that retail deposit rates are set less favorably for
consumers in more concentrated markets or with larger market shares. Sapienza (2002)
examines the effects of banking mergers on individual business borrowers. He finds that
if the merger is between banks previously operating in the same geographical area (inmarket mergers) and such mergers involve the acquisition of banks with small market
shares, interest rates charged by the consolidated banks decrease substantially, which are
beneficial to borrowers. This result is consistent with the view that horizontal mergers
generate efficiency gains. However, as the local market share of the target bank increases,
the efficiency effect is offset by market power. He also provides evidence that if the
merger is between banks previously operating in different geographical areas (out-ofmarket mergers), then the decrease in interest rates is not as significant. His findings
support the view that in-market mergers achieve higher efficiency gains than do out-ofmarket mergers.
The efficiency-structure hypothesis argues that more efficient firms charge lower
prices than competitors, gaining large market shares that may result in high levels of
concentration since these firms with superior management or production technologies
have lower costs (Demsetz, 1973, 1974; Peltzman, 1977). The efficient-structure (ES)
hypothesis posits that cost efficiency and scale efficiency are driving forces for price and
profit after controlling for the impact of other variables (Berger, 1995; Goldberg and Rai,
1996).
Tests that exclude efficiency and market power variables in observing the
determinants of insurance price differences across lines of business may be problematic if
insurance price, efficiency and market power variables are jointly determined; and
omitted variables significantly affect the differences in insurance prices across lines. Thus,
we hypothesize that insurance price differences by line of business may reflect the joint
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effects of marginal capital allocation, efficiency, and market power. We attempt to
identify a number of possible determinants of insurance price changes across different
lines by incorporating efficiency, and market power variables into the existing empirical
literature on insurance price. In this dissertation, we focus on testing three specific
hypotheses (capital allocation, efficient-structure, and market power hypothesis) to
indicate whether these hypotheses are valid in determining insurance price differences
across lines of business. Specifically, we hypothesize that variations in prices by lines of
business are directly related to corresponding variations of marginal capital allocation if
capital allocation theory holds. This hypothesis is related to the proposition of Myers and
Read (2001) and Zanjani (2002) that differences in marginal capital allocation by lines of
business generate price differences across lines of insurance. In addition, we test whether
both efficiency structure and market power hypothesis is valid. If the efficiency structure
hypothesis holds, we expect negative relationship between insurance price and cost
efficiency, while positive relationship between price of insurance and market share is
predicted under the market power hypothesis.

4.2 THE EFFECT OF M & A ON EFFICIENCY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Since the early 1990s, the U.S. property-liability insurance industry has
experienced significant changes of market structure. In response to rapid changes in new
computer and communications technologies and regulatory framework, insurance firms
have attempted to improve their efficiency and attract new customers by increasing their
geographical access and the range of products they offer through M & A activity.
Furthermore, the intensification of competition brought on by technological change and
increased exposure to catastrophic risk have constricted profit margins and have put
pressure on insurers to seek ways to reduce costs and improve efficiency.
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It is documented that M & As are value-increasing events (e.g., Shepherd, 1982;
Myers and Majluf, 1984; Hubbard and Pahlia, 1999; Berger, DeYoung, and Udell, 2001).
Value increasing may arise from economies of scope or scale, increases in managerial
efficiency, creation of market power, improvements in production techniques, lower
income volatitlity, or financial synergies. Economies of scope provide an important
production rationale for M & As. Scope economies can be present for costs and revenues.
Joint production of outputs can lead to lower costs and higher revenues than production
by separate firms. Cost scope economies can arise from the shared use of resources such
as information technology, customer database, managerial expertise, marketing and
distribution systems, and brand names across several businesses within the firm (Teece,
1980). Revenue economies of scope may arise from the opportunities of “one-stop
shopping” that can reduce consumer search costs and improve service quality (Berger, et
al. 2000).
Firms operating at a below-optimal scale can achieve scale gains through M & A.
Insurers that expand their size by merging with others to obtain optimal operating scale
are able to allocate fixed costs such as the cost of information and technology systems
and advertising expenses over a larger volume of output, thus reducing average costs and
improving profitability. Large scale not only provides insurers with more resources and
flexibility to adjust to changing market conditions, but also makes it easier to change
product focus and exit or sell unprofitable lines of business. Studies for US insurance
industry have found some evidence in favor of exploiting scale economies. Cummins and
Weiss (1993) and Hanweck and Hogan (1996) provide evidence of scale economies for
small and intermediate-size firms in the property-liability insurance industry, suggesting
that consolidation reduces average costs. Scale economies are also found in the life
insurance industry (e.g., Grace and Timme, 1992; Cummins and Zi, 1998). Cummins and
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Santomero (1999) also find that economies of scale exist in the life insurance industry.
They find that the majority of small insurers operate at a level where increasing returns to
scale apply.
The source of scale efficiency may be particularly applicable to insurers, because
the essence of insurance is risk diversification through pooling. By increasing the
magnitude of the insurance pool through geographical or product diversification,
expected losses become more predictable and earnings volatility can be reduced. There is
no question that, as long as the prospective earnings of the combining insurers are not
perfectly correlated, the newly formed insurer will yield an income stream for its owners
having a lesser degree of dispersion than was attainable only from one of its predecessors
(Lewellen, 1971). The less volatile earnings that reduce the expected costs of financial
distress or bankruptcy may permit insurers to hold less equity capital for risks
underwritten, providing a potentially significant source of cost reduction (Cummins,
Tennyson and Weiss, 1999).
On the other hand, the argument for economies of scale and scope as a major
driver of insurance M & As may be criticized if frictional costs arising from post-merger
integration problems outweigh any potential scale efficiency gains due to the
organizational diseconomies of operating larger institutions. Larger organizations may be
more complex to manage and may not be able to react quickly to a changing market
conditions, creating the possibility of inefficiency. Studies of US banks find that mergers
produce no improvement in cost efficiency, especially for the transactions that involve
very large banks (e.g., Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Berger, 2000).
M & A activity can also lead to increase in costs due to the aggravated agency
problems and inefficiencies of internal capital market. As firms become larger and more
complex, managerial monitoring becomes more difficult and thus the costs of governance
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will increase. In addition, managers are more likely to engage in activities that maximize
their private benefits and to subsidize poor business segments since larger internal capital
market enables managers to avoid the market discipline that comes with external
financing (Easterbrook, 1984; Berger and Ofek, 1995).
The agency theory states that M & A activity is driven by the manager’s incentive
to grow firm beyond its optimal size and the motive of M & As may not be stockholder
wealth maximization, but managerial self-interests that may increase manager’s
perquisite consumption (Jensen, 1986). The managerial hubris hypothesis suggests that M
& As may not create value or even destroy value because they may be the result of poor
decisions by overconfident managers (Roll, 1986). Bidding firm managers motivated by
managerial hubris are likely to overestimate their own ability to manage an acquisition
and overvalue the target, leading to overbidding. As a result, the hubris hypothesis
predicts a negative gain for bidders.
The recent study by Cummins and Xie (2005b) investigate scale economies in the
US property-liability insurance industry. They provide evidence that the majority of small
to medium-size firms operate with increasing returns to scale and most large insurers
show scale diseconomies, implying that large insurers with decreasing returns to scale are
already too large to be scale efficient. Cummins and Xie (2005a) provide evidence that
larger insurers are more likely to be acquirers. They also argue that scale economies were
not a predominant motive for M & A since non-decreasing returns to scale is unrelated to
being an acquirer. This provides a rationale for the hypothesis that the efficiency of
acquiring insurers is likely to decrease following M & A perhaps due to scale
diseconomies and increased frictional costs associated with post-merger managerial
integration and agency problems.

56

Other things being equal, the level of a firm’s earnings depends on the efficiency
and skill of its management. Thus, we hypothesize that the performance of acquiring
insurers (measured by ROA or ROE) is also likely to decrease following an M & A if the
agency theory and the managerial hubris hypothesis are predominant motives for M & As.
On the other hand, the performance of acquiring insurers is likely to improve following
an M & A if M & A activity is driven by value maximizing motivations such as
economies of scale and scope, financial efficiency and earnings diversification.
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CHAPTER 5
CAPITAL ALLOCATION RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY
We discuss the rationale of capital allocation and Myers-Read capital allocation
methodology in this chapter.
5.1 THE RATIONALE OF CAPITAL ALLOCATION
Because most policyholders purchase insurance policies to protect against adverse
financial contingencies and they are strongly risk-averse with respect to insurer default on
contractually-promised payoffs, insurers need to hold capital in order to secure
policyholders’ unexpected claims (Merton and Perold, 1993). The principal role of
holding capital in the insurance company is to keep the probability of bankruptcy low by
increasing ability to pay insurance claims even under adverse circumstances. However,
holding capital is costly because of frictional costs that include double taxation,
regulatory and agency costs. 20 More precisely, when shareholders provide capital to
insurance companies, the investment return is first taxed at the corporate level as
insurer’s taxable income and then again as part of shareholder’s taxable income when
distributed as dividends.21 Regulatory costs occur due to regulatory restrictions that may
require insurers to hold minimum levels of capital or in the form of conservative
reserving standards. Shareholders may demand an additional return on their investment
due to these frictional costs and thus in order to be profitable, insurers need to issue
insurance policies with more than their production costs including frictional capital costs
(Hancock, et al., 2001; Myers and Read; 2001).
Given that holding capital is costly and insurers should keep a specified level of
capital to meet regulation requirements, managing the cost of capital is of particular
importance in providing insurance policies, especially catastrophe insurance that needs
20

Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and others illustrate that the costly external finance and frictional
costs of holding capital are the driving force behind the firm’s motivation to manage risk.
21
Smith and Stulz (1985) note how nonlinear (or convex) tax schedules give rise to a rationale for hedging.
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large amounts of supporting capital. As the amount of capital held increases, the
frictional costs of holding capital may consist of large portions of the insurance premium
(Zanjani, 2002). Thus, insurers that properly manage frictional costs will have a
competitive advantage in pricing.
Insurers have an incentive to manage capital costs through risk management.
Effective risk management not only promotes stability, but also provides a protection
against unexpected losses. This protection is obtained primarily through the maintenance
of an appropriate level of economic capital by financial institution. The risk management
process involves estimating how much risk each business segment contributes to the total
risk of the firm and thus to overall capital requirements. Capital held by the firm is then
allocated across lines of business reflecting the varying risk level of individual lines of
business. All else equal, more (less) risky lines may require more (less) capital and thus
demand higher (lower) prices. Because policyholders are concerned about counterparty
default risk on contractual promised payments, they prefer insurer’s strong financial
strength that guarantees to pay unexpected losses and thus, are willing to pay more for
that.
Myers and Read (2001) argue that the essential rationale of the capital allocation
is to allocate the frictional costs of holding capital to the individual lines of business
depending on the marginal contribution of individual lines of business to firm’s overall
default value. Specifically, if a new line of business through M & A activity is added to
the existing portfolio, additional capital that is needed to obtain an insurer’s desired
default value will be determined. Once this additional capital amount is known, the cost
of surplus due to adding a new line of business can be calculated.22 The additional capital
summed up over insurer’s all lines of business yields the total amount of equity capital of
22

Cummins and Phillips (2005) develop the estimation model of cost of capital by lines of business in the
property-liability insurance industry using full information industry beta approach.
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the insurer. Thus, capital allocation can be considered a way to represent the allocation of
the costs of holding capital.
5.2 METHODS OF CAPITAL ALLOCATION
It is well documented in the financial pricing of insurance literatures that option
pricing model is utilized in analyzing firm default risk and surplus requirements (e.g.,
Doherty and Garven, 1986; Cummins, 1988, and Phillips et al,1998). The option pricing
model is also adopted to calculate marginal capital allocation (Merton and Perold, 1993;
Myers and Read, 2001). Both Merton-Perold and Myers-Read provide a capital allocation
rule based on a default insurance concept.
Merton-Perold capital allocation is conducted using incremental method. For
example, assume there are firms with three lines of business; the first step is to calculate
the risk capital required by firms that combine two of business lines.23 The second step is
to calculate the risk capital required for the full portfolio of businesses of the firms, i.e.,
adding the excluded business to the two-business firms. Marginal capital allocation by
line of business is then the difference between the risk capital of two-business firms
obtained from the first step and the required risk capital for all three businesses. Merton
and Perold show that the risk capital of a multi-line business firm is less than the
aggregate risk capital of the business on a stand-alone basis when the businesses are not
perfectly correlated with one another. Merton-Perold method is appropriate when
considering entering new businesses or getting out of existing businesses since their
methodology allows for discrete changes in the portfolio of businesses of the insurer.
However, the key deficiency of their model is that 100 percent allocation is not feasible
across the lines of business.

23

Merton-Perold(1993) define risk capital as the smallest amount that can be invested to insure the value of
the firm’s net assets against a loss in value relative to the risk-free investment of those net assets.
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Unlike Merton-Perold method, Myers-Read method (2001) uniquely allocates 100
percent of total capital of the firm. Relying on the assumption that insurer’s future losses
and asset values are lognormally or normally distributed,

24

Myers and Read use the

Black-Scholes option pricing model to estimate insurer’s insolvency put value. Assuming
an entity with limited liability, an insurance company does not pay losses if loss liabilities
exceed insurer’s assets. The insurer defaults and the payoff to the policyholder is loss
minus max (L-V, 0) where L represents losses and V is assets. Insolvency put value is
measured as max (L-V, 0). It can be said that the insurer holds an option to put the default
costs to the policyholders. As the insurer has the option to default on their liabilities in
the event of insolvency, this insolvency put option can be an asset to the insurer, but
lowers the present value of insurance policy and the premium a policyholder is willing to
pay for it. As mentioned earlier, maintaining solvency ability to a specified level causes
frictional costs for an insurer.
Myers-Read (2001) argue that marginal contribution of individual lines of
business to firm’s overall default value does vary and surplus (equity capital) should be
allocated by lines of business based on these marginal contributions such that the
marginal contribution to firm’s overall default value is equal across all lines of insurance.
They find a unique capital allocation method that leads to the “adding up” property; the
equity capital allocated to the individual lines of business “add up” to the overall equity
capital of the insurer. In their model, although the total capital requirement of the insurer
is not explicitly specified, it could be taken to be the amount of capital to keep up the
desired safety level of the insurer.
Zanjani (2002) develops multi-line insurance pricing and capital allocation model.
He demonstrates that capital costs have a significant impact on the prices of
24

Myers and Read emphasize that their result is independent of the distribution assumptions for the
insurer’s entire losses and assets portfolio(2001, p.573)
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intermediated risks, based on three key assumptions that (1) insurers are exposed to
default risk due to uncertain loss events, (2) it is costly for insurers to hold capital, (3)
consumers care about the insolvency risk of insurers. Capital market frictions provide an
economic rational for risk management and capital allocation by lines of business
depends on the contribution of an individual line of business to the overall firm
insolvency risk. Consumer demand for product quality may lead firms to charge high
prices for high-risk segments, which is driven by high marginal capital requirements
(Merton and Perold; 1993; Myers-Read, 2001). Zanjani proposes that “price differentials
across market are explained by differences in marginal capital requirements. Segments
with risk that threatens company solvency will have higher marginal capital requirements
and higher prices due to implicit capital costs, even if that risk is unrelated to the broader
securities markets.” which is consistent with the results of Froot-Stein (1998), and MyersRead (2001).
We employ Myers-Read methodology to calculate marginal capital allocation by
line of business in the present paper. We first describe the estimation of volatility and
correlation matrix between asset and liability portfolio that are needed to implement
capital allocation. We then discuss Myers-Read’s formula to estimate insolvency put
value and marginal capital allocation.
5.2.1. THE ESTIMATION OF VOLATILITY AND CORRELATION MATRIX
BETWEEN ASSET AND LIABILITY PORTFOLIO
The critical parameters that need to be estimated to implement Myers-Read
capital allocation are the volatility and the correlation matrix for both asset portfolio
returns and liability portfolio returns. Other things equal, insurer’s insolvency risk is
related to the amount of capital that insurer holds. Given the certain amount of capital,
the insolvency put value of the insurer depends on the respective volatility of asset return
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and loss return series, the correlation between loss return series across lines of business,
the correlation between asset portfolios return series, and correlation between asset
portfolio return and liability portfolio return series (Myers and Read, 2001).
The respective volatility for asset portfolio returns ( σ V ) and liability portfolio
returns ( σ L ) and covariance of the log losses returns and log asset returns ( σ VL ) are
estimated by the following expressions: 25
N

N

σ V2 = ∑∑ yi y j ρViV j σ Vi σ V j

(10)
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σ L2 = ∑∑ xi x j ρ Li L j σ Li σ L j

(11)

i =1 j =1
N

M

σ LV = ∑∑ yi x j ρVi L j σ Vi σ L j

(12)

i =1 j =1

Where xi = Li / L is the proportion of losses from line i , yi = Vi / V is the proportion of
assets from asset type i , ρViV j is the correlation between log asset type i and log asset
type j , ρ Li L j is the correlation between log line i losses and log line j losses, ρVi L j is the
correlation between log asset type i and log line j losses, σVi is the volatility of asset type
i , and σ L j is the volatility of log line j losses

We aggregate each insurer’s lines of business into four categories such as
personal property, personal liability, commercial property and commercial liability line.
We use NAIC quarterly time series data available from 1991-2004 to calculate
underwriting return series. The quarterly underwriting return series are adjusted for
seasonality using the U.S. Census Bureau’s X11 procedure. The underwriting return
series defined as the natural logarithm of the present value of incurred losses and loss
25

As in Myers and Read (2001), we assume that the distribution of loss return series and asset return series
is joint lognormal.
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adjustment expenses divided by the earned premium for each quarter. We estimate the
volatility and correlation matrix at the individual line of business with industry-wide
underwriting return series. Similar to Cummins, Lin, and Phillips (2006), individual
insurer’s liability portfolio volatility and correlation matrix were then calculated as
weighted averages of the elements of the overall by-line volatility and correlation matrix.
The sum of present value of expected loss payments and the unearned premium reserve
are employed as weights.
The asset portfolio is classified into seven categories: stocks, government bonds,
corporate bonds, real estate, mortgages, cash and other invested assets, and non-invested
assets. The quarterly estimates of the asset returns on the first six categories are obtained
from the standard rate of return series. The return series for the other assets are calculated
by the natural logarithm of the gross quarterly percentage change in the total market
value of asset of the insurance industry net of the market value of the first six asset
categories.
Finally, we can calculate the respective volatility and the respective correlation
matrix for both asset portfolio returns and liability portfolio returns and between asset
portfolio and liability portfolio returns using industry-wide quarterly data.
5.2.2. THE ESTIMATION OF MYERS-READ INSOLVENCY PUT VALUE
AND MARGINAL CAPPITAL ALLOCATION
Myers and Read propose a capital allocation model based on an options pricing
framework. A key element of their model is the value of the default put option. The
underlying variables for the default option are the market value of assets ( V ) and the
present value of loss liabilities ( L ). The amount of capital ( S ) can be expressed as V L . Assuming with the limited liability, shareholders hold an option to put the default

costs to the policyholders if the assets are insufficient to cover the loss liabilities. The
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insurer can declare bankruptcy if L > V at the end of period. The default amount is L - V .
Let D represent the market value of default amount, D = PV [( Max ( L − V , 0)] . The
default value, D is also called the insolvency put value.
The value of default option is a function of the market value of assets, the present
value of loss liabilities and the volatility of the asset-to-liability ratio: D = f (V , L, σ ) .
Myers and Read are modeling a multiple-line insurance company. If an insurer writes M
M

lines of business, the insurer’s total losses are the sum of loss of each line ( L = ∑ Li ,
i =1

where Li =present value of loss liabilities for line i and M represents the number of lines
N

of business). In this paper, assets are also classified into N categories, V = ∑ Vi , where
i =1

Vi =the amount of asset of type i and N represents the number of asset categories.
As Myers and Read point out, if the aggregate losses and asset values are jointly
lognormal distributed, the relevant measure of firm portfolio risk is the volatility of the
asset to liability ratio ( σ ): σ = σ V2 + σ L2 − 2σ LV , where σ V =the volatility of insurer’s
assets, σ L =the volatility of insurer’s loss liabilities, and σ VL =the covariance of the
natural

logarithms

of

assets

and

losses

values.

To calculate the default-value-to liability ratio, Myers and Read applied the
following formula:
d = N {z} − (1 + s ) N {z − σ }

where z =

(13)

− log(1 + s ) + σ 2 / 2

σ

Myers-Read shows that marginal default values can be a marginal capital allocation base.
Their marginal default values by line of business( di ) is obtained by taking partial
derivatives of insolvency put value, D with respect to loss liabilities for line i , Li :
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⎛ ∂d ⎞
⎛ ∂d ⎞ ⎛ 1 ⎡
⎞
( si − s ) + ⎜
(σ Li L − σ L2 ) − (σ Li V − σ LV ) ⎤⎦ ⎟
⎟
⎟
⎜
⎣
⎝ ∂s ⎠
⎝ ∂σ ⎠ ⎝ σ
⎠

di = d + ⎜

(14)

According to their unique “add up” property, the insolvency put value for the company
( D ) can be obtained by the sum of products of line-by-line liabilities and marginal
default values.
M

D = ∑ Li d i

(15)

i =1

Myers and Read (2001) propose to allocate insurer’s surplus to each lines of
insurance business to equalize marginal default values since insurer’s entire surplus is
available to pay the claims from any specific policy or line of business where it is needed
and policyholders have a preference for protection against default on their claims based
on the insurer’s total amount of surplus. Assuming the same default value to liability ratio
across all lines of insurance ( di = ∂D / ∂Li = d ), Myers and Read marginal capital
allocation by line of business ( si ) is derived by:
−1

⎛ ∂d ⎞ ⎛ ∂d ⎞⎛ 1 ⎡
⎞
si = s − ⎜ ⎟ ⎜
(σ Li L − σ L2 ) − (σ Li V − σ LV ) ⎤⎦ ⎟
⎟⎜
⎣
⎝ ∂s ⎠ ⎝ ∂σ ⎠⎝ σ
⎠

(16)

Where si (= ∂S / ∂Li ) is the surplus allocated per dollar of loss liability in line i ,
s ( = S / L) is the insurer’s aggregate surplus-to-liability ratio, d ( = D / L ) is the insurer’

insolvency put per dollar of total liabilities, σ is the volatility of the asset to liability
ratio, ∂d / ∂s is the partial derivative of d with respect to s (the option delta), ∂d / ∂σ is
the partial derivative of d with respect to volatility of the asset to liability ratio (the
option vega), σ Li L is the covariance of log losses in line i with log losses of liability
portfolio values, σ Li V is the covariance of log losses in line i with log assets portfolio
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values, σ LV is the covariance of log losses of liability portfolio values with log assets
portfolio values.
The important implication of Myers-Read’s marginal capital allocation formula is
that geographic diversification or diversification by adding more lines of business that
have low correlation with losses of other lines of business (or that have high correlation
with asset portfolio returns) may reduce insurer’s overall capital requirement.
Diversification reduces required capital because it can offset risks if both newly added
and existing lines are not perfectly correlated with one another. However, administrative,
operating, and agency costs also increase due to diversification such as M & A activity.
Myers and Read (2001) argue that the net financial gains from such diversification are
high in the beginning for an insurer starting one or a few highly correlated lines of
business. As more new lines and geographical areas are added, these net gains decrease
when administrative, operating, and agency costs outweigh the costs of reduced capital
requirement. Thus, efficient composition of business proceeds until the marginal benefit
from reducing required surplus is equivalent to the marginal cost (Myers and Read, 2001).
26

Using estimated volatility and correlation matrix for both asset portfolio returns
and liability portfolio returns, we estimate both the ratio of marginal capital allocation-toliability ( MCAi , g ,t ) and the ratio of insolvency put value-to-liability ( IPVg ,t ) that are
used to test our hypothesis.

26

Myers and Read (2001) also state that “Efficient diversification does not minimize required surplus. It
minimizes the total cost of issuing, administering, and collateralizing policies. This establishes the efficient
composition of business.”
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CAHPTER 6
EFFICIENCY METHODOLOGY
This chapter begins by discussing the concepts of frontier efficiency. We then
present DEA estimation methodology used to create efficiency scores. We also describe
the measurement of outputs, output prices, inputs and inputs prices utilized in our
analysis.
6.1 FRONTIER EFFICIENCY CONCEPTS
Efficiency is often used as one of tools that measure firm performance. The basic
idea of efficiency analysis is to split firms that perform well from those that perform
unsuccessfully. This is related to a benchmarking method called frontier efficiency
methodology (Lovell, 1993 and Grosskopf, 1993). The frontier methodology measure the
performance of each firm relative to “best practice” frontiers derived from firms in the
industry. The frontier efficiency method summarizes the overall performance of a firm
into a single statistic that takes account of different multi-dimensional production process
among firms. A firm is considered fully efficient (with efficiency scores of 1.0) if it
operates on the frontiers, while any departure from the frontiers is measured as
inefficiency (with efficiency scores between 0 and 1.0).
There are several types of efficiency measurement that convey different
information about firm performance. Efficient production, and cost frontiers are
estimated providing measures of cost, technical, and allocative efficiency for each firm.
Cost efficiency for a given firm is defined as the ratio of the costs of a fully efficient firm
(i.e., a firm operating on the efficient cost frontier) to the given firm’s actual costs
employed to produce the same output quantities. Given output quantities and input prices,
a firm is considered fully efficient if its actual input usage equals optimal input usage
while a firm is measured as inefficient if actual input usage exceeds optimal input usage.
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Cost efficiency includes both technical efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm to
reduce its input usage to produce a given set of outputs by adopting the best practice
technology, and allocative efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm to use the cost
minimizing combination of inputs to produce a given amount of output.
Technical efficiency can be decomposed into two components, one due to pure
technical efficiency and one due to scale efficiency. The fact that it is socially and
economically optimal for firms to operate at constant returns to scale provides the
rationale for separating pure technical and scale efficiency (Cummins and Weiss, 2001).
Pure technical efficiency is measured relative to a variable returns to scale (VRS)
production frontier. This is the proportion by which the firm could reduce its input usage
by implementing the state of the art technology characterized by the VRS frontier.
However, a firm operating on the VRS frontier, i.e., a frontier represented by increasing,
and/or decreasing returns to scale is scale inefficient because it can improve its efficiency
by moving to a constant returns to scale (CRS) frontier. Scale efficiency can be
calculated by the ratio from the CRS to the VRS production frontier.
6.2 DEA ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
We estimate efficiency of firms using data envelopment analysis (DEA). DEA is
a mathematical programming (non-parametric) approach that compares each firm to a
“best-practice” cost and production frontiers formed by convex combination of the most
efficient firms in the sample (Cooper, Seiford, and Tone, 2006).27 The frontier efficiency
method summarizes the overall performance of a firm into one score by taking account of
the multi-dimensional production process of the firm. A firm is considered fully efficient

27

While the econometric frontier efficiency methodology requires the specification of functional form such
as the translog to estimate the frontier and requires the distributional assumptions about error term, DEA
method avoids this type of the specification error since it is not necessary to specify a functional form or
distributional assumptions. Accordingly, the econometric approach may potentially confounds the
efficiency estimates with specification error if it uses the wrong functional form or distributional
assumptions for the error terms. (Cummins and Weiss, 2001)
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(with efficiency scores equal to 1) if it operates on the frontiers, while any departure from
the frontiers is measured as inefficiency (with efficiency scores between zero and 1).
DEA provides a convenient way for decomposing efficiency into its
components.28 For example, cost efficiency can be easily decomposed into pure technical,
scale, and allocative efficiency. DEA is expected to yield more accurate results if the
objective is to study the performance of specific units of observation, because the
optimization is conducted separately for each decision making unit (DMU). Cummins
and Zi (1998) find that DEA estimates of efficiency are more highly correlated with
conventional performance measures such as return on assets than are the estimates of
econometric approach in the U.S. life insurance industry.
Detailed descriptions of the DEA methodology are provided in Ali and Seiford (1993),
Charnes, et al. (1994), Seiford (1996), Zhu (2003) and Cooper, Seiford, and Tone (2006).
DEA technical efficiency is measured by estimating “best practice” production frontiers,
employing the input-oriented distance function (Shephard, 1970). The purpose of DEA is
to construct a non-parametric envelopment frontier over the data points such that all
observed points lie on or below the production frontier. Suppose producers use input
vector x = ( x1 , x2 ,..., xk )T ∈ ℜ k+ to produce output vector y = ( y1 , y2 ,..., ym )T ∈ ℜ m+ , where

k is the number of inputs, m is the number of outputs, and T denotes the vector transpose
operator. A production technology that converts inputs into outputs can be modeled by an
input correspondence y → V ( y ) ⊆ ℜ k+ . For any y ∈ ℜ m+ , V ( y ) denotes the subset of all
input vectors x ∈ ℜ k+ , which yield at least y . The input-oriented distance function for a
specific decision making unit (DMU) is defined by

28

An econometric model is more difficult to decompose efficiency into its components (see the Cummins
and Weiss (2001) for more detailed discussion about advantages and disadvantages of the econometric and
the mathematical programming approaches).
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⎧ ⎛ x⎞
⎫
D( x, y ) = sup ⎨θ : ⎜ y, ⎟ ∈ V ( y ) ⎬ = inf {θ : ( y, θ x ) ∈ V ( y )}
⎩ ⎝ θ⎠
⎭

(

)

−1

(17)

The input-oriented distance function is the reciprocal of the minimum equi-proportional
contraction of the input vector x , given outputs y , i.e., Farrell’s (1957) measure of input
technical efficiency. Input technical efficiency TE ( x, y ) is therefore defined as
TE ( x, y ) = 1/ D ( x, y ) .

Technical efficiency for each year is estimated independently for each firm in the
sample by solving linear programming problems. The following formulation is one of the
standard forms for DEA linear programming of i-th DMU:29

( D ( x , y ))
i

i

−1

= TE ( xi , yi ) = min θ i

subject to Y λi ≥ yi , X λi ≤ θi xi , λi ≥ 0

(18)

where X is a K × I input matrix and Y an M × I output matrix for all DMUs in the sample,
xi is a K × 1 input vector and yi an M × 1 output vector of firm i , and λi is an
I × 1 intensity vector for firm i , and I =the number of firms in the sample ( i = 1, 2,..., I ).

The first constraint forces the i-th DMU to produce at least many outputs as the peers of
i-th DMU. The second constraint finds out how much less input the i-th DMU would
need. Hence, it is called input-oriented. The factor used to scale back the inputs is θ and
the value of θ i is the efficiency score for the i-th DMU. It will satisfy θ ≤ 1 , with a value
of 1 indicating a point on the frontier and hence a technically efficient DMU. A DMU
with θ less than one is not operating on the “best practice” frontier and should be able to
reduce the consumption of all inputs by 1- θ without reducing output. The linear
programming problem of this form must be solved I times, once for each DMU in the
sample. A value of θ is then obtained for each DMU.
29

There are other ways to formulate DEA technical efficiency problem such as the ratio approach or the
dual form (e.g., Coelli, 1998).
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The constraint λi ≥ 0 imposed on the equation (18) produces a constant returns to
scale (CRS) production frontier. The CRS assumption is only appropriate when all
DMU’s are operating at an optimal scale (i.e., equivalent to the flat part of the LRAC
curve). However, firms may not be operating at optimal scale due to imperfect
competition or capital market imperfection with frictions. Banker, Charnes and Cooper
(1984) extended CRS DEA model to account for variable returns to scale (VRS) that
firms operate with increasing returns to scale (IRS), constant returns to scale (CRS) or
decreasing returns to scale (DRS). We estimate VRS production frontier by adding the
convexity constraint N1′λ = 1 to the equation (18), where N1 is an N ×1 vector of ones. A
non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) production frontier that firms operate either with
CRS or DRS can be estimated by substituting the N1′λ = 1 restriction with N1′λ ≤ 1 .
Technical efficiency (TE) can be decomposed into pure technical efficiency (PTE) and
scale efficiency (SE), where TE=PTE*SE. PTE is measured relative to the VRS
production frontier. If there is a difference in the two TE scores by conducting both a
CRS and a VRS DEA for a particular DMU, then this indicates that the DMU has scale
inefficiency, and that scale efficiency can be obtained from the ratio of the CRS TE score
to the VRS TE score. If TE equals PTE, the DMU operates with CRS. If TE does not
equal PTE and the NIRS score is equal to the VRS TE score, the DMU is operating with
DRS. However, if TE does not equal PTE and the NIRS score is unequal to the VRS TE
score, then IRS exist for that DMU (Aly, et al., 1990).
The DEA cost efficiency is estimated by using input-oriented linear programming models.
A firm’s objective is assumed to be the minimization of cost by choosing input quantities
while holding constant the input prices w and output quantities y . The cost efficiency
(CE) is calculated by first solving the linear programming problem for each firm
i ( i = 1, 2,..., I ):
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Min wiT xi∗
x ,λ
i i

subject to Y λi ≥ yij , j = 1, 2,..., M

(19)

X λi ≤ xir , r = 1, 2,..., K
and λi ≥ 0
The solution vector xi∗ is the cost minimizing input vector for the input price vector
wi and the output vector yij . The cost efficiency of the firm i is then the ratio of frontier
costs (minimum costs) to actual costs, CE =

wiT xi∗
, where 0 ≤ CE ≤ 1and if CE score is
wiT xi

equal to 1, the firm is considered fully efficient. Cost efficiency of a firm consists of both
technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE), where allocative efficiency
reflects the ability of a firm to use the inputs in optimal proportions given their respective
prices and can be calculated as

CE
. A firm might not be cost efficient if it is not
TE

allocatively efficient and/or if it is technically inefficient.
Another important objective of firms is to maximize revenue efficiency by choosing
optimal output quantities, taking as given input quantities and output prices. Revenue
efficiency is estimated based on an output-oriented approach. The linear programming
problem for each firm in each year of the sample period is estimated as follows:
M

Max ∑ pij yij∗
yi , λi

j =1

subject to Y λi ≥ yij , j = 1, 2,..., M

(20)

X λi ≤ xir , r = 1, 2,..., K
and λi ≥ 0
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The optimal solution for firm i is the revenue maximizing output vector yi∗ . Then the
revenue efficiency is defined in ratio form, RE=

piT yi
where piT is the transpose of the
piT yi∗

output price vector for firm i and yi is the vector of actual output quantities for firm i .
The revenue efficiency score can be interpreted as the ratio of actual revenue to
maximum possible revenue given output prices and input levels. A score of one indicates
that the firm is fully revenue efficient, while inefficient firms have RE between 0 and 1.
6.3 MEASUREMENT OF OUTPUTS AND INPUTS
In this section, we discuss the measurement of the outputs, inputs and their prices
used in estimating efficiency.
Outputs and Output Prices
The definition or identification of the outputs produced by the financial institution
is critical to the measurement of its performance. Three alternative approaches have been
used to define and measure outputs in financial firms: the asset approach, the user cost
approach, and the value-added approach. The asset approach considers property-liability
insurers as pure financial intermediaries that collect funds from policyholders and
intermediate these funds into loans and other assets. However, the asset approach is not
optimal to identify the output because property-liability insurers provide many other
services in addition to financial intermediation (Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Cummins
and Weiss, 2000). The user cost approach involves classifying financial products into
output and input categories based on their user costs or signs of their derivatives in a
profit function (Hancock, 1985). The user cost approach is not appropriate for the
insurance industry because specific data required on product revenues and opportunity
costs are not available due to the fact that insurance policies bundle together many
services which are implicitly priced. The value-added approach considers all liability and
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asset categories to have some output characteristics rather than separating inputs from
outputs in a mutually exclusive way. The value-added approach is regarded most suitable
method to measure insurance outputs among the alternative methods.
We employ a modified version of the value-added approach to define insurance
outputs, consistent with most of recent financial institutions efficiency literature (e.g.,
Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Cummins and Weiss, 2000). Three main services provided
by property-liability insurers are specified as a basis of defining outputs.
• Risk-pooling and risk-bearing: Insurance provides a mechanism through which
individuals and businesses exposed to losses can engage in risk reduction through pooling.
The actuarial, underwriting, claim settlement and related expenses involved in risk
pooling and risk bearing constitute a main element of value added in the insurance
industry. While pooling reduces uncertainty, unexpected losses may still arise, potentially
jeopardizing the insurer’s ability to meet its obligations. Thus, insurers recognize the
need for holding equity capital that serves as a buffer against unexpected future losses on
their portfolios. Holding capital can add value by providing financial security against
unexpected underwriting and investment losses.
• Financial Intermediation: Insurance companies are generally viewed as liabilitydriven financial intermediaries. As corporations issue bonds to raise debt capital, insurers
issue debt (premiums) in the form of insurance policies and some of the premiums
received from policyholders are invested in financial markets to pay future claims if
uncertain event occurs. The net interest margin between the rate of return earned on
invested assets and the rate credited to policyholders represent the value added from the
intermediation function.
• Real financial services relating to insured losses: Property-liability insurers
provide a variety of real services for policyholders including risk surveys, coverage
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design, and loss prevention and loss reduction services in addition to fundamental
indemnification function. By contracting with insurers to provide these services,
policyholders can benefit from insurers’ expertise in reducing the costs of managing risk.
Because transactions flow data such as the number of policies issued and the number of
claims settled for each insurer and for each line of business are not publicly available, a
number of recent studies proposed the present value of real losses incurred as the most
common proxy for output quantity of risk pooling and real insurance services provided
by property liability insurers (Berger, Cummins and Weiss, 1997; Cummins, Weiss and
Zi, 1999, Cummins and Weiss, 2001, Cummins and Xie, 2005).30 Losses incurred are
defined as the losses that are expected to be paid as insurer obligations for policy claims
during a specific period of time. Losses incurred are composed of losses paid during the
year, plus loss reserves existing at the end of the year, minus loss reserves existing at the
beginning of the year. Insurance is created when individuals pool their resources to
protect themselves from the effects of a loss. Pooling is the spreading of losses incurred
by the few over the entire group, so the effects of the loss to any individual can be
minimized. Because the basic idea of risk pooling is that each policyholder in the group
shares a part of the risk by making a payment into a fund and receives compensation from
that fund when loss occurs, it is argued that losses incurred provide a good proxy for the
risk pooling. Losses are also an appropriate proxy for the quantity of real services
provided, since the amount of claims settlement and risk management services are highly
correlated with loss aggregates (Cummins and Nini, 2002).
Since lines of coverage provided by property liability insurers have different risks
and the payout patterns vary depending on the characteristics of lines of business and

30

Premiums were employed as the measure of output on the early insurance efficiency research. However,
premiums represent revenues (i.e., price times quantity) rather than quantity. Because price differences
across firms may result in distortions in performance measures, premiums are not a suitable proxy for
output (Yuengert, 1993).
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insurers’ claims handling procedures, lines of insurance with similar features are grouped
together. Four insurance outputs are calculated: present value of real losses incurred in
personal property (short-tail) lines, personal liability (long-tail) lines, commercial
property (short-tail) lines, and commercial liability (long-tail) lines. The payout tail
proportions for each line of business are estimated based on Schedule P of annual
statement data using Taylor separation method (Taylor, 2000). Using bootstrap method,
U.S. Treasury spot rate (zero rate) curve from the constant maturity treasury yields
obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis is estimated to calculate loss discounting factors.
Consistent with recent efficiency studies (Cummins and Nini, 2002; Cummins
and Xie, 2005), the price of insurance output is obtained based on following formula:
Pi =

PEi − PV ( Li )
, where Pi is the price of insurance output i , PEi is the premiums
PV ( Li )

earned for line i , and PV ( Li ) is the present value of losses and loss adjustment expenses
incurred of line i , i = 1,..., 4 for personal short-tail, personal long-tail, commercial shorttail, and commercial long-tail. The present value of losses and loss adjustment expenses
incurred is employed to calculate the price of insurance output because premiums reflect
implicit discounting to account for insurer’s investment of policyholder funds between
the premium payment and the loss payment dates. Thus, consistency is preserved by
taking into account the time value of money both in the premium and loss elements of the
price. A potential problem may exist in using the losses incurred as outputs because
losses are random and this random component may distort insurance output. Therefore it
is necessary to consider methods to manage the potential “errors in variables” problem.
The smoothing procedure is adopted for both incurred losses and output prices.
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The average of the beginning and end of year invested assets are used to measure
the quantity of the intermediation output. The values of losses incurred and invested
assets are deflated to real 2000 values based on the consumer price index (CPI). The price
of the intermediation output is obtained from the measure of the expected rate of return
on the insurer’s invested assets. Interest-bearing assets (mostly bonds and short-term debt
instruments) and equities are main components of invested assets for property-liability
insurers. Accordingly, the price of the intermediation is the weighted average of expected
investment returns, which are equal to the expected return on equities weighted by the
proportion of invested assets in equities, plus the expected return on interest-bearing
assets weighted by the proportion of the portfolio in this asset type. The expected return
on equities is obtained from the average 30-day Treasury bill rate in year t plus the longterm (1926 to the end of the preceding year) average market risk premium on large
company stocks from Ibbotson Associates. The method assumes that insurers have equity
portfolios with a market beta coefficient of 1.0. Because the expected return on interestbearing assets is generally close to the actual income return, we use their realized income
return to represent the expected rate of return on the debt component of the portfolio. The
realized return on interest-bearing assets equals the total net investment income of the
insurer, minus dividends on equities, divided by the average amount of interest-bearing
assets during the year. Therefore, the price of the intermediation output varies across
insurers.
Inputs and Input Prices
Insurance inputs will be represented by a combination of operating expenses and
available measures of capital. Insurance inputs are classified into four principal
categories: administrative labor (home office labor), agent labor, business services and
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materials (including physical capital), and financial equity capital.31 Administration labor
and agent labor are treated separately because the two types of labor have different prices
and each insurer use them in different proportions. Because insurers do not report
publicly detailed information for the quantities of labor (such as the number of employees
or hours worked) and materials used, they are imputed from the dollar value of related
expenses. The quantity of an input is defined as the current dollar expenditures associated
with the particular input divided by its current price.
Current dollar expenditures for administrative labor are obtained from insurers’
regulatory annual statements as the sum of salaries, payroll taxes, and employee relations
and welfare. The price of administrative labor is calculated from the U.S. Department of
Labor data on average weekly wage rates for property-liability insurer Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC 6331). The quantity of administrative labor is acquired from the total
expenditures divided by its price. Current dollar expenditures for agent labor are the sum
of net commissions, brokerage fees and allowances to agents. The price of agent labor
comes from the U.S. Labor Department’s weekly wage rate for insurance agent (SIC
6411). We use national average weekly wage rate for both administrative and agent labor
to reduce missing observations.
The quantity of business services and materials input is imputed from total
expenditures and prices. Current dollar expenditures for business services and materials
are calculated as the difference of the total expenses incurred from the regulatory annual
statement and the total labor expenses of the insurer. The price of business services and
materials input is used by a national average price index for business services from U.S.
Department of Labor.

31

Because physical capital such as buildings accounts for only a small fraction of total insurer expenses, we
do not define physical capital as a separate input.
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Financial equity capital is included as an important input, consistent with the
theory of firm and financial institutions efficiency studies (McAllister and McManus,
1993; Berger, Cummins and Weiss, 1997; Hughes and Mester, 1998; and Hughes, Mester
and Moon, 2001). Because policyholders are strongly risk-averse with respect to insurer
default risk, insurers need to hold equity capital in order to ensure payment against
unexpected losses. Financial equity in the insurance company plays a significant role in
keeping the probability of bankruptcy low. As insurance prices reflect capital costs,
capital levels ultimately affect the revenue and profit of an insurer.
Financial equity capital of a property-liability insurer is defined as the statutory
policyholders surplus deflated to real 2000 values by the CPI. The quantity of this input is
measured by the real value of the average of the beginning and end-of-year capital level.
Although the ideal price of financial equity capital is the market return of equity capital,
market equity returns are not observed for most firms in the sample because the majority
of insurers are not publicly traded. Following Cummins and Nini (2002), we adopt an
approach that assumes a constant cost of equity across all firms in the industry. The price
of financial equity capital in the year t is set equal to the average 90-day Treasury bill rate
in year t, plus the long-term (1926 to the end of year t-1) average market risk premium on
large company stocks from Ibbotson Associates.
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CAHPTER 7
DATASET AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
7.1 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION
The empirical analysis is conducted with pooled cross-sectional and time-series
data of U.S. property-liability insurers over the sample period 1989-2004. Annual
financial statement data are obtained from the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC). Our initial sample includes all firms in the NAIC database.
Insurance companies may structure as an unaffiliated single insurer or as an affiliate of a
large insurance group. Because corporate strategies such as M & A decisions and
investment strategies are likely performed at the group level (Berger et al. 2000),
affiliated insurance companies that belong to the same group are aggregated as one
observation unit in our sample. In the case where multiple insurers are grouped as one
unit, the values of indicator variable (i.e. organizational structure or distribution systems)
on the groups are chosen from the largest insurer in the group based on the size of assets.
This study focuses on mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. property-liability
insurance industry. The initial samples involved in M & As are identified through list of
Best’s Insurance Reports-Property/Casualty. We investigate each of these M &A related
insurers through NAIC demographic files to identify insurance company codes and then
cross-check the list of M &A related insurers from Best’s Insurance Reports against
NAIC demographic files. Those M &A related insurers which could not be verified in
NAIC demographic files are excluded from the sample. Thus, our final list of M &A
involved insurers should exist both in NAIC demographic files and in the Best’s
Insurance Reports.
Some sample selection criteria are imposed to ensure that insurance firms
analyzed are actively engaged in the writing insurance contracts as ongoing concerns, and
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thus, reported financial data are meaningful measures of insurer price and capital
structure. Accordingly, the insurers that report positive values for premiums written,
surplus and total admitted assets are included in our initial sample. Because we are
unable to estimate values for some key variables such as economic premium ratio for
those insurance companies that report non-positive values, they are excluded. Mergers
and acquisitions of shell, inactive, or run-off companies are excluded from the sample
since the focus of the study is on the viable operating entities. We also omit insurers that
were retired, or put into liquidation or receivership at merger and acquisition or within
two years thereafter.
We initially identified 538 firms that were involved in mergers and acquisitions
during the period, 1990-2003 through a search of Best’s Insurance Reports. We first
exclude any acquirer that merges with a shell company (44 firms) or with reinsurers (24
firms). Also excluded from the sample were insurers that merge into inactive firms, or put
into liquidation within one or two years after M & A (21 firms).32 Some insurers are
involved in multiple M & A transactions within the same year or within two years before
or after the transactions. We omit them (53 firms) to prevent double counting in the
sample. The 66 firms are eliminated because the company codes of those merging or
acquiring firms are not found in the NAIC demographic files. The 51 firms that exhibit
negative premiums, negative economic equity, or unusual financial ratios are also
excluded because we are unable to estimate the economic premium ratio and calculate
Myers-Read capital allocation. We also exclude 82 insurers that have negative outputs
and inputs and negative prices in calculating efficiency scores. A total of 190 firms are
eventually considered as insurers that pass our sample selection criteria.

32

For example, some insurers merge into inactive firms in other states even merged firms do not operate
with no assets or premiums because acquiring firms may want to move their headquarters to other states.
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To analyze insurance prices, we aggregate each insurer’s lines of business into
four categories: personal property lines of business, personal liability lines of business,
commercial property lines of business, and commercial liability lines of business.33
We also utilize the NAIC by-line quarterly data (1991-2004) to estimate
underwriting returns, which are used to obtain estimates of industry-wide volatilities, and
correlation matrix between the asset and liability portfolios. Data for the input prices used
to estimate efficiency are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The
quarterly time series of returns of asset classes are obtained from the standard rate of
return series: Stocks- the total return on the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index;
government bond-the Lehman Brothers intermediate term total return; corporate bondMoody’s corporate bond total return; real estate-the National Association of Real Estate
Investment Trusts (NAREIT) total return; mortgages-the Merrill Lynch mortgage backed
securities total return; and cash and other invested assets-30 day U.S. Treasury bill rate.
A.M. Best’s ratings and data on the variable measuring market distribution systems are
obtained from Best’s Key Rating Guide for each year of sample period.
7.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The number of insurers and the economic value of assets of the U.S. propertyliability insurance industry for the sample period 1989-2004 are presented in the table1.
The number of insurers has remained relatively unvarying even though the insurance
industry has experienced a significant wave of merger and acquisition activity. The
reason is due to the fact that the numbers of firms that withdraw from the market due to

33

Personal property lines of business include Homeowners, Farmowners, Earthquake, and Auto Physical
Damage. Personal liability line includes Private Passenger Auto Liability. Commercial property lines
include Fire, Allied Lines, Commercial Multiple Peril, Mortgage Guaranty, Inland Marine, Financial
Guaranty, Group Accident and Health, Credit and Other Accident and Health, Fidelity, Surety, Burglary
and Theft, Credit. Commercial liability lines include Medical Malpractice, Other Liability, Product
Liability, Workers’ Compensation, Ocean Marine, Commercial Auto Liability, Aircraft, Boiler and
Machinery, International, Reinsurance.
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merger have been partially offset by the formation of new insurers (Cummins, Tennyson,
and Weiss, 1999).
The economic value of assets is defined as the book value of total assets minus
the book value of stocks, government bonds, and corporate bonds plus the market value
of stocks, government bonds, and corporate bonds. Assets such as stocks, government
bonds, and corporate bonds are adjusted to market values based on NAIC statutory
accounting standards. However, other assets are reported at NAIC annual statement book
values. Table1 shows yearly and average values of several asset classes. Government
bonds in the industry averages 38.5 percent of total economic assets, whereas stocks and
corporate bonds account for 21.3 and 14.6 percent, respectively. Cash and short-term
investments tend to be around 7 percent. Other assets including reinsurance recoverable
on loss and loss adjustment expense payments, receivable from subsidiaries and affiliates,
and agent’s balances or uncollected premiums average around 17.2 percent.
Table2 shows the economic value of liabilities and equity for the U.S. propertyliability insurance industry. The reserves for each line of business are adjusted to the
present values by discounting the expected future loss cash flows with the estimated U.S.
Treasury spot-rate curve. The payout tail proportions for each line of business and for
each year of the sample period are estimated based on Schedule P of annual statement
data using Taylor separation method (Taylor, 2000). Other liabilities are defined as total
liabilities of the industry minus reserves for unpaid loss and loss adjustment expenses of
commercial liability, commercial property, personal liability, and personal property after
discounting. The commercial liability reserves account for a significant proportion of
total unpaid loss reserves. The economic equity is 34.4 percent of total economic assets
on average. Notably, the amount of equity capital in the industry has increased from 33.4

84

percent in 2002 to 36.4 percent in 2004 because insurers may increase holding capital to
avoid insolvency risk following a large loss shock such as 9/11.
The industry-wide volatility and correlation matrix that are determined by the
quarterly time series of returns of seven asset classes and of the underwriting returns of
twelve aggregated insurance lines are estimated as shown in Table3, 4, and 5.34 Table 3
shows the estimated industry-wide volatility and correlation matrix based on the NAIC
quarterly underwriting returns data. Special property (includes earthquake insurance),
fidelity and surety, and homeowners insurance lines exhibit the highest volatility. Of the
pair-wise correlations between returns of twelve insurance lines, the pairs of medical
malpractice and auto liability and the pairs of commercial multiple peril and special
property show the highest positive correlations with 85.6 and 64.3 percent, respectively.
High correlations between them may be justified since their businesses are similar in
nature. The correlation between medical malpractice and special liability is negative 79.5
percent. It can be argued that special liability lines that cover damage to ocean marine or
boiler and machinery are less likely to be correlated with medical malpractice line that
provides coverage for bodily injuries.
Table 4 displays the correlation matrix for asset and liability portfolios. The
returns of stocks have negative correlations with the returns of all loss liability lines,
implying that investment in stocks does not provide a hedge against losses in liability
lines. However, the returns of government bonds, corporate bonds, and real estate are
positively correlated with several important lines of insurance, suggesting that investment
in these types of assets provides effective hedges against some losses in liability lines.
34

Classification of lines of business into 12 is based on Schedule P of the NAIC regulatory annual
statement. For example, special property (SP) lines include fire, allied lines, inland marine, earthquake,
burglary and theft. Accident, health, financial guaranty (AH) include mortgage and financial guaranty,
group accident and health, credit accident and health, other accident and health, and credit insurance.
Special liability (SP) includes ocean marine, aircraft, and boiler and machinery insurance. Miscellaneous
liability includes international insurance.
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In table 5, stocks among asset classes show the highest volatility, 15.8 percent,
consistent with common perception. The correlations between asset classes are also
presented in table 5. The returns of government bonds and mortgages are strongly
positively related each other, 92.5 percent correlations. Insurers may have an incentive to
reduce asset portfolio risk by investing both in stocks and government bonds since both
stocks and government bonds returns are inversely related each other, with 28.3 percent
correlations.
Table6 provides an illustration of Myers-Read insolvency put value and capital
allocations for the U.S. property-liability insurance industry. We measure insurer’s
default risk by the Myers-Read insolvency put value. The default-to-liability ratio is
calculated to obtain the insolvency put value. For instance, the average default value of
industry during the period 1989-2004 is $28.83 million or 4.67E-05 percent of the present
values of industry liabilities. We allocate the economic capital across the four aggregated
insurance lines and other liabilities based on the economic values of the assets and
liabilities in Table1 and 2, and the estimation of industry-wide volatility and correlations
shown in Table3, 4, and 5. The capital-to-liability ratio indicates the marginal capital
requirement for each line. In other words, the marginal increase in the present value of
losses for the line requires the marginal increase in capital requirement for that line. On
average, the capital-to-liability ratio for commercial liability, commercial property,
personal liability, and personal property line is 110 percent, 47 percent, 40 percent, and
50 percent, respectively, compared to 19 percent of other liabilities. The right column of
Table6 shows that the amount of total economic capital is 100 percent allocated by lines
of business.
We use five outputs and four inputs to estimate insurer’s efficiency scores. Table
7 shows the summary statistics of inputs, input prices, and expenses over the sample
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period, 1989-2004 for the groups and unaffiliated companies. Among the insurance
inputs, administrative labor represents about 12.1% of total expenses, agent labor
represents 23.6%, materials and business services represents 40.4%, and financial equity
capital represents approximately 23.9%.
Summary statistics on outputs, output prices and revenues of insurance groups
and unaffiliated companies for the period 1989-2004 are presented in Table 8. The
quantity of insurance output in the personal lines outweighs the amount in commercial
lines. The intermediation output accounts for a considerable proportion of total outputs.
The prices of commercial lines are higher than those of personal lines, implying that
commercial lines are likely to be more risky and complex than personal lines. Revenues
are defined as the products of output quantities and prices. The last section of the table
shows the percentage of total revenues attributable to the intermediation function and by
line of business. Among them, intermediation output is the largest source of total
revenues in the industry, representing about 24.4% of total insurance revenues. Personal
short-tail and personal long-tail constitute 23.1% and 16.6% of the total revenues on
average, while commercial short-tail and commercial long-tail represent approximately
18.2% and 17.6% of insurance revenues.
Table10 and 11 report summary statistics on the economic premium ratio, firm
performance, marginal capital allocation by lines of business, efficiency scores and
financial and operating characteristics for all the insurers in the sample and acquiring
insurers, respectively. On average, the economic premium ratios (EPR) in the personal
property and commercial property line for the entire sample of insurers is higher than
those for acquiring insurers, whereas the EPR of personal liability and commercial
liability lines for all insurers is lower than those for acquirers. Acquirers have higher
ROA (return on asset) than the entire sample of insurers (0.045 versus 0.034) while ROE
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(return on equity) of all insurers are higher than the ROE of acquirers (0.066 versus0.054).
Acquiring insurers have higher underwriting performance than all insurers across all lines
except commercial property line, indicating that acquiring firms have higher loss ratio
and underwriting expense ratio than all insurers.
The average of overall firm capital-liability ratio for acquirers is lower than that
of non-acquirers from 0.715 to 0.842. Notably, marginal capital requirements (line
capital-to-liability ratio) and relative marginal capital allocation for all insurers are higher
than those of acquirers across all lines except the commercial liability line. Acquirers
exhibit higher portfolio risk than all insurers on average (14.2% versus 12.9%).
Acquiring insurers are more cost efficient than all insurers while all insurers are more
revenue efficient than acquirers. Acquiring insurers are more diversified over product
lines and geographical areas than all insurers, as measured by Herfindahl indices, based
on premium written across all lines and 51 states, respectively.
The size of acquiring firms is on average much larger than those of all insurers
with mean assets of $1.8 billion for acquirers versus $632 million for all insurers.
Table10 and 11 also demonstrates that underwriting leverage measured by premium
written relative to firm overall equity capital for all insurers is higher than acquirers
(1.275 versus 1.228). 40.6% of acquirers are mutual insurers, compared to 38.7% for all
insurers. Only 22.6% of acquirers are unaffiliated single firms, compared to 57.5% for all
insurers and 69% of acquirers have independent marketing systems, compared to 61.2%
for all insurers. On average, acquirers have higher A.M. Best’s ratings than all insurers.
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CAHPTER 8
INSURANCE PRICE ANALYSIS
We begin by discussing the estimation of the price of insurance. Next, we specify
regression methodology that enables us to test hypotheses developed in the previous
chapter. We also define explanatory variables and discuss expected relationship between
dependent and explanatory variables and then present the results.
8.1. THE ESTIMATION OF PRICE OF INSURANCE
We use the economic premium ratio as the price of insurance following the
insurance literature (e.g., Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Phillips et al., 1998, and
Cummins et al., 2005). The economic premium ratio for a line of insurance is defined as
premiums written for the line net of dividends to policyholders and underwriting
expenses divided by the present value of losses and loss adjustment expenses incurred.
More precisely, the economic premium ratio is as follows:

EPRi ,t =

NPWi ,t − DIVi ,t − EXPi ,t
(NLI i ,t + LAEi ,t ) x PVFi ,t

(21)

where EPRi ,t = the economic premium ratio for line i, in year t

NPWi ,t = net premium written for line i, in year t
DIVi ,t = dividends to policyholders incurred for line i, in year t
EXPi ,t =underwriting expense incurred for line i, in year t
NLI i ,t =net loss incurred for line i, in year t
LAEi ,t =net loss adjustment expense incurred for line i, in year t
PVFi ,t = present value factor for line i, in year t
t

⎛ 1 ⎞
PVF = ∑ wt ⎜
⎟ where wt represents the proportion of losses
t =1
⎝ 1 + rt ⎠
T

and loss adjustment paid at time t with assumption of 0 < wt ≤ 1 , and

∑

wt = 1 . rt is U.S Treasury spot rate at time t and T represents the

number of periods in the payout tail.
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We assume premiums are paid at the beginning of the year and the losses and loss
adjustment expenses are paid at the end of the time period. Premiums are measured net of
dividends to policyholders and underwriting expenses because the purpose is focusing on
the part of premiums that reimburse the insurer for bearing risks (Cummins et al., 2005).
The cost of acquiring and underwriting both new and renewal insurance business is a
substantial element of expenses for most property-liability insurers and also varies
significantly across lines of business. The underwriting expense includes commissions to
agents that are generally the largest portion of underwriting expenses.
Losses and loss adjustment expenses incurred are discounted based on two
present value factors: (1) the pattern of loss and loss adjustment expense payment, and
(2) the discount interest rate. The pattern of loss payment (payout tail) depends on the
characteristics of lines of business that insurer writes and its claims handling procedures.
For example, the losses of short-tail lines such as property insurance are fully developed
or ultimately paid in one or two years. Long-tail liability claims such as auto liabilities
are fully developed in three to five years, while medical malpractice and workers
compensation may develop for ten years or longer. The payout tail proportions for each
line of business and for each year of the sample period are estimated based on Schedule P
of annual statement data using Taylor separation method (Taylor, 2000).
We also estimate U.S. Treasury spot rate (zero rate) curve from the constant
maturity treasury data using bootstrap method. The present value factor for each year is
calculated by summing up the estimated payout tail proportions divided by the estimated
zero curves for the number of periods in the payout tail. Thus, the present value of losses
and loss adjustment expenses incurred is obtained by multiplying the total losses and loss
adjustment expenses by the present value factor. The economic premium is calculated
separately for each insurer and for each year of the sample period. The present value

90

factor calculated for each line and each year are shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 presents that
the commercial liability lines are more heavily discounted than the personal property
lines over the sample period, consistent with the view that commercial lines develop
longer than short-tail lines.
8.2. REGRESSION METHODOLOGY
We conduct regressions using a series of pooled, cross-sectional, and time-series
data to test hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. We also examine several exogenous
factors that affect the insurers’ price differences across lines of business. One-way and
two-way fixed effects model regressions are conducted to control for unobserved
heterogeneity problems. The regressions are based on the unbalanced panel data to
maximize the number of observations included in the analysis and to avoid survivor bias.
The estimated regression model has the following specifications:

EPRikt = α 0 + α1MAkt + α 2 MCAikt + α 3Cost kt + α 4 Sharekt + α 5 IPVkt

+α 6GeoHHI kt + α 7 ProdHHI kt + γ ′ X kt + d t + f k + ε ikt

(22)

where EPRikt = the economic premium ratio charged at time t by insurer k for line i

MAkt = indicator variable equal to 1 in t+1, t+2, and t+3 years after M & A
if the insurer is an acquiring firm, and otherwise is zero.35

MCAikt = the marginal capital allocated-to-liability ratio for line i, and insurer k
in year t

Costkt = cost efficiency score for insurer k, in year t
Sharekt = market share for insurer k, in year t

IPVkt = the insolvency put value-to-liability ratio for insurer k, in year t
GeoHHI kt =Geographical Herfindahl for insurer k, in year t
ProdHHI kt =Product line Herfindahl for insurer k, in year t

35

t+1 indicates one year after M & A transaction, t+2 is two years after M & A, and t+3 is three years after
M&A.
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X kt = a vector of firm characteristics for insurer k, in year t

d t = a vector of time fixed-effects
f k = a vector of firm fixed-effects

ε ikt = error term for insurer k, in year t
The dependent variable in our analysis is the economic premium ratio across
different lines of business. Similar to Sapienza (2002), we use the indicator
variable, MAkt to examine the insurance price change of acquiring firms before and after
M & A. A positive (negative) value for α1 indicates that insurance price of acquiring
insurers increases (decreases) following M & A.
Following Cummins, Lin, Phillips (2006), the marginal capital allocated-toliability ratio is included as the explanatory variable in the regression to test the
hypothesis that the marginal capital allocated across lines are reflected in the line-by-line
price differences. As the amount of capital allocated to specific lines increase, insurance
price that reflects increased capital cost will go up. Thus, we expect positive relationship
between the insurance price and marginal capital allocation across lines of business.
To examine whether efficiency structure (ES) hypothesis is valid, we incorporate
cost efficiency measure into the regression model. The negative sign for cost efficiency is
expected under the ES hypothesis. The variable of market share is included to control for
the market power hypothesis. Market share is defined as the proportion of total premiums
accounted for by insurer k, in year t. If the market power hypothesis holds, we predict
positive coefficient for market share.
To control for firm insolvency risk, we include the insolvency put value-toliability ratio, calculated from Myers-Read (2001) methodology. We predict insurance
prices are inversely related to the insolvency put values, consistent with Phillips et al.
(1998), Zanjani (2002), and Cummins et al. (2006). As an alternative measure of insurer
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financial strength, A. M. Best’s ratings for the firms are included in the regressions.
Insurers that have higher A. M. Best ratings are expected to charge higher prices.
Geographical and product line Herfindahl index are included as explanatory
variables in the regression equation to test the hypothesis that diversified insurers charge
lower prices due to the risk diversification benefits. Product line Herfindahl index is
calculated by the sum of the squares of the percentages of direct premium written across
all lines of business for each insurer. An insurer that focuses on writing only one or a few
lines of business has a higher Herfindahl index, whereas a firm that offers a wider range
of product lines has a lower Herfindahl index, indicating higher diversification.
Geographic Herfindahl index is measured based on direct premiums written across 51
states. If geographic diversification or adding more lines of business that coinsure each
other tend to reduce the capital requirements of acquiring insurer, more diversified
insurers will charge lower prices. Thus, we expect that both geographic and product line
Herfindahl index are positively related to the insurance price.
Other firm characteristics are also expected to affect the price of property-liability
insurance. The natural log of firm assets is used as a proxy for firm size. The expected
sign on this variable is ambiguous a prior. Because large firms tend to have lower
insolvency risk and are safer than smaller firms, risk-averse policyholders are likely to
pay higher prices for large insurers. We expect a positive relationship between firm size
and the price of insurance. On the other hand, a negative relationship between firm size
and the price of insurance is predicted. Since large firms are likely to be more diversified
and better accessible to capital markets than smaller firms, large firms should require
relatively lower capital to achieve a given level of insolvency risk and thus may demand
lower price.
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We include the ownership form variable, set equal to one for mutual firms and to
zero for stock firms. Mutual firms eliminate the owner-policyholder conflict because
policyholders are both customers and owners. However, benefits from control of ownerpolicyholder conflict are offset by less efficient control of owner-manager conflict
(Mayers and Smith, 2001). The owner-manager conflict is more severe for mutual
insurers than for stock firms since mutual managers are not well monitored in capital
markets as compared to mangers of stock insurers. Because cost of controlling
management in mutual insurer is greater than in stock firms, mutual insurers should be
more prevalent in lines of insurance where lower managerial discretion is required. In
other words, mutual insurers have a comparative advantage in writing business lines with
less underwriting risk, requiring less capitalization. Thus, the expected sign on this
variable is negative.
A dummy variable is included, equal to one if the firm is an unaffiliated single
company and zero otherwise. The managers of an unaffiliated company are likely to be
more risk averse because group insurers may be able to diversify underwriting risk across
member companies in a more efficient manner than unaffiliated single firms. Because an
unaffiliated company tends to engage in less risky activities to avoid insolvency risk and
may hold more capital, the expected sign on this variable is positive. A dummy variable
equal to one if the insurer is licensed in New York and zero otherwise is used to proxy for
regulatory restrictions. If regulatory restrictions function to depress insurance price, the
predicted sign on this variable is negative. To control for the insurance industry’s
underwriting cycle, we use year dummy variables with 1989 as the base year.
8.3. RESULTS
The regression results are presented in Table 12, 13, 14, and 15. Four lines of
business are estimated separately: personal property, personal liability, commercial

94

property, and commercial liability lines of business. Several variants of the model are
estimated with different variables included and with the time and firm fixed effects
included and excluded.
The results generally provide support for the hypothesis that the price of insurance
for newly formed insurers decreases following the M & As. The coefficients for MAkt
are negative and statistically significant across all models in personal property line and in
the year fixed and firm fixed effects model of personal liability line, indicating that
insurance price changes are negatively correlated with M & A activity in these lines.
However, indicator variables for MAkt are not significant in commercial property and
liability lines.
The regressions shown in Table 12, 13, 14, and 15 provide the results of testing
three specific hypotheses (capital allocation, efficient-structure, and market power
hypothesis). The results provide strong support for the capital allocation theory that
variations in prices by lines of business are directly related to corresponding variations of
marginal capital allocation. The coefficients of marginal capital allocation (line capitalto-liability ratio) are positive and statistically significant in the personal property (models
1, 3, 4, and 5), personal liability line (model 1), commercial property line (models1, 3,
and 4), and commercial liability lines (across all models), implying that insurance lines
that hold more capital charge higher prices. The result is consistent with the findings of
Cummins, Lin, Phillips (2006).
The price of insurance is inversely related to cost efficiency in all lines except for
the commercial liability line. This relationship is significant at the 1 percent level and
thus strongly supports the efficiency structure hypothesis. The coefficient for market
share is negative and significant at the 10 percent level only in the OLS models of
personal property line and is not significant generally across other lines of business. The
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negative and/ or insignificant signs for the market share variable indicate that market
power hypothesis is not valid with our sample data. If market power is the driving force
behind mergers and acquisitions, it is predicted that M & As result in increased market
power, leading in turn to price changes that are not beneficial to consumers. This
reasoning is particularly true when the merging firms are direct competitors and their
combination results in a substantial increase in market concentration within specified
geographical or product markets (e.g., Shepherd, 1982). However, the market power
theory overlooks the possibility of entry. If combined firm increases price to a more
profitable level, this may attract other insurers to enter the market. The firm will
eventually lose both its market share to other rivals and ability to control the price. The
only way the dominant firm could maintain the high price and profits would be by
colluding with its rivals to form a cartel. The formation of cartels through takeovers can
not be achieved as a result of U.S. antitrust legislation, which precludes excessive
increases in market power by regulating M & A activity. Another possible explanation
for the negative relationship between market share and insurance price is that if insurer’s
motivation is to gain market share through M & As, consolidated insurers may try to
attract more customers by decreasing prices.
The coefficients of geographical and product line Herfindahl index are positive
and significant across all lines of business with the exception of product line Herfindahl
index in the commercial liability line. The positive signs on both Herfindahl index
strongly support the hypothesis that diversified insurers that may have lower overall
capital costs due to the effect of risk diversification charge lower prices than less
diversified insurers. The result is also consistent with Myer-Read’ propositions that
diversification by adding more new lines and geographical areas that have low
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covariability with the insurer’s current loss portfolio or high covariability of loss portfolio
with asset portfolio leads to more efficient use of capital, resulting in lower prices.
The signs of other control variables are generally consistent with the predictions.
The coefficients of firm insolvency put value are negative and statistically significant
across all lines, suggesting that lower capitalization is related to higher insolvency risk,
resulting in lower prices. Our result is consistent with the findings of Cummins and
Danzon(1997), Phillips, Cummins and Allen(1998), and Cummins, Lin, Phillips (2006).
The regressions that include A. M. Best’s ratings instead of firm insolvency put value
also provide evidence that the price of insurance is inversely related to firm insolvency
risk. Similar to Cummins, Lin, Phillips (2006), three indicator variables-set equal to one
for insurers with Best’s ratings of A or A-, B++ or B+, and B or lower, respectively, and
set equal to zero otherwise-are used as an alternative measure of insurer financial strength.
Insurers with Best’s ratings of A++ or A+ are omitted as a reference group to avoid
multicollinearity. The coefficients of the Best’s rating are negative and significant across
all lines, suggesting that safer firms charge higher prices. The results also show that the
magnitude of the coefficients of Best’s ratings become monotonically smaller as the
Best’s ratings move down, implying that progressively lower ratings are related to higher
firm insolvency risk.
Firm size is positive and statistically significant only in personal property line, as
expected if larger firms have lower insolvency risk and are safer than smaller firm. Other
possible explanations for why larger firms demand higher prices may be due to brand
name recognition by consumers. However, firm size is significant and inversely related to
insurance price in other lines. Recall that the expected signs for firm size variables were
indeterminate. The possible explanation for the negative sign is that large firms require
relatively lower capital to achieve a given level of insolvency because large firms tend to
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be more diversified and to have better access to capital markets than smaller firms and
thus may demand lower price.
The coefficient of mutual is negative and significant in personal property and
commercial property line, as predicted if mutual insurers have a comparative advantage
in writing business lines where lower managerial discretion is required, requiring less
capitalization and demanding lower prices. However, the mutual variable is significant
and positively related to insurance prices in the commercial liability line where greater
managerial discretion is required, implying that greater owner-manager agency costs
exceed any benefits associated with the reduction in owner-policyholder agency costs;
therefore, the higher cost of controlling management leads to higher insurance prices.
The dummy variable for unaffiliated firm is positive and significant in all lines of
business, consistent with expectation that unaffiliated firms charge higher prices if an
unaffiliated company tends to engage in less risky activities to avoid insolvency risk and
thus may hold more capital than diversified firms. A New York dummy variable is
significantly inversely related to insurance price, suggesting that strict regulations lead to
price reduction, which is favorable for consumers.
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CAHPTER 9
EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
This chapter specifies the empirical model used to test the hypotheses developed
in the chapter 4 and then define the variables to be used in the estimation. We also
present efficiency regression results in this chapter.
9.1 REGRESSION METHODOLOGY
In order to test our hypothesis that the efficiency of acquiring insurers is likely to
decrease following M & A, we conduct regressions using a series of pooled, crosssectional, and time-series data. Because the characteristics of firms’ exogenous variables
may affect the differences in efficiency scores between before and after M & A, we also
examine several exogenous factors that determine insurer’s efficiency. We analyze the
relationship between efficiency scores and firm characteristics using unbalanced panel
data to avoid survivor bias and to maximize the number of observations included in the
analysis. We control for some types of unobserved heterogeneity problems by employing
one-way and two-way fixed effects models because the estimates of coefficients derived
from OLS regression may be biased if there is some unknown variable or variables that
cannot be controlled for that affect the dependent variable (Kennedy, 2003 and Greene
2003). 36 With panel data, the functional form of two-way fixed effects model is as
follows:
Yit = β 0 + β1MAit + β ′ X it + d t + f i + vit

(23)

where i indexes firms and t represents year. The dependent variables of regression, Yit ,
are five different efficiency scores (cost, revenue, pure technical, scale, and allocative
efficiency scores). The indicator variable, MAit , is equal to one in t+1, t+2, and t+3 years
after M & A if the insurer is an acquiring firm, and zero otherwise is used to examine the

36

The Hausman testing shows that these models fit better to the data.
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relationship between M & A activity and insurers’ efficiency.37 X it is a vector of control
variables described below. β 0 is the estimated intercept terms; β1 and β ′ are the
estimated parameters. dt is a vector of time fixed-effect and fi is a vector of firm fixedeffects. vit is error term. Similar to Sapienza (2002), we include non-M & A involved
firms as a control group in the regression to control for economy-wide factors and
changes in the regulatory framework that influence firm efficiency change. The MAit
indicator for these firms is always equal to zero.
Firm characteristics that may be systematically related to efficiency change are
incorporated as explanatory variables in the regression. The natural logarithm of total
assets is included to control for firm size. We control for insurer’s business mix by
including the percent of losses incurred in personal property lines, the percent of losses
incurred in personal liability lines, the percent of losses incurred in commercial liability
lines.38 Geographical and product line Herfindahl indices are included as explanatory
variables in the regression equation to control for the effects of diversification.
Geographic Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of the squares of the
percentages of premium written by state for each insurer. Geographic Herfindahl index is
measured based on direct premiums written across 51 states. A firm with a high
geographic Herfindahl index has a significant portion of its business concentrated in one
or a few states, whereas firms with lower Herfindahl index are likely to be more
geographically diversified. Product line diversification is measured using a Herfindahl
index of direct premiums written across all lines of business. Lower Herfindahl indices
imply higher diversification. The expected signs of Herfindahl indices are ambiguous a
prior. Geographical and product line Herfindahl indices are predicted to have a positive
37

It is argued that the gestation period of restructuring following a merger can be as long as three years
(Berger et al. 1998).
38
The percent of losses incurred in commercial property lines is omitted as the reference category.
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sign if diversification benefits are offset by the additional costs associated with agency
conflicts and administrative problems arising from operating multiple lines and states. On
the other hand, geographical and product line Herfindahl indices could have a negative
sign if consolidated firms are more efficient by offering multiple lines of business, either
due to the benefits of risk diversification or revenue scope economies with customers
who are willing pay higher prices for “one-stop shopping.”
The ratio of net premium written to policyholders’ surplus is included in the
regression to control for the effects of underwriting leverage on efficiency change. To
control for company’s ability to meet its anticipated short- and long-term obligations to
policyholders and other creditors without having to resort to selling long-term
investments or affiliated assets, liquidity ratio measured by the proportion of liabilities
covered by cash and investments that can be quickly converted to cash is included.
We control for efficiency variation that is induced by different distribution
systems. The property-liability insurance is distributed by a variety of distribution
systems: insurance contracts are sold through direct writers, independent agents, brokers
and mixed systems. Direct writing includes exclusive agents and insurer employees. An
exclusive agent represents a single insurer, but is not technically insurer’s employee. An
independent agent represents more than one insurer. A broker represents the customer,
negotiates with multiple insurers and tends to focus more on the commercial lines of
business for larger-scale customers. These systems have coexisted in insurance markets
for many decades, despite evidence that independent agency-insurers have higher costs
than direct writers. Previous empirical studies find that independent agency insurers have
higher expense margins than exclusive dealing insurers (e.g., Barrese and Nelson, 1992;
Kim, Mayes, and Smith 1996) and thus may be considered less efficient in delivering
products to consumers. In contrast, according to the product-quality hypothesis, the
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higher costs of independent-agency insurers are associated with producing higher-quality
product or service differences. The product-quality hypothesis implies that independent
agency insurers are compensated by higher revenues, with customers who are willing to
pay higher prices for greater service intensity and the reduced search costs (Kim, Mayes,
and Smith 1996; Regan and Tennyson, 1996). Berger, Cummins and Weiss (1997)
provide evidence supporting for the product-quality hypothesis. They estimate both cost
and profit efficiency for independent-agency and direct-writing insurers using
econometric efficiency methods. Berger, Cummins and Weiss (1997) find that
independent-agency and direct-writing insurers generate almost the same profitability for
delivering the same mix and quantity of outputs and are approximately equal in revenue
and profit efficiency. Their empirical results support the view that independent-agency
insurers are less cost efficient on average than direct-writing insurers.
We revisit the issue of the coexistence of multiple distribution systems for
insurance industry by breaking them into direct writing, independent agency, brokerage,
and mixed distribution using more recent data.39 Independent agency is omitted in the
regression as a reference category. We predict that insurers with direct writing
distribution systems are more efficient than insurers using independent agents because
direct writing insurers can easily recognize cost savings by advanced technology and
automated customer database. In addition, insurers using independent sales agents pay a
greater proportion of commissions for their role in risk assessment and renewals of
policies, especially where insurance products are complicated and risks are
heterogeneous, and thus agent information is a valuable supplement to standardized
underwriting inputs. Because the broker is the legal agent of the customer and not the
insurer, insurance firms with brokerage distribution systems are even less vertically
39

Mixed distribution includes using both independent agency and direct writing or using both brokerage
and direct writing.
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integrated. Insurers using brokerage are likely to be more efficient than other independent
agency insurers because brokers are generally larger than independent agencies, offer a
wider array of services to more sophisticated clients, and have advantages over
independent agent in more complex lines.
We include dummy variables equal to one for mutual firms and zero for stock
insurers to control for organizational form. An indicator variable equal to one for
unaffiliated insurers and zero for groups is also used. Regulatory restrictions may
increase insurer costs in the form of conservative reserving standards or minimum levels
of capital requirements and thus contribute to firm cost and revenue efficiency. The state
of New York is generally recognized as the state that has the most rigid insurance
regulations in the United States (Sommer, 1996). A dummy variable equal to one if the
insurer is licensed in New York and zero otherwise is used to proxy for regulatory
restrictions.
9.2 REGRESSION RESULTS
The regression results using each of the estimation techniques are presented in
Tables 16 and 17. Model 1 (or year) indicates one-way fixed effects regression, which
controls for time-specific effects that are not otherwise controlled for by other variables,
while model 2 (or year+firm) controls for both time and company fixed effects. 40 F
statistic is presented for all regressions to investigate whether there is company and time
fixed effects. The large F statistic rejects the null hypothesis in favor of the fixed effect
model (p<.0000).41
We conduct overall regressions for cost and revenue efficiency and analyze the
decomposition of cost efficiency by also conducting regressions where the dependent
40

We also estimated regressions using one-way and two-way random effects model. The results of random
effect models are consistent with those of the fixed-effect models.
41
The null hypothesis is that parameters of company and time dummies are
zero: H 0 = µ1 = ... = µn −1 = 0 and τ 1 = ... = τ T −1 = 0 .
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variables are pure technical, scale, and allocative efficiency, respectively. Although
technical and allocative efficiency provide important indicators, the discussion is mainly
focused on the cost and revenue efficiency regressions because they determine the
profitability of firms and provide the best measures of overall firm performance.
The regressions, shown in Table 16, reveal significant differences in cost and
revenue efficiency of acquiring firms between before and after M & A. The coefficients
on MAit in both cost and revenue efficiency are negative and significant, supporting the
hypothesis that acquiring firms experience significantly larger losses in cost and revenue
efficiency after M & A. This result suggests that expansion of the firm through M & As
has the potential to create inefficiencies. As firms become larger and more complex,
diversification benefits are offset by the additional costs. Administrating and operating
over wider geographical areas and integration of different information systems can lead
to higher costs. Bonding different organizations have more potential to create managerial
conflict and agency costs since managerial monitoring becomes more difficult.
The signs of explanatory variables are generally consistent with theoretical
predictions. The coefficients estimated on firm size are positive and significant in all
types of efficiency, with the exception of scale efficiency, indicating that larger firms
tend to experience more efficiency than smaller firms. This result is consistent with prior
findings (Cummins and Zi, 1998). However, firm size is negatively related to scale
efficiency. A possible explanation for this result is that as Cummins and Xie (2005) find
that the majority of firms above median size are operating with decreasing returns to
scale, firms with DRS may not attain scale efficiency.
We document a significant and positive relationship between the percentage of
loss incurred in both personal property and personal liability lines and cost efficiency.
Thus, it appears that insurers with a higher proportion of business in personal property
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and personal liability lines obtain greater cost efficiency than those with more business in
commercial property lines, suggesting that types of business and their combination has an
important role in improving insurer’s efficiency.42 This result is consistent with Cummins
and Xie (2005). Surprisingly, the percentage of loss incurred in commercial liability lines
are inversely related to cost efficiency, indicating that firms with emphasizing
commercial liability lines are likely to create cost inefficiency. As shown in Table 17, the
decomposition regression shows that the primary source of cost efficiency gains in
personal property and personal liability lines is pure technical efficiency, suggesting that
automated systems are more advantageous in the personal lines. Because long-tail
commercial liability lines such as medical malpractice and workers compensation are
more complex and the pattern of loss payment are more uncertain, allocating resources
and adopting new technology and marketing systems are relatively difficult in
commercial liability lines.
The percentage of loss incurred in personal property lines and personal liability
lines is significantly negatively related to revenue efficiency. Thus, firms with a higher
proportion of business in personal lines are less advantageous in output-oriented revenue
efficiency. The negative relation may be induced by the fact that personal property lines
that include homeowners and earthquake insurance are highly exposed to catastrophic
property risks from hurricanes and earthquakes. In addition, because personal liability
lines such as primary personal auto liability is written as a compulsory insurance along
with auto physical damage, it may be more difficult to choose optimal output
combinations to maximize revenue efficiency.
The coefficient on the geographical Herfindahl index is positive and significant in
both cost and revenue efficiency, supporting the pro-focus arguments that geographically
42

To investigate whether our results are robust to a different measure of business mix, we repeat our
regression analysis using the percentage of premiums written in personal property lines, personal liability
lines, and commercial liability lines and observe similar results.
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focused insurers are able to achieve greater cost and revenue efficiency than
geographically diversified insurers. This result implies that potential benefits from risk
diversification are likely to be offset by the extra costs associated with greater managerial
discretion, inefficient allocation of resource, and additional administrative and regulatory
issues that are required to deal with when operating across different states. The product
line Herfindahl index is significant and positively related to cost efficiency. However it is
not significant in revenue efficiency. The product line Herfindahl index is negative and
significant as related to allocative efficiency, consistent with pro-conglomeration
arguments that diversified insurers are more advantageous in choosing cost minimizing
combinations of inputs than focused insurers.
The underwriting leverage measured as premium revenues net of reinsurance
transactions relative to policyholders’ surplus is significant and positively related to cost
and revenue efficiency. The net premium-to-surplus ratio is inversely related to the
capacity of an insurer to write additional business because new policies generate
liabilities, which must be supported by surplus due to regulatory accounting rules. The
positive relationship between cost efficiency and underwriting leverage ratio is primarily
attributable to pure technical efficiency, which offsets a negative effect of allocative
efficiency, implying that insurers with higher premium-to-surplus ratios employ less
capital input relative to premium revenues. The liquidity ratio calculated by dividing
liquid assets (cash and marketable securities) by total liabilities is significantly negatively
related to all types of efficiency. A high degree of liquidity enables an insurer to meet
unexpected financial needs without the untimely sale of investments or fixed assets,
which may result in substantial realized losses due to temporary market conditions or tax
consequences. The negative sign on this variable suggests that firms with higher liquidity
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ratio to meet financial obligations to pay off reserves by holding cash and quickly
convertible investments have lower cost and revenue efficiency.
As predicted, the coefficient on the direct marketing indicator variable is
significantly positive in both cost and revenue efficiency. This results support the
hypothesis that direct marketing distributions are more cost and revenue efficient than
independent agency distributions. This result is contrary to the finding of Berger,
Cummins, and Weiss (1997) who provide evidence that there is no difference in revenue
efficiency between direct writing and independent agency. The regression results also
show that brokers are more cost efficient than independent agents, but indicator variable
for mixed distribution is not significant in cost efficiency. The advantage of direct
marketing and brokerage over independent agency is mostly attributable to pure technical
efficiency which also offset the negative effect of allocative efficiency. We also find that
mixed distribution is more revenue efficient than independent agency distribution.
Mutual variable has a positive and significant coefficient in cost efficiency, as
predicted if mutual insurers have a comparative advantage in writing less complex
business lines where lower managerial discretion is required, requiring fewer inputs.
There is no significant difference in revenue efficiency between mutual firms and stock
firms. The unaffiliated single firms are significantly positively related to all type of
efficiency, with the exception of allocative efficiency. Group insurers may be able to
diversify risks across member companies, whereas unaffiliated single firm may not have
diversification opportunities. Thus, managers of an unaffiliated company are likely to be
more risk averse and may have more incentive to minimize costs and maximize revenues
than those of stock firms. The negative sign on allocative efficiency may indicate that
less resource allocation is conducted at an unaffiliated company level. The coefficient on
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firms licensed in New York is significant and negative, suggesting that stricter regulation
leads to cost and revenue inefficiencies, perhaps due to the imposition of regulatory costs.
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CAHPTER 10
FIRM PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this chapter, we discuss our regression methodology for the analysis of firm
performance and then present estimation results.
10.1 REGRESSION SPECIFICATION
To further examine the relationship between M & A activity and financial
performance and to explore the differences in performance across lines of insurance, we
conduct a panel data regression with a series of pooled, cross sectional, time-series data.
We control for unobserved heterogeneity using time and company fixed effect model. In
addition to the fixed effects model, other estimation techniques are also utilized for
robustness of estimation results. We also investigate several factors that affect insurers’
performance by including firm and industry characteristics as explanatory variables.
We use return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as dependent
variables to measure insurer performance. 43 ROA and ROE are widely used in
diversification-performance literature (e.g., Browne et al., 2001; Greene and Segal, 2004).
ROA is defined as net income after policyholder dividend but before taxes divided by
total assets and ROE is the ratio of net income after policyholder dividend but before
taxes to insurer’s equity capital.44
A revenue efficiency variable is included as an explanatory variable based on the
hypothesis that revenue efficient firms tend to have higher returns because they dissipate
less of their potential revenues due to inefficiency than do inefficient firms. Because
revenue efficiency variable is expected to be jointly determined with the dependent
43

Finance literatures use Tobin’s Q to proxy for firm performance. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market
value of a firm’s financial claims to the replacement value of its assets. We can not estimate Tobin’s Q
because very few insurers are publicly-traded at the subsidiary level.
44
We also used ROA and ROE before policyholder dividends and taxes and after dividends and taxes. Both
support the same conclusions regarding the effects of M & A on firm performance.
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variable (ROA and ROE), OLS estimation model would result in inconsistent parameter
estimates. The most common test for endogeneity is the Hausman(1978) method
(Wooldridge, 2002). If Hauman test rejects the null hypothesis that revenue efficiency
variable is exogenous, this implies that the feedback effects between insurer performance
and revenue efficiency are significant. To correct for this endogeneity, we employ twostage least squares methods using instrumental variables. Thus, the specific empirical
model with endogeneous variable is:

Ψ kt = β0 + β1MAkt + β ′ X kt + δ Iˆkt + ε kt
I kt = π 0 + π ′Z kt + ν kt

(24)

Where k indexes firms and t indexes the time periods. The dependent variable Ψ kt is
firm k ’s performance measures. X kt is a vector of control variables. Iˆkt is the predicted
revenue efficiency values from a first-state regression. I kt is a true revenue efficiency
value. Z kt is a vector of instrumental variables. β 0 and π 0 are the estimated intercept
terms. β1 , β ′ , δ , and π ′ are the estimated parameter vectors. ε kt and vkt are error terms.
To test whether M & As improve firm performance also included in the performance
regression is an indicator variable ( MAit ) equal to 1 in t+1, t+2, and t+3 years after M &
A if the insurer is an acquiring firm, and zero otherwise.
Instrumental variables used in the first-stage regression should satisfy two
conditions. First, the instrumental variables must be highly correlated with revenue
efficiency, and second, they must be uncorrelated with firm performance measures. The
commonly suggested instrumental variables consist of lagged or historically averaged
measures of firm characteristics, industry growth, and general economic growth (e.g.,
Campa and Keida, 2002). Accordingly, the instrumental variables that are relatively
uncorrelated with ROA and ROE but correlated with revenue efficiency include average
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firm size for the prior five years, five-year average percentage of premium written in
personal property lines, five-year average percentage of premium written in personal
liability lines and five-year average percentage of premium written in commercial
property lines, as well as lagged revenue efficiency scores.
Because insurer’s profitability is influenced by both underwriting results and
investment returns, we also consider underwriting performance as an alternative
performance measure. The underwriting performance measured by combined ratio in
each line is regressed on firm characteristics to examine the effect of M & A on line by
line performance change. The combined ratio is calculated by the sum of loss ratio
(incurred loss/premium earned) 45 and expense ratio (underwriting expense/net premium
written).46
Firm characteristic variables employed in the preceding efficiency regression are
also included as control variables in the main regression. We use the natural logarithm of
assets as a measure for firm size. We expect firm size to be positively related to firm
performance since larger firms are likely to have lower insolvency risk and greater
potential to gain revenue scope economies. Revenue scope economies may be realized
due to firm-specific intangible assets such as brand reputation recognized by customers.
The ratio of equity capital to total assets is included to control for the effects of
capitalization on firm performance. The predicted sign on this variable is positive since
firms will be rewarded from safety benefits of holding the additional capital.
45

Earned premium is determined by insurance pricing and reporting convention that combines revenues
from policies priced in the current period as well as policies priced in earlier periods. Thus, if policies cover
one-year periods, earned premium for year t, EPt, will be a weighted average of prices from years t and t1(Pt and Pt-1). In particular, EPt =(1-αt) Pt + αt Pt-1, where αt, the weight for policies priced
in year t-1, is the fraction of policies sold in t-1 that were unexpired at the beginning of period t.
Incurred loss can be written as the sum of three variables: unexpected payments during year t for premiums
earned prior to t, revisions to outstanding liabilities for premiums earned prior to year t, and estimated
liabilities for premiums earned in period t. The first two components reflect differences between expected
payments and actual payments.
46
Underwriting expenses include commission and brokerage expenses incurred, licenses and fees incurred,
administrative expense incurred, and other acquisition, field supervision and collection expenses incurred
(Insurance expense exhibit Part II of NAIC annual statement).
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The predicted sign on some explanatory variables is ambiguous a prior. To
capture the effect of M & A on risk-adjusted performance, we include the standard
deviation of ROA and ROE over the past 5 years as a control variable of risk measure in
the regression, following previous literature (e.g., Lai and Limpaphayom, 2003;
Liebenberg and Sommer, 2005). The advantage of this approach is that it allows for
direct interpretation of the magnitude of the effect of M & A on the dependent variable.
The standard deviation of returns is likely to be inversely related to the firm performance
if it captures firm insolvency risk, or may be positively related if higher performance may
simply be the result of higher risk activities.
There is little consensus in the insurance literature about the benefits of
diversification in different lines of business versus focusing on one or a few specialized
area. We investigate this controversy using product line and geographical Herfindahl
index as explanatory variables in the regression equation. Cummins and Nini (2002) find
a positive relationship between ROE and product line Herfindahl index in the propertyliability insurance industry, consistent with the strategic focus hypothesis. Meador, Ryan,
and Schellhorn (2000) conducted efficiency analysis to investigate the effects of product
diversification for U.S. life insurers. Their results suggest that diversified life insurers are
more X-efficient than their more focused counterparts. Pro-focus arguments state that
firms can maximize value by focusing on core businesses and core competencies where
the firm has a comparative advantage. It is also argued that conglomeration may
aggravate agency problems by allowing cross-subsidization to poor subsidiaries (Jensen,
1986). Thus, we predict that product line Herfindahl index is likely to be positively
related to firm performance under the strategic focus hypothesis. In contrast, proconglomeration arguments suggest that operating multiple lines of business can add value,
either because of diversification benefits or because of revenue scope economies in
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offering “one-stop shopping” to customers who are willing to pay more. Thus, product
line Herfindahl index will have a negative sign if conglomeration hypothesis holds.47
Similarly, geographic Herfindahl index will have a positive sign if geographically
focused insurers are able to achieve efficiencies associated with market specialization in
core businesses and avoid costly monitoring that is required when operating across
different states, or geographic Herfindahl index will have a negative sign since
geographically diversified insurers have less volatile earnings due to coinsurance effects
and thus are able to charge higher prices as a result of their lower risk.
Firm performance will be affected by different distribution systems. The predicted
sign on direct marketing system is positive because the commission structure for an
independent agency system may impose higher costs than direct writers. We do not have
strong predictions on brokerage and mixed distributions. However, firms with brokerage
distribution systems are likely be more performance enhanced than firms using
independent agency systems because brokers are more technically advanced and have a
greater advantage over independent agents in more complex lines.
We include the percent of premium written in personal property lines, the percent
of premium written in personal liability lines, and the percent of premium written in
commercial property lines to control for possibility that insurer’s performance varies by
business mix. The percent of premium written in commercial liability lines is omitted as
the reference category. We predict that firms with a higher proportion of business in
personal lines are less advantageous in profitability than insurers emphasizing
commercial lines because personal property lines are highly exposed to catastrophic
property risks such as hurricanes and earthquakes.

47

For further discussion of the strategic focus and conglomeration hypotheses please see Berger, Cummins,
Weiss, and Zi (2000).
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We use an indicator variable equal to one for mutual firms and zero for stock
insurers to control for forms of ownership structure. The relationship between ownership
structure and performance is ambiguous. It is argued that mutual managers are not well
monitored in capital markets as compared to mangers of stock insurers and the pressure
to maximize firm value is far less in a mutual firm since the role of owner and
policyholder functions are merged (Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin, 1999). Thus, stock
insurers are likely to have incentives to yield better performance, other things equal. On
the other hand, mutual insurers are likely to be better performed because they tend to
underwrite less risky and complex policies requiring less managerial discretion. A
dummy variable is included, set equal to one for unaffiliated single companies and zero
otherwise. An unaffiliated company is likely to be more risk averse than the affiliated
firm of groups because the unaffiliated insurer may not have diversification opportunities.
Thus, managers of unaffiliated firms may have more incentive to minimize costs and
maximize revenues than those of affiliated groups, predicting positive sign on this
variable. We also control for performance variation that is induced by insurers operating
in different regulatory stringency. A dummy variable equal to one if the insurer is
licensed in New York and equal to zero otherwise is included to test the regulatory costs
hypothesis. New York is recognized as the state that has most stringent licensing and
solvency surveillance system (Cummins and Sommer, 1996). We predict a negative sign
for this variable because stricter regulation leads to revenue inefficiencies due to the
imposition of regulatory costs.
10.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The regression analysis consists of four equations with dependent variables equal
to ROA, ROE, combined ratio, and expense ratio, respectively. We first present ROA and
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ROE regression results and then turn to a discussion of the underwriting performance
regressions.
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE)
The ROA and ROE regressions are designed to provide additional information on
the relationship between M & A activity and insurers’ overall financial performance. The
results are shown in Table 18 and 19. The first two equations are estimated using oneway (year) fixed effects model omitting revenue efficiency variable and the third
equation is an instrumental variables version (IV) that includes potentially endogenous
variable, revenue efficiency. The first two equations use different risk measures-standard
deviation of returns or firm portfolio risk as an explanatory variable. Although fixed
effects estimation with panel data is useful to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the
presence of time-constant omitted variables, panel data methods may not be enough to
solve the problem of time-varying omitted variables that are correlated with the
dependent variable.48 A test for the endogeneity was performed using Hausman (1978)
method. The test rejects the null hypothesis that revenue efficiency variable is exogenous
at the 1% level. A rejection of the null suggests that firm performance and revenue
efficiency are contemporaneously determined and thus two-stage least squares estimation
is required. The standard errors reported in the IV version are robust to the presence of
serially correlated errors as well as heteroskedastic errors.49
We focus most of the discussion on the IV version of the ROA equation, although
fixed effects and IV models provide the similar results in both ROA and ROE regressions.
The coefficient estimates on MAit are negative and significant in fixed effects and IV
estimation in both ROA and ROE equations, supporting our hypothesis that the

48

More detailed discussions are shown in Wooldridge (2002), pp484-514.

49

The Durbin-Watson statistics for the regressions ranged from 0.89 to 1.52. Estimation uses the Newey
and West (1987) procedure with one lag to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
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performance of acquiring insurers decreases following M & As possibly due to scale
diseconomies and increase frictional costs associated with post-merger managerial
integration.
The results with other explanatory variables are mostly consistent with
expectations. Firm size is positively and significantly related to performance across all
models, consistent with the view that larger firms tend to have lower insolvency risk and
greater potential to gain revenue scope economies. The ratio of equity capital to total
assets is significantly positively related to ROA and ROE, as predicted if better
capitalized firms are more likely to charge higher prices and higher prices will translate
into higher performance.
The types of business that insurers write are found to be relevant to insurer
performance. Firms with a higher proportion of business in commercial property lines
exhibit greater ROA and ROE than those with more business in commercial liability lines.
The coefficient on the percent of premium written in personal property lines in the IV
version of ROE equation is significant and negative, consistent with the expectation that
firms emphasizing personal property lines are less advantageous in profitability than
insurers with a higher proportion of business commercial liability lines.
The product line Herfindahl indices are significant and positive across all models
in both ROA and ROE, consistent with the findings of Cummins and Nini (2002). The
positive relationship suggests that more focused insurers are rewarded with higher
performance. This result supports the strategic focus hypothesis that the insurer can
maximize value by focusing on one or a few specialized area where the firm has a
comparative advantage. However, geographic Herfindahl index is not significant in all
equations.
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The sign on direct marketing system is positive and significant, consistent with
the view that insurers using direct marketing system have higher financial returns than
insurers with independent agency system because independent agency distributors are
likely to have higher costs than direct writers. The coefficient on mixed distribution is
negative and significant only in the fixed effect model of ROE, indicating that firms
using independent agency distribution tend to have better performance than firms using
mixed distribution systems. The coefficient on brokerage indicator variable is not
significant in all regression, indicating that there is no considerable difference in
performance measure between firms with brokerage distribution and firms using
independent agency distribution.
The mutual variable has a significant negative sign across all models, consistent
with the argument that mutual insurers have less incentive than stock firms to maximize
firm value perhaps due to merged function of owner and policyholder. An unaffiliated
single firm indicator is positive and significant in all regressions, which supports the
argument that an unaffiliated company is likely to be more risk averse and managers of
unaffiliated firms may have more incentive to minimize costs and maximize revenues
than those of affiliated insurance groups. A New York dummy variable is significantly
inversely related to firm performance, indicating that stringent regulatory costs result in a
negative impact on a insurer’s financial performance. The coefficient on the standard
deviation of returns is negative and significant, suggesting that higher volatility of
earnings may imply higher firm insolvency risk. Finally, revenue efficiency variable has
a significant positive coefficient in the IV version of both the ROA and ROE equations,
consistent with the hypothesis that revenue efficient firms are likely to earn higher
financial returns.
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Underwriting Performance
The underwriting performance regressions are designed to examine the
relationship between M & As and the differences in performance across lines of
insurance. We conduct line by line regressions using both combined ratio and expense
ratio as dependent variables. The expense ratio regressions provide additional evidence of
the relationship between M & A activity and line by line performance.
The results are presented in Tables 20 and 21 and are generally consistent with
our hypotheses. The coefficient of M & A indicator variable is significant and positive in
both personal property and commercial liability lines in combined and expense ratio
regressions, indicating that loss ratio and underwriting expense ratio of acquiring insurers
tend to increase after M & As. This result reinforces the conclusion of ROA and ROE
regressions that the performance of acquiring insurers decreases after M & As. Since
incurred loss and underwriting expenses are major costs of insurance company, it is
important to keep in mind that combined ratio and expense ratio are an inverse measure
of insurer’s pricing and profitability.
The coefficients of explanatory variables in the combined and expense ratio
regressions generally strengthen the results presented in the ROA and ROE regressions.
For example, the coefficients of both geographic and product line Herfindahl index are
significant and inversely related to combined ratio across all lines only with the exception
of product line Herfindahl index of personal liability line. Similarly, geographic and
product line Herfindahl index is significant and negative in the expense ratio regression
across all lines except the personal liability line. The negative relationship between
underwriting performance and Herfindahl index indicates that loss ratio and expense ratio
tend to be higher in more diversified firms than less diversified insurers, which, as a
result, leads to lower financial performance for diversified firms.
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Firm size is negatively and significantly related to combined ratio in the personal
property and personal liability lines, indicating that larger firms experience lower loss
and expense ratio. However, the coefficient on the firm size is positive in the commercial
liability line, indicating that larger firms undergo higher combined ratios than smaller
firms. The coefficients of firm size are significant and negative in the expense ratio
regressions across all lines. The dummy variables for direct marketing are significant and
negative across all lines in both the expense ratio and the combined ratio regressions
except the personal liability line, implying that direct writers tend to use less costs than
independent agency distributors, and, this supports the results that insurers using direct
marketing system have higher financial performance than insurers with independent
agency system. The coefficient on brokerage is negative and significant only in the
commercial property line of expense ratio regression, indicating that firm with brokerage
distribution systems are likely to use less expenses than insurers with independent agency
systems in the commercial property line. Mixed distribution is also inversely and
significantly related to expense ratio across all lines except the personal liability line.
The indicator variable for unaffiliated single firms is significantly negatively
related to both combined ratio and expense ratio across all lines. The negative
relationship is consistent with the view that unaffiliated insurers are likely to be more risk
averse and thus have more incentive to reduce costs because they do not have
opportunities to obtain diversification benefits. The coefficients for firms licensed in New
York are significantly positively related to the combined ratio across all lines except
commercial liability line and also have significant and positive relationship with expense
ratio in the personal property and commercial liability lines, suggesting that stricter
regulations impose higher regulatory costs, leading to lower financial performance.
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10.3 ROBUSTNESS OF PERFORMANCE RESULTS
We estimate several variants of the model to investigate the robustness of the
results. First, to examine whether our results are robust to a different performance
measure, we repeat our regression analysis with alternative performance measures by
replacing ROA with ROE. As shown in Table 19, indicator variable for MAit is
significantly inversely related to performance across all models, consistent with the
results of ROA regression. The results for other explanatory variables are also unaffected
by an alternative performance measure.
Financial theory argues that higher risk activities earn higher returns. Thus, it is
important to consider the effect of M & A on risk-adjusted performance. As in the
preceding section, the first approach utilized to capture risk-return relationship is to
include a risk measure as a control variable in the regressions. In addition, we examined
the robustness of our results to different risk measures by replacing standard deviation of
returns with firm portfolio risk. Firm portfolio risk is calculated based on the option
pricing model.50 Firm portfolio risk is also significantly inversely related to ROA and
ROE as in Table 18 and 19.
An alternative approach suggested in the literature is to use risk-adjusted
performance as a dependent variable in the regression. The risk-adjusted performance is
calculated by dividing the relevant performance measure by its volatility over a given
time period (Brown et al, 2001; Liebenberg and Sommer, 2005). We calculated riskadjusted ROA and ROE again by dividing an insurer’s ROA and ROE by its standard
deviation of returns over the past 5 years following Liebenberg and Sommer (2005). We
repeat regressions using this measurement as dependent variables. Results are shown in
Table 22. Consistent with the first approach, the coefficient on MAit is significant and
50

Details of the calculation on the firm portfolio risk measure are discussed in Chapter 5.
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negative in both ROA and ROE regressions. The results for other explanatory variables
are generally similar to those presented in Table 18 and 19.
Although the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients
estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by
the consistent fixed effects estimator, we repeated regressions using one-way and twoway random effects models with the assumption that the unobserved effect is the random
variable to estimate. The key results are unaffected.
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CAHPTER 11
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This dissertation provides some of the first evidence on the relationship between
M & As activity and the changes in the price of insurance across lines of business and the
line-by line performance change in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry.
Because U.S. antitrust policy is primarily concerned with the potential for collusive
behavior due to M & As and one principal objective of antitrust regulation is to prevent
M & As that would lead to a substantial increase in market power, our findings have
important policy implications.
Using the sample of U.S. property-liability insurers that engaged in M & A
activity over the period 1990-2003, we conduct one-way and two-way fixed effects
model regressions where dependent variable is the insurance price for each line and
where explanatory variables include the marginal capital allocation for each line, firm
insolvency put value, cost efficiency, market share, and geographical and product line
Herfindahl index. We incorporate cost efficiency and market share variable into the
regression model to examine whether efficient structure and market power hypotheses are
valid. We include geographical and product line Herfindahl index as explanatory
variables to provide further evidence on the related hypothesis that diversified insurers
charge lower prices.
The results of regression analysis provide evidence that the price of insurance for
newly formed insurers decreases following the M & As, which are favorable to
consumers. We also find that diversified insurers charge lower prices than less diversified
firms. Our result is consistent with several possible explanations. One possibility is that
acquiring insurers reduce overall underwriting risks and more efficiently manage the
frictional costs of capital through geographical and/or product line diversification by
engaging in the M&A transaction and therefore gain a competitive advantage in pricing.
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Alternatively, the result is also consistent with acquiring firms, on average, purchasing
target firms that are underperforming in terms of price and therefore the newly combined
firms charge a lower average price. Finally, the result is also consistent with acquiring
firms purchasing targets which tend to underwrite less risky clients and therefore the
target, prior to the merger, is charging fair premiums but to a different segment of the
market than which the acquiring firm operates.
Our analysis also reveals a number of other interesting results. The regression
analysis provides support for the capital allocation theory that variations in prices by lines
of business are directly related to corresponding variations of marginal capital allocation.
We find that insurance price is positively related to marginal capital allocation across all
lines, consistent with the findings of Cummins, Lin, and Phillips (2006). Consistent with
prior studies on the relation between insurance price and firm insolvency risk, we find
that insurance price is inversely related to firm insolvency put value. This result implies
that market discipline is present in insurance markets. For example, an insurer that
pursues market share aggressively and thus takes on high levels of portfolio risk may
suffer lower capitalization, charges lower prices, and thus loses firm profits. This firm
will be restricted to risk-taking, even without regulation. Furthermore, these results show
the importance of incorporating insolvency risk and marginal capital costs in pricing lines
of insurance business.
We also find that the price of insurance is inversely related to cost efficiency,
consistent with the efficiency structure hypothesis. The results indicate that it is important
to control for cost efficiency in examining price determinants in insurance industry.
However, the negative and/ or insignificant signs for the market share variable indicate
that market power hypothesis is not valid with our sample data. Thus, the implication of
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the result suggests that market power that can arise from M & A activity may not be a big
concern for insurance regulators.
Next, the dissertation explores the relationship between M & A activity and
insurer’s efficiency and firm performance changes using more recent data. The regression
results reveal the negative relationship, indicating that acquirers’ overall cost and revenue
efficiency and financial performances such as ROA and ROE decrease following M & As.
One possible explanation is that expansion of the firm through M & As has the potential
to create inefficiencies, even though acquisition targets are financially healthy firms. As
firms become larger and more complex, diversification benefits tend to be offset by the
additional costs. Administrating and operating over wider geographical areas and
integration of different information systems can lead to higher costs. Bonding different
organizations has more potential to create managerial conflict and agency costs since
managerial monitoring becomes more difficult. An alternative explanation for this result
is that the target firms may be considerably badly performing and thereby acquiring firms
appears to perform poorly after the transaction because it takes time to improve the
performance of the target.
In addition to the studies on the M & A-performance relationship, we also
investigate the performance effects of geographic and product-line diversification within
the U.S. property-liability insurance industry. We test two alternative hypothesesstrategic focus hypothesis and conglomeration hypothesis-regarding diversification’s
effect on firm performance. The results provide support for the strategic focus hypothesis
that more focused insurers outperform the diversified insurers. Our results are consistent
with the findings of recent studies of the diversification-performance relation (e.g.,
Cummins and Nini, 2002; Liebenberg and Sommer, 2005). We also find that the results
are robust to alternative performance measure, risk-adjusted ROA and ROE. It is worth
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noting that we measure performance using risk-adjusted returns while most prior
literature did not incorporate risk factor.
To provide evidence on line-by-line performance differences, we conduct
regressions using both combined ratio and expense ratio as dependent variables. The
results indicate that loss ratio and underwriting expense ratio tend to increase after M &
A. Because loss ratio and expense ratio are an inverse measure of insurer’s pricing and
profitability, the result reinforces the conclusion of ROA and ROE regressions that
acquirers’ performance decreases after M & As.
In order to explain price declines for newly formed insurers following the M & As,
future work can analyze whether firms that engage in M & A activity utilize the capital of
the firm more efficiently and thus reflect lower overall capital costs by comparing overall
capital requirement relative to the liability for both newly formed insurers and combined
acquiring and target firms before and after M & As. We could also investigate the
efficiency and financial performance of the targets relative to the industry prior to the M
& A to figure out whether the decrease of efficiency and financial performance for newly
formed insurers following the M & As is attributable to the firm characteristics of target
insurers. Furthermore, there is potential for sample selection bias if one argues firms that
engage in M & A transactions are more or less likely to be good (or bad) performers (e.g.
Campa and keida, 2002; Villalonga, 2004; Liebenberg and Sommer, 2005). To control
for potential self-selection and to gain more insights, additional exploration using
“treatment effects” may be necessary.

125

References:
Akhavein, J. D., Berger, A. N., and Humphrey, D. B., 1997, “The Effects of
Megamergers on Efficiency and Prices: Evidence from a Bank Profit Function,”
Review of Industrial Organization 12, 95-139
Ali, A. I., and Seiford, L. M., 1993, “The Mathematical Programming Approach to
Efficiency Analysis,” in Fried, H.O., C.A.K. Lovell and S. S. Schmidt (Eds),
The Measurement of Productive Efficiency, Oxford University Press, New York,
120-159
Aly, H. Y., Grabowski, R., Pasurka, C., and Rangan, N., 1990, “Technical, Scale, and
Allocative Efficiencies in U.S. Banking: An Empirical Investigation,” The Review of
Economics and Statistics 72, 211-218
Amihud, Y., and Lev, B., 1981, “Risk Reduction As a Managerial Motive for
Conglomerate Mergers,” Bell Journal of Economics 12, 605-617
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., and Stafford, E., 2001, “New Evidence and Perspectives on
Mergers,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 103-120
Andrade, G., and Stafford, E., 2004, “Investigating the Economic Role of Mergers,”
Journal of Corporate Finance 10, 1-36
BarNiv, R and Hathorn, J, 1997, “The Merger or Insolvency Alternative in the Insurance
Industry,” Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64, 89-113
Barrese, J and Nelson, J.M., 1992, “Independent and Exclusive Agency Insurers: A
Reexmination of the Cost Differential,” Journal of Risk and Insurance, 59:375-397
Berger, A. N., 1995, “The Profit-Structure Relationship in Banking-Tests of MarketPower and Efficient-Structure Hypotheses,” Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, 27, 404-431
Berger, A. N., 2000, “The Integration of the Financial Services Industry: Where are the
Efficiencies?” North American Actuarial Journal 4
Berger, Allen N., Cummins, David J. and Weiss Mary A. (1997), “The Co-Existence of
Multiple Distribution Systems for Financial Services: The Case of Property-Liability
Insurance,” The Journal of Business 70(4), 515-546.
Berger, A. N, Cummins, J. D, Weiss, M.A, and Zi, H, 2000, “Conglomeration versus
Strategic Focus: Evidence from the Insurance Industry,” Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 9, 323-362

126

Berger, A. N, DeYoung, R., and Udell, G. F., 2001, “Efficiency Barriers to the
Consolidation of the European Financial Services Industry,” European Financial
Management, 7, 117-130
Berger, A. N., and Humphrey, D. B., 1992, “Measurement and Efficiency Issues in
Commercial Banking,” in Output Measurement in the Service Sectors, ed. by Zvi
Griliches, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 245-279
Berger, P.G, and Ofek, E, 1995, “Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value,” Journal of
Financial Economics, 37, 39-65
Berger, A. N., and DeYoung, R., 2000, “The Financial Performance of Cross-Regional
Commercial Banks in the U.S.: Some Clues Regarding the Eventual Structure of a
Consolidating Industry”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Berger, A. N., and Hannan, T. H., 1989, “The Price-Concentration Relationship in
Banking,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 71, 291-299
Biger, N., and Kahane, Y., 1978, “Risk Consideration in Insurance Ratemaking,”
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 45, 121-132
Borch, K., 1974, “The Mathematical Theory of Insurance,” Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books
Bouwman, C., Fuller, K., and Nain, A., 2003, “The Performance of Stock-Price Driven
Acquistions,” Working Paper
Brealey, R.A., and S.C.Myers, 2000, Principles of Corporate Finance, 6th ed. (Homewood,
III.:Irwin McGraw-Hill)
Brennan, M. J., and Schwartz, E.S., 1979, “Pricing and Investment Strategies for
Guaranteed Equity Linked Life Insurance, Philadelphia, PA: S.S.Huebner
Foundation
Browne, M. J., Carson, J. M., and Hoyt, R. E., 2001, “Dynamic Financial Models of Life
Insurers,” North American Actuarial Journal, 5, 11-26.
Buhlmann, H., 1984, “The General Economic Premium Principle,” ASTIN Bulletin,
11, 52-60
Cagle, J.A.B. and Harrington, S. E., 1995, “Insurance Supply with Capacity Constraints
and Endogenous Insolvency Risk,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 11:219-232.
Campa, J.M., and Kedia, S, 2002, “Explaining the Diversification Discount,” Journal of
Finance, 57, 1731-1762

127

Campello, M, 2002, “Internal Capital Markets in Financial Conglomerates: Evidence
from Small Bank Responses to Monetary Policy,” Journal of Finance, 57, 27732805
Chamberlain, L.S, and Tennyson, S, 1998, “Capital Shocks and Merger Activity in
the Property-Liability Insurance Industry,” Journal of Risk and Insurance, 65,
563-595
Charnes, A., Cooper, W., Lewin, A. Y., and Seiford, L.M., 1994, “Data Envelopment
Analysis: Theory, Methodology, and Applications,” Norwell, MA: Kluwer
Academic Publishers
Colquitt, L. L., Sommer, D. W., and Godwin, N. H., 1999, “Determinants of Cash
Holding by Property-Liability Insurers,” Journal of Risk and Insurance, 66, 401-415
Cooper, R.W., 1974, “Investment and Return and Property-Liability Insurance
Ratemaking,” Philadelphia: S.S. Huebner Foundation, University of Pennsylvania
Cooper, W. W., Seiford, L. M., and Tone, K., 2006, “Introduction to Data Envelopment
Analysis and its Uses with DEA-Solver Software and References,” Springer
Cummins, J.D., 1988, “Risk-Based Premiums for Insurance Guaranty Funds, Journal
of Finance, 43, 823-839
Cummins, J.D., 1990, “Multi-Period Discounted Cash Flow Ratemaking Models in
Property-Liability Insurance,” Journal of Risk and Insurance, 57(1), 79-109
Cummins, J.D, 2000, “Allocation of Capital in the Insurance Industry,” Risk
Management and Insurance Review, 3, 7-28
Cummins, J.D., and Danzon, P.M., 1992, “Price Shocks and Capital Flows in Liability
Insurance,” Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania
Cummins, J. D., and Weiss, M. A., 1993, “Measuring Cost Efficiency in the Property
Liability Insurance Industry,” Journal of Banking and Finance 17, 463-482
Cummins, J.D., Harrington, S.E, and Niehaus, G, 1994, “Risk-based capital requirements
in property-liability insurance:A financial analysis of conceptual and measurement
issues,” in:E. Altman and I.Vanderhoof, eds., The future of the insurance
industry(Irwin Professional Publishers, Homewood, IL).
Cummins, J.D., and Danzon, P.M., 1997, “Price, Financial Quality, and Capital Flows
in Insurance Markets,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 6
Cummins, J. D., and Zi, H., 1998, “Comparision of Frontier Efficiency Methods: An
Application to the U.S. Life Insurance Industry,” Journal of Productivity Analysis
10, 131-152
128

Cummins, J.D., and Santomero, A. M., 1999, “Changes in the Life Insurance Industry:
Efficiency, Technology, and Risk Management,” Norwell, Mass: Kluwer Academic
Publisher
Cummins, J. D., and Weiss, M., A., and Zi, H., 1999, “Organizational Form and
Efficiency: An Analysis of Stock and Mutual Property-Liability Insurers,”
Management Science 45, 1254-1269.
Cummins, J. D, Tennyson, S and Weiss, M.A, 1999, “Consolidation and Efficiency in the
U.S. Life Insurance Industry,” Journal of Banking and Finance 23, 325-357
Cummins, J.D, and Mary A. Weiss, 2001, “Analyzing Firm Performance in the Insurance
Industry Using Frontier Efficiency Methods,” in Georges Dionne, ed., Handbook of
Insurance Economics (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers).
Cummins, J. D., and Nini, G, 2002, “Optimal Capital Utilization by Financial Firms:
Evidence from the Property-Liability Insurance Industry, Journal of Financial
Services Research, 21, 15-53
Cummins, J.D., and Phillips, R. D., 2001, “Applications of Financial Pricing Models in
Property-Liability Insurance,” Handbook of Insurance, edited by Georges Dionne
Cummins, J.D., and Phillips, R. D., 2005, “Estimating the Cost of Equity Capital for
Property-Liability Insurers,” Journal of Risk and Insurance, 72, 441-478
Cummins, J. D., and Rubio-Misas, M., 2003, “Deregulation, Consolidation, and
Efficiency: Evidence from the Spanish Insurance Industry,” Working paper,
Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Philadelphia, PA
Cummins, J. D, Weiss, M.A, and Zi, H, 2003, “Economies of Scope in Financial
Services: A DEA Bootstrapping Analysis of the US Insurance Industry, working
paper, Wharton Financial Institutions Center (Philadelphia, PA)
Cummins, J.D, Phillips, R.D., and Tennyson, S., 2001. “Regulation, Political
Influence, and the Price of Automobile Insurance.” Journal of Insurance
Regulation 20:9-50
Cummins, J. D., and Xie, X., 2005a, “Mergers & Acquisitions in the U.S. PropertyLiability Insurance Industry: Productivity and Efficiency Effects,” Working paper,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
Cummins, J. D, and Xie, X, 2005b, “Efficiency and Scale Economies in the
U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Industry,” Working paper, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

129

Cummins, J.D, Lin, Y and Phillips, R.D, 2006, “Capital Allocation and the
Pricing of Financially Intermediated Risks: An Empirical Investigation,”
Working paper
Demsetz, H., 1973, “Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy,” Journal of
Law and Economics 16, 1-9
Demsetz, H., 1974, “Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly,” in H.J. Goldschmid, H.M.
Mann, and J.F. Weston, eds., Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, Boston:
Little, Brown, 164-184
Doherty, N.A., and Garven, J, 1986, “Price Regulation in Property-Liability
Insurance,” Journal of Finance, 41, 1031-1050
Dong, M., Hirshleifer, D, Richardson, S., and Teoh, S. H., 2003, “Does Investor
Misvaluation Drive the Takeover Market?” Working Paper
Easterbrook, F. H., 1984, “Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends,” American
Economic Review, 74, 650-659
Eckles, D, Powell, L.S and Sommer, D.W, 2005, “Internal Capital Market Efficiency
within Financial Conglomerates: Evidence from Property-Liability Insurance
Groups,” WRIEC, Working Paper
Fairley, W.B., 1979, “ Investment Income and Profit Margins In Property-Liability
Insurance: Theory and Empirical Results,” Bell Journal 10(1), 192-210
Farrel, M.J., 1957, “The Measurement of Productive Efficiency,” Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society A 120, 253-281.
Feldblum, S, 1992.”Expense Allocation and Policyholder Persistency,” Casualty
Actuarial Society1990 Discussion Paper Program, 29-54
Froot, K.A, Scharfstein, D.S and Stein, J.C, 1993, “Risk Management: Coordinating
Corporate Investments and Financing Policies,” Journal of Finance, 68, 1629-1658
Froot, K.A and Stein, J.C, 1998, “Risk Management, Capital Budgeting, and Capital
Structure Policy for financial Institutions: an Integrated Approach,” Journal of
Financial Economics, 47, 55-82
Gallo, J.G., Apilado, V.P., and Kolari, J. W., 1996, “Commercial Bank Mutual Fund
Activities: Implications for Bank Risk and Profitability,” Journal of Banking and
Finance, 20, 1775-1791
Gertner, R.H, Scharfstein, D.S, and Stein, J.C, 1994, “Internal versus External Capital
Markets,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1211-1230

130

Golbe, D.L, and White, L. J., 1988, “ A Time-Series Analysis of Mergers and
Acquisitions in the U.S. Economy,” chapter 9 in Alan J. Auerbach, ed., Corporate
Takeover: Causes and Consequences, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
265-309
Goldberg, L., G., and Rai, A, 1996, “The Structure-Performance Relationship for
European Banking,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 20, 745-771
Grace, M. F., and Timme, S. G., 1992, “An Examination of Cost Economies in the U.S.
Life Insurance Industry,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 59, 72-103
Greene, W. H., 2003, “Econometric Analysis,” 5th Edition, Prentice Hall
Greene, W. H., and Segal, D., 2004, “Profitability and Efficiency in the U.S. Life
Insurance Industry,” Journal of Productivity Analysis, 21, 229-247
Grosskopf, S., 1993, “Efficiency and Productivity,” in H.O. Fried, C.A.K. Lovell, and
S.S. Schmidt, eds., The Measurement of Productive Efficiency, New York: Oxford
University Press
Hancock, D., 1985, “Bank Profitability, Interest Rates, and Monetary Policy,” Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 17, 189-202
Hancock, J, Huber, P, and Koch, P, 2001, “The Economics of Insurance: How Insurers
Create Value for Shareholders,” Swiss Re
Hannan, T. H., 1991, “Bank commercial loan markets and the role of market structure:
Evidence from surveys of commercial lending,” Journal of Banking and Finance 15,
133-149
Hanweck, G. A., and Hogan, A. M, 1996, “The Structure of the Property/Casualty
Insurance Industry,” Journal of Economics and Business 48, 141-155
Hill, R., 1979, “Profit Regulation in Property-Liability Insurance,” Bell Journal, 10,
172-191
Houston, J. F. and Ryngaert, M. D., 1997, “Equity Issuance and Adverse Selection: A
Direct Test Using Conditional Stock Offers”, Journal of Finance 52(1), 197-219.
Houston, J, James, C, and Marcus, D, 1997, “Capital Market Frictions and the Role of
Internal Capital Markets in Banking,” Journal of Financial Economics, 46, 135-164
Hubbard, G., and Pahlia, D., 1999, “A Re-examination of the Conglomerate Merger
Wave in the 1960s: An Internal Capital Market View,” Journal of Finance
Hughes, J.P., and Mester, L. J, 1998, “Bank Capitalization and Cost: Evidence of Scale
Economies in Risk Management and Signaling,” The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 80, 314-325
131

Hughes, J. P., Mester, L., J and Moon, C., 2001, “Are Scale Economics in Banking
Elusive or Illusive? Evidence Obtained by Incorporating Capital Structure and RiskTaking into Models of Bank Production”, Journal of Banking and Finance,25 (12)
2169-2208.
Humphrey, D.B., and Pulley, L.B, 1997, “Banks’ Responses to Deregulation: Profits,
Technology, and Efficiency,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 29
(February):73-93.
Jensen, M, 1986, “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,”
The American Economic Review, 76, 323-329
Jensen, M. C., 1988, “Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences,” The Journal of
Economic Perspectives 2, 21-48.
Jensen, M., 1993, “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and Control Systems,”
Journal of Finance, 48, 831-880
Jensen, M., and Murphy, K., 1990, “Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives,”
Journal of Political Economy, 98, 225-263
Kennedy, P., 2003, “A Guide to Econometrics,” 5th Edition, Blackwell Publishing
Kim, W., Mayers, D., and Smith, C. W., 1996, “On the Choice of Insurance Distribution
Systems,” The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 63, 207-227
Kraus, A., and Ross, S., 1982, “The Determination of Fair Property for the PropertyLiability Insurance Firm,” Journal of Finance, 33, 1015-1028
Lai, G. C., and Limpaphayom, P., 2003, “Organizational Structure and Performance:
Evidence From the Nonlife Insurance Industry in Japan,” Journal of Risk and
Insurance, 70, 735-758
Lamont, O, 1997, “Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Internal Capital
Market,” Journal of Finance, 52, 83-109
Lewellen, W. G., 1971, “A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger,” The
Journal of Finance, Vol. 26, No. 2, 521-537
Liebenberg, A. P., and Sommer, D. W., 2005, “Effects of Corporate Diversification:
Evidence from the Property-Liability Insurance Industry,” Working Paper
Lovell, C.A.K., 1993, “Production Frontiers and Productive Efficiency,” in H.O. Fried,
C.A.K. Lovell, and S.S. Schmidt, eds., The Measurement of Productive Efficiency
(New York: Oxford University Press)
Manne, H. G., 1965, “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,” Journal of
Political Economy 73, 110-120
132

Mayes, D., and Smith, C.W., 1992, “Executive Compensation in the Life Insurance
Industry,” Journal of Business, 65, 51-74
Mayes, D., and Smith, C.W., 2001, “Organizational Forms within the Insurance Industry:
Theory and Evidence,” in Georges Dionne, ed., Handbook of Insurance (Boston:
Kluwer Academic Publishers)
McAllister and McManus, 1993, “Resolving the scale efficiency puzzle in banking”,
Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 17, pp.389-405.
Meador, J. W., Ryan, H. E., and Schellhorn, C. D., 2000, “Product Focus versus
Diversification: Estimates of X-Efficiency for the US Life Insurance Industry, in
Patrck T. Harker, and Savros A. Zenios, eds.: Performance of Financial Institution:
Efficiency, Innovation, Regulation (Cambridge University Press, New York)
Merton, R.C, and Perold, A.F., 1993, “Theory of Risk Capital in Financial Firms,”
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 6, 16-32
Mitchell, M., and Mulherin, J., 1996, “The impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and
Restructuring Activity,” Journal of Financial Economics 41, 193-229
Mulherin, J., and Boone, A., 2000, “Comparing Acquisitions and Divestures,” Journal of
Corporate Finance 6, 117-139
Myers, S.C., and Cohn, R.A. 1987, “Insurance Rate Regulation and the Capital Asset
Pricing Model,” In Fair Rate of Return in Property-Liability Insurance, edited
by Cummins, J.D., and Harrington, S., Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Myers, S.C., and Majluf. N. S., 1984, “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have,” Journal of Financial
Economics 13,187-221.
Myers, S.C., and Read, J.A, 2001, “Capital Allocation for Insurance Companies,”
The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 68, No 4,545-580
Peltzman, S., 1977, “The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration,” Journal of
Law and Economics 20, 229-263
Perold, A, 2001, “Capital Allocation in Financial Firms,” Harvard Business School
Working Paper, 98-072, Cambridge, MA
Phillips, R. D., Cummins, J. D., and Allen, F., 1998, “Financial Pricing of Insurance
in the Multiple-Line Insurance Company,” Journal of Risk and Insurance,
65(4)
Prager, R. A., and Hannan, T. H., 1998, “Do Substantial Horizontal Mergers Generate
Significant Price Effects?” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 46, 433-452
133

Rau, P. R., and Vermaelen, T., 1998, “Glamour, Value and the Post-Acquisition
Performance of Acquiring Firms,” Journal of Financial Economics 49, 223-253
Rajan, R.G., Servaes, H, and Zingales, L, 2000, “The Cost of Diversity: The
Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment,” Journal of Finance, 55,
35-80
Regan, L., and Tennyson, S., 1996, “Agent Discretion and the Choice of Insurance
Marketing System,” Journal of Law and Economics, 39, 637-66
Rhodes-Kropf, M., and Viswanathan, S., 2004, “Market Valuation and Merger Waves,”
The Journal of Finance 59, 2685-2718
Roll, R., 1986, “The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers,” Journal of Business, 59
(2), 197-216
Sapienza, P., 2002, “The Effects of Banking Mergers on Loan Contracts,” The Journal of
Finance, 57, 329-367
Scharfstein, D.S, 1998, “The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets II: Evidence from
Diversified Conglomerates,” NBER Working Paper No. 6352
Scharfstein, D.S, and Stein, J.C., 2000, “The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets:
Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment,” Journal of Finance, 55,
2537-2564
Seiford, L.M., 1996, “Data Envelopment Analysis: The Evolution of the State of the Art
(1978-1995),” Journal of Productivity Analysis 7, 99-138
Servaes, H., 1996, “The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger
Wave,” Journal of Finance, 51(4), 1201-1225
Shepherd, R. W., 1970, “Theory of Cost and Production Functions,” Princeton, Princeton
University Press
Shepherd, W. G., 1982, “Economies of Scale and Monopoly Profits,” In Industrial
Organization, Antitrust, and Public Policy, edited by J. V. Craven, Boston: Kluwer
Nijhoff
Shleifer, A, and Vishny, R. W., 1988 “Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process,”
The Journal of Economics Perspectives 2, 7-20.
Shin, H, and Stulz, R.M, 1998, “Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient?” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, May, 531-552
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1989, “Management Entrenchment: The Case of ManagerSpecific Investment,” Journal of Financial Economics 25, 123-139

134

Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 2003, “Stock Market Driven Acquisitions,” Journal of
Financial Economics 70, 295-311
Smith, C.W. Jr., 1977, “Application of Option Pricing Analysis, in James, L. Bicksler,
ed., Handbook of Financial Economics, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing
Company
Sommer, D.W., 1996, “The Impact of Firm Risk on Property-Liability Insurance
Prices,” Journal of Risk and Insurance, 63(3), 501-514
Stein, J.C., 1997, “Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate
Resources,” Journal of Finance, 52, 111-133
Stigler, G. J., 1964, “A Theory of Oligopoly,” Journal of Political Economy 72, 44-61
Stulz, R., 1990, “Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies,” Journal of
Financial Economics 26, 3-27
Taylor, G, 2000, “Loss Reserving: An Actuarial Perspective,” Boston Kluser
Academic Publishers
Teece, D.J, 1980, “Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise,” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 1, 223-247
Trautwein, F., 1990, “Merger Motives and Merger Prescriptions,” Strategic Management
Journal 11, 283-295
Villalonga, B., 2004, “Diversification Discount or Premium?, New Evidence from the
Business Information Tracking Series,” The Journal of Finance, LIX, No. 2, 479-506
Weston, J.F., 1970, “The Nature and Significance of Conglomerate Firms,” St. John’s
Law Review, 44, 66-80
Zanjani, G, 2002, “Pricing and Capital Allocation in Catastrophe Insurance,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 65, 283-305
Zhu, J., 2003, “Quantitative Models for Performance and Evaluation and Benchmarking:
Data Envelopment Analysis with Spreadsheets and DEA Excel
Solver,” Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers

135

Figure1. Present Value Factor By Line of Business
The Figure1 presents the present value factors that are used to calculate the present value of loss and loss
adjustment expense incurred. The economic premium ratio for a line of insurance is defined as premiums
written for the line divided by the present value of losses and loss adjustment expenses incurred. Losses
and loss adjustment expenses incurred are discounted based on two present value factors: (1) the pattern of
loss and loss adjustment expense payment, and (2) the discount interest rate. The payout tail proportions for
each line of business and for each year of the sample period are estimated based on Schedule P of annual
statement data using Taylor separation method (Taylor, 2000). We also estimate U.S. Treasury spot rate
(zero rate) curve from the constant maturity treasury data using bootstrap method. The present value factor
for each year is calculated by summing up the estimated payout tail proportions divided by the estimated
zero curves for the number of periods in the payout tail. The present value of losses and loss adjustment
expenses incurred is obtained by multiplying the total losses and loss adjustment expenses incurred by the
present value factor.
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Table1. Economic Value of Assets for the U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Industry, 1989-2004 (Unit: $Millions)
Table shows the economic value of assets for the U.S. property-liability insurance industry over the sample period 1995-2004. Assets are adjusted to market values based on
NAIC statutory accounting standards. Stocks, government bonds, and corporate bonds are reported at market values. However, other assets are described at NAIC annual
statement book values. The economic value of assets is defined as the book value of total assets minus the book value of stocks, government bonds, and corporate bonds plus
the market value of stocks, government bonds, and corporate bonds.
Number of
Government
Bonds
Year Company Stocks
%
1989
2596
115,609 0.188
255,473
1990
2649
112,924 0.174
277,062
1991
2668
131,780 0.185
305,942
1992
2669
134,383 0.179
321,752
1993
2655
145,354 0.182
359,540
1994
2681
154,534 0.195
347,949
1995
2688
186,129 0.209
379,726
1996
2708
201,990 0.217
386,251
1997
2721
257,936 0.251
403,769
1998
2757
282,565 0.262
393,125
1999
2708
293,569 0.277
349,494
2000
2679
267,784 0.254
343,561
2001
2699
249,362 0.226
344,673
2002
2680
229,278 0.193
389,675
2003
2699
273,158 0.205
436,372
2004
2727
301,135 0.207
497,056
Average
2687
208,593 0.213
361,964

%
0.415
0.426
0.429
0.429
0.451
0.440
0.427
0.416
0.392
0.365
0.330
0.326
0.312
0.328
0.328
0.342
0.385

Corporate
Bonds
76,786
81,878
96,567
96,340
102,449
100,352
121,060
135,770
154,531
166,333
169,096
177,461
191,549
196,025
216,052
228,786
144,440

% Real Estate
0.125
6,171
0.126
6,996
0.135
7,710
0.128
8,476
0.129
9,086
0.127
9,441
0.136
9,273
0.146
9,623
0.150
9,472
0.154
9,188
0.160
9,532
0.168
9,646
0.173
9,329
0.165
9,532
0.162
9,280
0.158
9,329
0.146
8,880

%
Mortgages
%
0.010
6,499
0.011
0.011
6,916
0.011
0.011
6,537
0.009
0.011
5,710
0.008
0.011
4,525
0.006
0.012
3,813
0.005
0.010
2,857
0.003
0.010
2,544
0.003
0.009
2,315
0.002
0.009
2,045
0.002
0.009
2,197
0.002
0.009
1,645
0.002
0.008
2,554
0.002
0.008
2,588
0.002
0.007
2,715
0.002
0.006
3,108
0.002
0.010
3,661
0.004

Cash+
Invested
39,449
44,986
39,541
48,393
48,097
46,135
56,209
56,683
59,788
69,853
66,569
81,568
83,502
112,345
127,536
130,726
69,461

%
0.064
0.069
0.055
0.064
0.060
0.058
0.063
0.061
0.058
0.065
0.063
0.077
0.076
0.095
0.096
0.090
0.070

Other
Assets
115,446
119,929
125,522
135,307
128,037
128,694
134,403
136,613
141,695
154,241
168,031
171,725
224,514
248,327
267,290
281,947
167,608

%
0.188
0.184
0.176
0.180
0.161
0.163
0.151
0.147
0.138
0.143
0.159
0.163
0.203
0.209
0.201
0.194
0.172

Economic
Assets
615,434
650,690
713,600
750,361
797,088
790,920
889,661
929,469
1,029,506
1,077,355
1,058,491
1,053,393
1,105,485
1,187,773
1,332,406
1,452,089
964,608
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Table2. Economic Value of Liabilities and Capital for the U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Industry, 1989-2004 (Unit: $Millions)
Table shows the economic value of liabilities and equity for the U.S. property-liability insurance industry over the sample period 1995-2004. The reserves for each line of
business are adjusted to the present values by discounting the expected future loss cash flows with the estimated U.S. Treasury spot-rate curve. The expected future loss cash
flows are based on the pattern of loss and loss adjustment expense payment. Other liabilities are defined as total liabilities of the industry minus all reserves of commercial
liability, commercial property, personal liability, and personal property after discounting.
Number of Personal
Year Company Property
1989
2596
12,404
1990
2649
12,278
1991
2668
12,484
1992
2669
13,759
1993
2655
12,244
1994
2681
12,911
1995
2688
12,766
1996
2708
13,025
1997
2721
12,424
1998
2757
13,893
1999
2708
14,241
2000
2679
15,433
2001
2699
17,361
2002
2680
19,494
2003
2699
20,908
2004
2727
21,893
Average 2687
14,845

%
0.020
0.019
0.017
0.018
0.015
0.016
0.014
0.014
0.012
0.013
0.013
0.015
0.016
0.016
0.016
0.015
0.016

Personal
Liability
66,159
70,208
74,131
77,543
81,035
77,952
64,168
63,529
63,242
64,199
61,968
64,480
68,202
73,913
76,631
77,215
70,286

%
0.107
0.108
0.104
0.103
0.102
0.099
0.072
0.068
0.061
0.060
0.059
0.061
0.062
0.062
0.058
0.053
0.077

Commercial
Property
31,039
32,916
34,230
37,715
38,925
38,939
43,462
44,397
45,194
49,222
49,153
49,519
57,726
60,768
62,907
67,856
46,498

%
0.050
0.051
0.048
0.050
0.049
0.049
0.049
0.048
0.044
0.046
0.046
0.047
0.052
0.051
0.047
0.047
0.048

Commercial
Liability
139,988
151,833
165,012
177,303
187,479
182,893
201,820
205,276
203,047
208,093
188,292
186,409
197,159
220,915
240,739
259,577
194,740

Other
Economic
Economic
Economic
Liabilities %
Liabilities
Equity
%
%
% Liab+Equity
0.227 187,217 0.304 436,807 0.710 178,627 0.290
615,434
0.233 192,877 0.296 460,112 0.707 190,578 0.293
650,690
0.231 208,347 0.292 494,204 0.693 219,396 0.307
713,600
0.236 222,183 0.296 528,503 0.704 221,858 0.296
750,361
0.235 224,926 0.282 544,609 0.683 252,479 0.317
797,088
0.231 246,668 0.312 559,363 0.707 231,557 0.293
790,920
0.227 258,986 0.291 581,204 0.653 308,456 0.347
889,661
0.221 274,150 0.295 600,378 0.646 329,090 0.354
929,469
0.197 285,505 0.277 609,414 0.592 420,091 0.408 1,029,506
0.193 293,866 0.273 629,276 0.584 448,078 0.416 1,077,355
0.178 322,932 0.305 636,588 0.601 421,902 0.399 1,058,491
0.177 330,511 0.314 646,355 0.614 407,038 0.386 1,053,393
0.178 381,402 0.345 721,852 0.653 383,632 0.347 1,105,485
0.186 416,455 0.351 791,547 0.666 396,225 0.334 1,187,773
0.181 464,060 0.348 865,247 0.649 467,158 0.351 1,332,406
0.179 497,633 0.343 924,176 0.636 527,912 0.364 1,452,089
0.207 300,482 0.308 626,852 0.656 337,755 0.344
964,608

138

Table3. Liability Volatility and Correlation Matrix, 1991-2004
Table3, 4, and 5 provide industry-wide volatilities and correlation matrix that are determined by the quarterly time series of returns of seven asset classes and of the
underwriting returns of four aggregated insurance lines over the period, 1991-2004. The quarterly estimates of the asset returns on the first six categories are obtained from
the standard rate of return series (Stocks- S & P 500 index; government bond-Lehman Brothers intermediate term total return; corporate bond-Moody’s corporate bond total
return; real estate-NAREIT total return; mortgages-Merrill Lynch mortgage backed securities total return; cash and others invested-30-day U.S. Treasury bill rate). The return
series for other assets are calculated by the natural logarithm of the gross quarterly percentage change in the total market value of asset of the insurance industry net of the
market value of the first six asset categories. The quarterly underwriting return series adjusted for seasonality with the U.S. Census Bureau’s X11 procedure are defined as the
natural logarithm of the present value of incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses divided by the earned premium for each quarter.
Liability Class
Homeowners/Farmowners(HO)
Auto Physical Damage(APD)
Auto Liability(AL)
Commercial Multiple Peril(CMP)
Special Property(SP)
Fidelity/Surety(FS)
Accident, Health, Fin. Guaranty(AH)
Medical Malpractice(MM)
Workers' Compensation(WC)
Other Liability(OL)
Special Liability(SL)
Miscellaneous Liability(ML)

Volatility
0.302
0.124
0.125
0.189
0.481
0.430
0.088
0.164
0.207
0.221
0.207
0.053

HO
1.000

APD AL
-0.312 -0.192
1.000 0.235
1.000

CMP
0.569
0.208
-0.047
1.000

SP
0.562
0.136
-0.764
0.643
1.000

FS
-0.130
0.396
0.236
0.188
-0.180
1.000

AH
0.491
0.128
-0.090
0.011
-0.014
-0.091
1.000

MM
-0.282
-0.166
0.856
0.019
-0.087
0.277
-0.143
1.000

WC
0.054
0.006
0.245
-0.045
0.123
-0.133
0.027
0.188
1.000

OL
0.136
0.275
-0.345
0.190
0.053
0.438
0.238
-0.283
-0.527
1.000

SL
0.544
0.360
-0.685
0.261
0.276
-0.085
0.343
-0.795
-0.066
0.369
1.000

ML
-0.036
0.278
0.141
0.001
-0.124
0.177
-0.127
0.002
-0.097
-0.046
-0.078
1.000
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Table4. Asset and Liability Correlation Matrix, 1991-2004

Stocks
Government Bonds
Corporate Bonds
Real Estate
Mortgages
Cash & Others Invested
Other Assets

HO
-0.175
-0.092
0.012
0.207
-0.189
-0.403
0.018

APD
-0.018
-0.079
-0.059
0.054
-0.059
-0.105
0.095

AL
-0.009
0.173
0.031
0.005
0.003
0.037
-0.155

CMP
-0.248
-0.153
-0.346
-0.084
-0.296
-0.227
0.200

SP
-0.150
-0.313
-0.248
-0.044
-0.395
-0.240
-0.016

FS
-0.072
-0.106
-0.230
-0.072
-0.087
-0.217
0.174

AH
-0.151
0.199
0.239
0.173
0.181
-0.336
0.139

MM
-0.180
0.161
-0.066
-0.041
0.075
-0.072
-0.086

WC
-0.125
-0.141
0.064
-0.194
-0.097
-0.190
-0.185

OL
-0.065
0.026
-0.213
0.113
0.038
-0.311
0.312

SL
-0.025
-0.149
-0.038
0.014
-0.112
-0.189
0.190

ML
-0.028
0.006
0.106
-0.185
0.020
0.198
-0.076

Table5. Asset Volatility and Correlation Matrix, 1991-2004

Asset Class
Stocks

Volatility

Stocks

Government
Bonds

Corporate
Bonds

Real Estate

Mortgage

Cash &
Others Inv.

Other Assets

0.1581

1.0000

-0.2833

0.5570

0.2946

-0.0907

0.1952

-0.1972

Government Bonds

0.0373

-0.2833

1.0000

-0.0146

0.0493

0.9250

0.1966

-0.0141

Corporate Bonds

0.0682

0.5570

-0.0146

1.0000

0.2662

0.1354

0.1013

0.0767

Real Estate

0.1211

0.2946

0.0493

0.2662

1.0000

0.1247

0.0684

-0.1591

Mortgages

0.0065

-0.0907

0.9250

0.1354

0.1247

1.0000

0.2809

0.0051

Cash & Others Invested

0.0061

0.1952

0.1966

0.1013

0.0684

0.2809

1.0000

0.0307

Other Assets

0.0704

-0.1972

-0.0141

0.0767

-0.1591

0.0051

0.0307

1.0000
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Table6. Insolvency Put Value and Capital Allocations for the U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Industry, 1989-2004 (Unit: $Millions)
The table displays insolvency put value for the U.S. property-liability insurance industry and amount of economic capital allocated across five lines of business based on
Myers and Read (2001) methodology. CL represents commercial liability, CP commercial property, PL personal property, PP personal property, and OL other liabilities.
The column of default-to-liability ratio is calculated to obtain insolvency put value. The column of capital-to-liability ratio shows the marginal capital requirement for each
line in response to the marginal increase in the present value of losses for the line.

Year
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Avg.

Insolvency Put
Insolvency/Liability Insolvency
Ratio
Put Value
6.20E-05
27.08
6.18E-05
28.43
3.70E-05
18.26
5.68E-05
30.03
3.45E-05
18.76
3.65E-05
20.43
6.41E-05
37.26
5.29E-05
31.76
5.18E-05
31.57
3.73E-05
23.46
4.77E-05
30.35
5.53E-05
35.76
6.62E-05
47.82
4.09E-05
32.36
1.98E-05
17.12
1.14E-05
10.57
4.60E-05
27.56

Capital-To-Liability Ratio
CL CP PL PP OL
0.84 0.33 0.36 0.38 0.12
0.85 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.11
0.91 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.12
0.86 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.11
0.95 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.12
0.86 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.12
1.10 0.42 0.36 0.45 0.15
1.14 0.44 0.37 0.47 0.17
1.44 0.57 0.47 0.61 0.23
1.48 0.61 0.49 0.64 0.24
1.37 0.63 0.51 0.67 0.29
1.30 0.61 0.50 0.65 0.28
1.10 0.55 0.43 0.58 0.25
1.05 0.50 0.39 0.54 0.22
1.14 0.53 0.41 0.58 0.25
1.21 0.56 0.42 0.61 0.26
1.10 0.47 0.40 0.50 0.19

Marginal Capital Requirement and Allocation
The Amount of Capital Allocated By Line and % of Industry Capital
CL
%
CP
%
PL
%
PP
%
OL
117,153 0.656 10,372 0.058 23,724 0.133
4,679 0.026 22,697
128,929 0.677 10,776 0.057 24,769 0.130
4,499 0.024 21,603
150,014 0.684 11,787 0.054 27,488 0.125
4,831 0.022 25,275
152,932 0.689 12,346 0.056 26,632 0.120
5,030 0.023 24,915
177,807 0.704 13,648 0.054 30,100 0.119
4,709 0.019 26,212
156,548 0.676 12,984 0.056 26,537 0.115
4,770 0.021 30,717
222,639 0.722 18,133 0.059 22,839 0.074
5,720 0.019 39,123
234,414 0.712 19,508 0.059 23,347 0.071
6,158 0.019 45,672
291,561 0.694 25,858 0.062 29,999 0.071
7,581 0.018 65,094
307,076 0.685 29,898 0.067 31,462 0.070
8,893 0.020 70,748
257,211 0.610 31,082 0.074 31,362 0.074
9,520 0.023 92,726
243,010 0.597 30,284 0.074 32,006 0.079 10,079 0.025 91,657
217,284 0.566 31,659 0.083 29,049 0.076 10,021 0.026 95,618
233,024 0.588 30,468 0.077 28,798 0.073 10,484 0.026 93,451
274,538 0.588 33,608 0.072 31,563 0.068 12,184 0.026 115,265
314,274 0.595 38,237 0.072 32,382 0.061 13,385 0.025 129,634
217,401 0.653 22,540 0.065 28,254 0.091
7,659 0.023 61,900

Economic
Capital
%
0.127
0.113
0.115
0.112
0.104
0.133
0.127
0.139
0.155
0.158
0.220
0.225
0.249
0.236
0.247
0.246
0.169

178,627
190,578
219,396
221,858
252,479
231,557
308,456
329,090
420,091
448,078
421,902
407,038
383,632
396,225
467,158
527,912
337,755
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Table7. Inputs and Expenses-Groups and Unaffiliated Companies, 1989-2004
N
Input Quantities (000s)
Administrative Labor
Agent Labor
Materials and Business Services
Financial Equity Capital
Input Prices
Administrative Labor
Agent Labor
Materials and Business Services
Financial Equity Capital
Expenses (000s)
Administrative Labor
Agent Labor
Materials and Business Services
Financial Equity Capital
Percent of Total Expenses
Administrative Labor
Agent Labor
Materials and Business Services
Financial Equity Capital

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

10,643
10,643
10,643
10,643

2,871
6,619
15,279
332,830

131
348
783
12,611

14,131
31,851
92,820
2,124,947

0.011
0.096
20
705

262,171
679,788
2,554,499
55,868,199

10,643
10,643
10,643
10,643

6.928
5.277
4.372
0.111

7.076
5.140
4.186
0.114

0.663
0.345
0.400
0.029

5.958
4.925
3.965
0.060

7.932
6.039
5.075
0.166

10,643
10,643
10,643
10,643

20,150
35,184
67,233
34,956

912
1,830
3,385
1,350

101,104
172,190
411,901
220,750

0.065
0.486
80
51

2,011,635
3,929,143
10,655,961
6,715,357

10,643
10,643
10,643
10,643

12.1%
23.6%
40.4%
23.9%

11.9%
23.5%
39.4%
18.1%

8.8%
17.2%
17.2%
18.3%

0.001
0.001
0.019
0.001

83.8%
97.9%
99.8%
100.0%
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Table8. Outputs, Prices, and Revenues-Groups and Unaffiliated Companies, 1989-2004
N

Mean

Output Quantities (000s)
Personal Short-Tail
7,259
172,007
Personal Long-Tail
5,176
164,879
Commercial Short-Tail
7,786
91,398
Commercial Long-Tail
7,314
149,098
Intermediation
10,643
2,277,673
Output Prices
Personal Short-Tail
7,259
0.241
Personal Long-Tail
5,176
0.273
Commercial Short-Tail
7,786
0.713
Commercial Long-Tail
7,314
0.474
Intermediation
10,643
0.079
Revenues (000s)
Personal Short-Tail
7,259
88,654
Personal Long-Tail
5,176
73,499
Commercial Short-Tail
7,786
74,306
Commercial Long-Tail
7,314
85,582
Intermediation
10,643
169,573
Revenues: Percentage of Insurance Revenues
Personal Short-Tail
7,259
23.1%
Personal Long-Tail
5,176
16.6%
Commercial Short-Tail
7,786
18.2%
Commercial Long-Tail
7,314
17.6%
Intermediation
10,643
24.4%

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

20,625
14,081
9,484
8,841
209,573

839,914
732,146
258,510
503,577
7,321,154

344
187
4
6
11,057

14,741,160
11,535,170
3,262,982
10,793,424
94,700,304

0.204
0.221
0.622
0.352
0.074

0.112
0.134
0.498
0.223
0.061

0.002
0.001
0.003
0.001
0.001

4.966
4.753
4.991
4.981
2.176

9,457
8,244
9,540
8,313
15,798

318,045
314,838
211,724
308,014
600,242

30
134
3
1
1,210

8,961,194
7,266,213
2,753,662
7,971,607
9,735,310

21.6%
14.5%
15.6%
13.2%
23.1%

15.1%
13.0%
13.9%
16.2%
10.7%

0.01%
0.03%
0.01%
0.01%
0.50%

81.1%
80.8%
90.6%
87.9%
98.1%
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Table9. Number of M & A Transactions and Sample Selection Criteria, 1990-2003
Sample Selection Criteria/Year
M & As initially identified in Best's Reports
Less Merge with shell target
Reinsurer M & A
In liquidation after M & A
Remerge within 2 years
Merge with life insurer, reinsurer
Merge into inactive insurer
Involve in multiple M & A
Not identified on NAIC database
Negative premium/loss/surplus
Negative input/output or prices
Sample used in the regression analysis

1990
26
4
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
4
7

1991 1992
36
4
1

35
1
2
2
1

1
1
8
2
4
15

1
9
3
7
9

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

44
3
4

38
4
1

44
1
2

49
5
1

44
5
7
1

40
4
1

36
0
1
1
2

38
3
0
1

34
2
1
1
2

41
3
2
1
1

1
1
1
4
6
8
16

1
2
2
2
5
3
2
16

33
5
1
2
1

1
3
2
5
7
16

3
1
1
4
5
5

1
5
7
4

4
6
3

7
19

10
13

7
10

1
4
4
2

1
3
4
4

4
7
4

3
1
6

1
7
1
1

3
11

6
17

5
12

6
17

6
12

Total
538
44
24
11
11
7
10
42
66
51
82
190

Data source: Best's Insurance Reports and NAIC database
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Table10. Summary Statistics for All Groups and Unaffiliated Companies: 1989-2004
Variables

Obs.

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Economic Premium Ratio
Personal Property(PP) Line

7259

1.106

1.057

0.440

0.012

4.000

Personal Liability(PL) Line

5176

1.051

1.029

0.408

0.010

3.982

Commercial Property(CP) Line

7786

1.383

1.271

0.617

0.014

3.995

Commercial Liability(CL) Line

7314

1.243

1.145

0.589

0.011

3.999

Return On Asset

10643

0.034

0.037

0.098

-1.357

4.145

Return On Equity

10643

0.066

0.085

0.300

-5.937

10.594

Risk-Adjusted Return On Asset

10643

1.045

0.910

1.483

-5.581

9.719

Risk-Adjusted Return On Equity

10643

0.983

0.842

1.434

-8.838

9.006

PP Line Underwriting Performance

7259

0.904

0.905

0.300

0.012

4.211

PL Line Underwriting Performance

5176

0.947

0.930

0.318

0.028

4.129

CP Line Underwriting Performance

7786

0.873

0.862

0.294

0.020

4.502

CL Line Underwriting Performance

7314

0.942

0.908

0.382

0.010

4.642

Firm Performance

PP line Expense to Premium Ratio

7259

0.281

0.287

0.155

0.001

0.996

PL line Expense to Premium Ratio

5176

0.254

0.264

0.140

0.001

0.995

CP line Expense to Premium Ratio

7786

0.360

0.339

0.181

0.001

0.998

CL line Expense to Premium Ratio

7314

0.372

0.347

0.188

0.002

0.999

PP Line Capital Allocation

10643

0.862

0.605

0.805

0.011

3.990

PL Line Capital Allocation

10643

0.676

0.538

0.637

0.014

3.982

CP Line Capital Allocation

10643

0.835

0.590

0.780

0.013

3.987

CL Line Capital Allocation

10643

0.884

0.699

0.719

0.011

3.999

Relative PP Line Capital Allocation

10643

1.256

1.157

0.791

0.012

3.988

Relative PL Line Capital Allocation

10643

1.002

1.007

0.724

0.010

3.800

Relative CP Line Capital Allocation

10643

1.093

1.018

0.671

0.013

3.988

Relative CL Line Capital Allocation

10643

1.310

1.408

0.677

0.010

3.985

Pure Technical Efficiency

10643

0.589

0.546

0.274

0.006

1.000

Scale Efficiency

10643

0.843

0.923

0.192

0.002

1.000

Capital Allocation

Efficiency Scores

Allocative Efficiency

10643

0.696

0.722

0.198

0.005

1.000

Cost Efficiency

10643

0.335

0.302

0.199

0.001

1.000

Revenue Efficiency
10643 0.408
0.400
0.192 0.001
1.000
Note: We exclude observations when economic premium ratio is greater than 4 or less than 0.01. We also
exclude observations when either line capital allocation is greater than 4 or less than 0.01.
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Table10. Continued
Variables
Firm Characteristics
Total Assets ($ million)
Total Premiums ($ million)
Equity Capital ($million)
Firm Insolvency Put Value
Firm Portfolio Risk(Sigma)
Firm Capital/Total Assets
Firm Capital/Firm Liability
Net Premium/Surplus
Liquidity Ratio
Advertising Expenses/Total Expenses
Standard Deviation of ROA
Standard Deviation of ROE
Industry Concentration
Market Share
Geographic Herfindahl Index
Number of States Operated
Product Line Herfindahl Index
Number of Product Line
Percent of Premiums Written in PP Line
Percent of Premiums Written in PL Line
Percent of Premiums Written in CP Line
Percent of Premiums Written in CL Line
Percent of Losses Incurred in PP Line
Percent of Losses Incurred in PL Line
Percent of Losses Incurred in CP Line
Percent of Losses Incurred in CL Line
Percent of Mutual Companies
Percent of Unaffiliated Companies
Percent of Independent Agent
Percent of Direct Writing
Percent of Brokerage
Percent of Mixed Distribution
Percent of New York Domicile
Percent Insurers with A++ or A+ Rating
Percent Insurers with A or A- Rating
Percent Insurers with B++ or B+ Rating
Percent Insurers with B or Below B

Obs.

Mean

10643
632
10643
329
10643
333
10643 0.002
10643 0.129
10643 0.465
10643 0.842
10643 1.275
10643 0.309
10643 0.007
10643 0.058
10643 0.127
10643 0.057
10643 0.002
10643 0.637
10643 12.418
10643 0.503
10643 8.016
7259 0.249
5176 0.152
7786 0.286
7314 0.316
7259 0.256
5176 0.162
7786 0.267
7314 0.315
10643 0.387
10643 0.575
10643 0.612
10643 0.180
10643 0.059
10643 0.058
10643 0.088
10643 0.132
10643 0.377
10643 0.157
10643 0.077

Median Std. Dev.
40
19
13
0.000
0.128
0.421
0.599
1.164
0.154
0.002
0.045
0.097
0.053
0.000
0.766
2.000
0.394
6.000
0.178
0.102
0.168
0.113
0.171
0.001
0.139
0.101
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

3,343
1,832
2,135
0.015
0.034
0.193
0.709
0.776
0.438
0.017
0.051
0.121
0.045
0.008
0.379
17.828
0.321
7.425
0.259
0.221
0.327
0.380
0.272
0.234
0.325
0.382
0.487
0.494
0.487
0.384
0.233
0.234
0.283
0.338
0.485
0.364
0.266

Min

Max

2.003
0.101
0.001
0.000
0.003
0.012
0.013
0.006
0.002
0.001
0.002
0.001
0.003
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.003
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.003
0.001
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

84,405
47,762
57,977
0.833
0.741
0.998
3.997
3.992
4.792
0.581
1.507
1.653
0.832
0.187
1.000
51.000
1.000
31.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
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Table11. Summary Statistics for Acquiring Groups and Unaffiliated Companies:
1989-2004
Variables

Obs.

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Economic Premium Ratio
Personal Property(PP) Line

149

1.079

1.034

0.349

0.251

2.678

Personal Liability(PL) Line

113

1.053

1.045

0.340

0.010

3.977

Commercial Property(CP) Line

156

1.333

1.262

0.512

0.060

3.488

Commercial Liability(CL) Line

168

1.244

1.141

0.503

0.013

3.938

Return On Asset

190

0.045

0.038

0.079

-0.279

3.656

Return On Equity

190

0.054

0.060

0.170

-1.105

4.983

Risk-Adjusted Return On Asset

190

0.940

0.691

1.408

-3.229

6.951

Risk-Adjusted Return On Equity

190

0.645

0.659

1.303

-3.676

6.024

PP Line Underwriting Performance

149

0.943

0.932

0.260

0.109

2.426

PL Line Underwriting Performance

113

0.974

0.947

0.239

0.370

2.359

CP Line Underwriting Performance

156

0.870

0.845

0.274

0.038

3.293

CL Line Underwriting Performance

168

0.985

0.963

0.372

0.001

3.857

PP line Expense to Premium Ratio

149

0.290

0.286

0.137

0.001

0.947

PL line Expense to Premium Ratio

113

0.282

0.288

0.127

0.001

0.728

CP line Expense to Premium Ratio

156

0.322

0.305

0.145

0.013

0.939

CL line Expense to Premium Ratio

168

0.381

0.348

0.166

0.001

0.981

PP Line Capital Allocation

149

0.836

0.595

0.758

0.018

3.649

PL Line Capital Allocation

113

0.673

0.525

0.636

0.011

3.270

CP Line Capital Allocation

156

0.725

0.567

0.650

0.038

3.904

CL Line Capital Allocation

168

0.936

0.824

0.602

0.040

3.873

Relative PP Line Capital Allocation

149

1.106

1.091

0.638

0.012

3.156

Relative PL Line Capital Allocation

113

0.878

0.783

0.603

0.012

2.152

Relative CP Line Capital Allocation

156

0.927

0.925

0.431

0.106

2.059

Relative CL Line Capital Allocation

168

1.440

1.608

0.594

0.012

3.306

Pure Technical Efficiency

190

0.621

0.594

0.242

0.107

1.000

Scale Efficiency

190

0.809

0.855

0.183

0.244

1.000

Allocative Efficiency

190

0.746

0.777

0.157

0.210

1.000

Cost Efficiency

190

0.358

0.352

0.157

0.015

0.975

Firm Performance

Capital Allocation

Efficiency Scores

Revenue Efficiency
190 0.406
0.407
0.160
0.083 1.000
Note: We exclude observations when economic premium ratio is greater than 4 or less than 0.01. We also
exclude observations when either line capital allocation is greater than 4 or less than 0.01. The statistics refer to
the calendar year prior to the M & As
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Table11. Continued
Variables
Firm Characteristics
Total Assets ($ million)
Total Premiums ($ million)
Equity Capital ($million)
Firm Insolvency Put Value
Firm Portfolio Risk(Sigma)
Firm Capital/Total Assets
Firm Capital/Firm Liability
Net Premium/Surplus
Liquidity Ratio
Advertising Expenses/Total Expenses
Standard Deviation of ROA
Standard Deviation of ROE
Industry Concentration
Market Share
Geographic Herfindahl Index
Number of States Operated
Product Line Herfindahl Index
Number of Product Line
Percent of Premiums Written in PP Line
Percent of Premiums Written in PL Line
Percent of Premiums Written in CP Line
Percent of Premiums Written in CL Line
Percent of Losses Incurred in PP Line
Percent of Losses Incurred in PL Line
Percent of Losses Incurred in CP Line
Percent of Losses Incurred in CL Line
Percent of Mutual Companies
Percent of Unaffiliated Companies
Percent of Independent Agent
Percent of Direct Writing
Percent of Brokerage
Percent of Mixed Distribution
Percent of New York Domicile
Percent Insurers with A++ or A+ Rating
Percent Insurers with A or A- Rating
Percent Insurers with B++ or B+ Rating
Percent Insurers with B or Below B

Obs.
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
149
113
156
168
149
113
156
168
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190
190

Mean
1,822
929
1,026
0.001
0.142
0.467
0.715
1.228
0.277
0.006
0.069
0.138
0.059
0.004
0.400
24.350
0.326
14.662
0.258
0.172
0.292
0.302
0.254
0.178
0.284
0.306
0.406
0.226
0.690
0.123
0.065
0.084
0.058
0.221
0.468
0.143
0.045

Median Std. Dev.
187
103
139
0.000
0.137
0.425
0.575
1.120
0.138
0.003
0.052
0.105
0.054
0.000
0.236
21.000
0.230
15.000
0.196
0.115
0.227
0.226
0.175
0.104
0.215
0.237
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

4,105
2,114
2,164
0.003
0.029
0.194
0.470
0.649
0.296
0.011
0.119
0.131
0.041
0.008
0.356
20.411
0.267
8.569
0.199
0.147
0.234
0.290
0.224
0.170
0.224
0.320
0.493
0.419
0.464
0.329
0.246
0.278
0.235
0.416
0.501
0.351
0.209

Min
2.000
0.611
0.822
0.000
0.055
0.128
0.108
0.170
0.011
0.000
0.012
0.010
0.016
0.000
0.005
1.000
0.074
1.000
0.001
0.002
0.008
0.002
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Max
23,956
14,905
11,163
0.037
0.261
0.997
3.147
3.904
3.404
0.101
1.272
0.969
0.436
0.057
1.000
51.000
1.000
32.000
0.750
0.674
1.000
1.000
0.942
0.798
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
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Table12. Economic Premium Ratio Regression for Personal Property Line, 1989-2004
Dependent Variable:
Fixed Effects
Variable/Model Number
Intercept

Economic Premium Ratio
X
Year
X
Year
Year+Firm
1
2
3
4
5
***
**
*
***
***
0.8147
0.8847
0.6978
0.7453
1.0542 ***
(0.0895)
(0.0910)
(0.0838)
(0.0854)
(0.3129)
Indicator for MA
-0.0463 **
-0.0567 **
-0.0476 **
-0.0563 **
-0.0683 *
(0.0229)
(0.0229)
(0.0229)
(0.0229)
(0.0433)
Marginal Capital Allocation
0.0189 **
0.0109
0.0193 **
0.0145 *
0.0323 **
(0.0077)
(0.0077)
(0.0076)
(0.0076)
(0.0132)
Cost Efficiency
-0.1079 ***
-0.1346 ***
-0.1214 ***
-0.1413 ***
-0.5656 ***
(0.0312)
(0.0335)
(0.0311)
(0.0334)
(0.0509)
Market Share
-1.0906 *
-0.8666
-1.1881 *
-0.9901
1.5958
(0.6134)
(0.6089)
(0.6069)
(0.6031)
(1.6419)
Geographic Herfindahl Index
0.0416 **
0.0380 **
0.0421 **
0.0391 **
0.0522 *
(0.0176)
(0.0176)
(0.0176)
(0.0176)
(0.0329)
Product Line Herfindahl Index
0.1279 ***
0.1267 ***
0.1360 ***
0.1362 ***
0.1542 **
(0.0329)
(0.0327)
(0.0328)
(0.0326)
(0.0591)
Natural log of Assets
0.0182 ***
0.0134 ***
0.0238 ***
0.0201 *
0.0360 *
(0.0043)
(0.0044)
(0.0041)
(0.0041)
(0.0155)
Mutual
-0.1264 ***
-0.1258 ***
-0.1269 ***
-0.1265 ***
-0.0202
(0.0117)
(0.0116)
(0.0116)
(0.0116)
(0.0382)
Unaffiliated Single Firms
0.0533 ***
0.0453 ***
0.0564 ***
0.0489 ***
0.0205 ***
(0.0142)
(0.0141)
(0.0142)
(0.0141)
(0.0043)
Firm Licensed in New York
-0.0689 ***
-0.0716 ***
-0.0625 ***
-0.0667 ***
0.0192
(0.0170)
(0.0169)
(0.0172)
(0.0171)
(0.0534)
A.M. Best Rating A or A-0.0193
-0.0262 **
(0.0122)
(0.0122)
A.M. Best Rating B++ or B+
-0.0322 *
-0.0437 ***
(0.0166)
(0.0166)
A.M. Best Rating B or lower
-0.0668 ***
-0.0798 ***
(0.0214)
(0.0215)
Firm Insolvency Put Value
-8.8723 ***
-7.0252 **
-16.0084 **
(2.8913)
(2.8878)
(3.3975)
Adjusted R-square
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.05
0.44
Observations
7259
7259
7259
7259
7259
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
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Table13. Economic Premium Ratio Regression for Personal Liability Line, 1989-2004
Dependent Variable:
Fixed Effects
Variable/Model Number
Intercept

Economic Premium Ratio
X
Year
X
Year
Year+Firm
1
2
3
4
5
***
***
***
***
1.0583
1.0660
0.8542
0.1814
1.5988 ***
(0.0952)
(0.0949)
(0.0875)
(0.0877)
(0.3282)
Indicator for MA
0.0269
-0.0099
0.0236
-0.0092
-0.0189 *
(0.0236)
(0.0232)
(0.0235)
(0.0232)
(0.0347)
Marginal Capital Allocation
0.0178 *
0.0133
0.0078
0.0103
-0.0110
(0.0100)
(0.0097)
(0.0100)
(0.0098)
(0.0161)
Cost Efficiency
0.0145
-0.0999 ***
-0.0044
-0.1077 ***
-0.3097 ***
(0.0355)
(0.0383)
(0.0351)
(0.0381)
(0.0571)
Market Share
0.4112
0.7951
0.0089
0.3382
1.5158
(0.5942)
(0.5810)
(0.5862)
(0.5752)
(2.0201)
Geographic Herfindahl Index
0.0603 ***
0.0662 ***
0.0652 ***
0.0703 ***
-0.0283
(0.0191)
(0.0187)
(0.0190)
(0.0187)
(0.0384)
Product Line Herfindahl Index
0.1589 ***
0.1549 ***
0.1648 ***
0.1684 ***
0.2923 ***
(0.0409)
(0.0401)
(0.0406)
(0.0398)
(0.0720)
Natural log of Assets
-0.0047
-0.0077 *
0.0066
0.0057
-0.0085
(0.0046)
(0.0045)
(0.0043)
(0.0043)
(0.0165)
Mutual
0.0006
0.0057
-0.0022
0.0040
-0.0078
(0.0121)
(0.0118)
(0.0120)
(0.0118)
(0.0472)
Unaffiliated Single Firms
0.0247 *
0.0236
0.0307 **
0.0307 **
0.0118 **
(0.0149)
(0.0146)
(0.0148)
(0.0146)
(0.0047)
Firm Licensed in New York
-0.0316
-0.0375 *
-0.0118
-0.0218
-0.0784
(0.0207)
(0.0202)
(0.0208)
(0.0204)
(0.0606)
A.M. Best Rating A or A0.0011
-0.0148
(0.0132)
(0.0130)
A.M. Best Rating B++ or B+
-0.0465 **
-0.0698 ***
(0.0188)
(0.0185)
A.M. Best Rating B or lower
-0.1015 ***
-0.1289 ***
(0.0227)
(0.0223)
Firm Insolvency Put Value
-22.9823 ***
-19.1810 ***
-12.4967 *
(3.0394)
(3.0199)
(3.6946)
Adjusted R-square
0.02
0.06
0.02
0.07
0.38
Observations
5176
5176
5176
5176
5176
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
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Table14. Economic Premium Ratio Regression for Commercial Property Line, 1989-2004
Dependent Variable:
Fixed Effects
Variable/Model Number
Intercept

Economic Premium Ratio
X
Year
X
Year
Year+Firm
1
2
3
4
5
***
***
***
***
1.9049
2.0597
1.5545
1.6829
1.1364 ***
(0.1151)
(0.1168)
(0.1084)
(0.1101)
(0.4092)
Indicator for MA
0.0198
0.0027
0.0160
0.0032
0.0186
(0.0300)
(0.0299)
(0.0300)
(0.0299)
(0.0299)
Marginal Capital Allocation
0.0169 *
0.0120
0.0183 *
0.0176 *
0.0036
(0.0120)
(0.0103)
(0.0101)
(0.0101)
(0.0168)
Cost Efficiency
-0.1475
-0.1454 ***
-0.1887 ***
-0.1723 ***
-0.4041 ***
(0.0427)
(0.0456)
(0.0430)
(0.0458)
(0.0704)
Market Share
0.0718
0.3877
-0.6662
-0.4183
1.3656
(0.8295)
(0.8236)
(0.8226)
(0.8179)
(2.7520)
Geographic Herfindahl Index
0.0976 ***
0.0911 ***
0.1001 ***
0.0953 ***
0.1014 **
(0.0223)
(0.0222)
(0.0223)
(0.0222)
(0.0410)
Product Line Herfindahl Index
0.0827 ***
0.0852 ***
0.1001 ***
0.1072 ***
0.0175
(0.0318)
(0.0316)
(0.0317)
(0.0316)
(0.0614)
Natural log of Assets
-0.0283 ***
-0.0344 ***
-0.0095 *
-0.0138 **
0.0132
(0.0056)
(0.0057)
(0.0054)
(0.0054)
(0.0198)
Mutual
-0.0468 ***
-0.0507 ***
-0.0459 ***
-0.0499 ***
0.0453
(0.0153)
(0.0152)
(0.0153)
(0.0152)
(0.0511)
Unaffiliated Single Firms
0.0192
0.0060
0.0324 *
0.0206
0.0047
(0.0178)
(0.0177)
(0.0178)
(0.0177)
(0.0039)
Firm Licensed in New York
-0.0804 ***
-0.0752 ***
-0.0709 ***
-0.0667 ***
-0.0626
(0.0220)
(0.0218)
(0.0221)
(0.0220)
(0.0664)
A.M. Best Rating A or A0.0038
-0.0056
(0.0156)
(0.0157)
A.M. Best Rating B++ or B+
-0.0654 ***
-0.0822 ***
(0.0215)
(0.0217)
A.M. Best Rating B or lower
-0.2277 ***
-0.2378 ***
(0.0320)
(0.0320)
Firm Insolvency Put Value
-28.9689 ***
-27.5552 ***
-24.2742 ***
(3.9977)
(3.9857)
(4.7061)
Adjusted R-square
0.04
0.06
0.04
0.05
0.45
7786
Observations
7786
7786
7786
7786
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
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Table15. Economic Premium Ratio Regression for Commercial Liability Line, 1989-2004
Dependent Variable:
Fixed Effects
Variable/Model Number
Intercept

Economic Premium Ratio
X
Year
X
Year
Year+Firm
1
2
3
4
5
***
***
***
***
2.0288
2.1671
1.7325
1.8355
1.1499 ***
(0.1009)
(0.1029)
(0.0974)
(0.0997)
(0.3776)
Indicator for MA
0.0425
0.0157
0.0385
0.0145
-0.0043
(0.0290)
(0.0289)
(0.0289)
(0.0289)
(0.0306)
Marginal Capital Allocation
0.0491 ***
0.0338 ***
0.0419 ***
0.0337 ***
0.0557 ***
(0.0095)
(0.0098)
(0.0096)
(0.0098)
(0.0161)
Cost Efficiency
0.2103
0.1480
0.1856
0.1419 *
0.0642
(0.0406)
(0.0441)
(0.0405)
(0.0441)
(0.0673)
Market Share
0.6247
0.9785
-0.1534
0.2668
0.5246
(0.8061)
(0.8004)
(0.7992)
(0.7958)
(3.0781)
Geographic Herfindahl Index
0.1239 ***
0.1172 ***
0.1256 ***
0.1187 ***
0.0581
(0.0205)
(0.0204)
(0.0205)
(0.0204)
(0.0428)
Product Line Herfindahl Index
-0.1259
-0.1660 *
-0.0867
-0.1171 *
-0.0693
(0.0233)
(0.0237)
(0.0235)
(0.0239)
(0.0555)
Natural log of Assets
-0.0496 ***
-0.0558 ***
-0.0339 ***
-0.0387 ***
-0.0012
(0.0050)
(0.0050)
(0.0049)
(0.0046)
(0.0194)
Mutual
0.0270 **
0.0283 **
0.0282 **
0.0301 **
-0.0144
(0.0137)
(0.0137)
(0.0137)
(0.0137)
(0.0443)
Unaffiliated Single Firms
0.0367 **
0.0256
0.0522 ***
0.0423 **
0.0267 ***
(0.0164)
(0.0163)
(0.0164)
(0.0164)
(0.0036)
Firm Licensed in New York
-0.1570 ***
-0.1540 ***
-0.1480 ***
-0.1466 ***
-0.0591
(0.0209)
(0.0208)
(0.0210)
(0.0208)
(0.0659)
A.M. Best Rating A or A0.0128
-0.0081
(0.0145)
(0.0146)
A.M. Best Rating B++ or B+
-0.0682 ***
-0.1016 ***
(0.0196)
(0.0198)
A.M. Best Rating B or lower
-0.1488 ***
-0.1777 ***
(0.0286)
(0.0286)
Firm Insolvency Put Value
-13.5920 ***
-12.4990 ***
-16.5255 ***
(1.6802)
(1.6833)
(2.2637)
Adjusted R-square
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.08
0.41
Observations
7314
7314
7314
7314
7314
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
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Table16. Cost and Revenue Efficiency Regression
-One Way and Two Way Fixed Effect Model
Dependent Variable
(Type of Efficiency):
Variable/Model(Fixed Effects)
Intercept
Indicator for MA
Size
Natural log of assets
Business Mix
% of Losses Incurred in PP Line
% of Losses Incurred in PL Line
% of Losses Incurred in CL Line
Geographic Herfindahl Index
Product Line Herfindahl Index
Capitalization
Net Premium Written/Surplus
(Cash+Invested Assets)/Liability
Distributions Systems
Direct Marketing
Brokerage
Mixed Distribution
Organization Form
Mutual
Unaffiliated Single Firms

Cost

Revenue

Year
Year+Firm
-0.3749***
0.0229
(0.0195)
(0.0625)
-0.0201***
-0.0023
(0.0068)
(0.0056)

Year
Year+Firm
-0.0863***
0.0761
(0.0206)
(0.0700)
-0.0227***
-0.0134**
(0.0072)
(0.0063)

0.027***
(0.0009)

0.0191***
(0.0028)

0.0133***
(0.0009)

0.0256***
(0.0031)

0.2848***
(0.0061)
0.2543***
(0.0073)
-0.0037
(0.0047)
0.0442***
(0.0041)
0.0204***
(0.0053)

0.2727***
(0.0148)
0.1886***
(0.0138)
-0.0420***
(0.0110)
0.0140**
(0.0063)
0.0003
(0.0079)

-0.0275***
0.0069
-0.0505***
(0.0075)
0.0037
(0.0050)
0.0280***
(0.0043)
0.0070
(0.0056)

-0.0956***
(0.0166)
-0.0533***
(0.0155)
-0.0177
(0.0123)
0.0287***
(0.0070)
-0.0311
(0.0089)

0.0235***
(0.0018)
-0.0334***
(0.0033)

0.0338***
(0.0023)
-0.0295***
(0.0036)

0.0769***
(0.0020)
-0.0037
(0.0035)

0.0632***
(0.0026)
-0.0205***
(0.0040)

0.0686***
(0.0035)
0.0142**
(0.0058)
0.0075
(0.0057)

0.0034
(0.0065)
0.0094
(0.0135)
-0.0134
(0.0083)

0.0074**
(0.0037)
0.0216
(0.0061)
-0.0296
(0.0061)

0.0167**
(0.0073)
0.0004
(0.0151)
0.0247***
(0.0093)

0.0107***
(0.0031)
0.0166***
(0.0033)

0.0035
(0.0075)
0.0178***
(0.0069)

0.0125
(0.0033)
0.0074**
(0.0035)

0.0015
(0.0084)
0.0148**
(0.0072)

Regulation
Firm Licensed in New York

-0.0138**
-0.0220*
-0.0125**
0.0170
(0.0046)
(0.0122)
(0.0049)
(0.0137)
Adjusted R-square
0.51
0.80
0.38
0.72
F-Statistic for fixed effect
148.61
11.78
226.06
13.17
Observations
10643
10643
10643
10643
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent level, respectively.
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Table17. Decomposition of Cost Efficiency Regression
-One Way and Two Way Fixed Effect Model
Dependent Variable:
Variable/Model
Intercept
Indicator for MA
Size
Natural log of assets
Business Mix
% of Losses Incurred in PP Line
% of Losses Incurred in PL Line
% of Losses Incurred in CL Line
Geographic Herfindahl Index
Product Line Herfindahl Index
Capitalization
Net Premium Written/Surplus
(Cash+Invested Assets)/Liability
Distributions Systems
Direct Marketing
Brokerage
Mixed Distribution
Organization Form
Mutual
Unaffiliated Single Firms
Regulation
Firm Licensed in New York
Adjusted R-square
F-Statistic for fixed effect
Observations

Pure Technical
Model1
-0.8897***
(0.0305)
-0.0213**
(0.0106)

Scale

Allocative

Model2
Model1
Model2
Model1
Model2
-0.3161***
1.4170***
1.5201***
0.0444***
0.4076***
(0.0944)
(0.0212)
(0.0749)
(0.0224)
(0.0809)
-0.0080
-0.0114*
0.0048
0.0072
0.0036
(0.0085)
(0.0074)
(0.0068)
(0.0078)
(0.0073)

0.0639*** 0.0515*** -0.0320**
(0.0014)
(0.0042)
(0.0010)

-0.0319*
(0.0033)

0.0141***
(0.0010)

0.0201***
(0.0036)

0.2629***
(0.0103)
0.1900***
(0.0111)
0.0176**
(0.0073)
0.0278***
(0.0064)
0.0383***
(0.0082)

0.0759***
(0.0071)
0.0536***
(0.0077)
-0.0332***
(0.0051)
0.0195***
(0.0045)
0.0051
(0.0057)

0.0516***
(0.0177)
0.0244
(0.0165)
-0.0698***
(0.0132)
0.0263***
(0.0075)
0.0217
(0.0095)

0.1911***
(0.0075)
0.1891***
(0.0081)
0.0431***
(0.0054)
0.0417***
(0.0047)
-0.0545*
(0.0060)

0.1875***
(0.0192)
0.1275***
(0.0179)
0.0227
(0.0142)
0.0280***
(0.0081)
-0.0423
(0.0103)

0.0534*** 0.0846***
0.0064**
(0.0029)
(0.0035)
(0.0020)
0.0111
-0.0260*** -0.0469***
(0.0051)
(0.0055)
(0.0036)

0.0144**
(0.0028)
-0.0255***
(0.0043)

-0.0236**
(0.0021)
-0.0438***
(0.0038)

-0.0287*
(0.0030)
-0.0192***
(0.0047)

0.0995***
(0.0055)
0.0285***
(0.0090)
-0.0100
(0.0090)

0.0159**
(0.0078)
0.0257
(0.0162)
0.0271***
(0.0099)

-0.0109**
(0.0040)
-0.0430
(0.0066)
-0.0084
(0.0066)

-0.0053
(0.0084)
-0.0286
(0.0175)
-0.0273**
(0.0108)

0.0496*** 0.0082
0.0086**
(0.0048)
(0.0114)
(0.0034)
0.0351*** 0.0311***
0.0146***
(0.0052)
(0.0110)
(0.0036)

-0.0120
(0.0090)
0.0148**
(0.0066)

0.0621***
(0.0035)
-0.0175***
(0.0038)

0.0053
(0.0097)
-0.0124*
(0.0070)

-0.0120*
(0.0072)
0.38
70.85

0.0009
(0.0147)
0.62
6.48

0.0047
(0.0053)
0.33
183.45

-0.0218
(0.0158)
0.66
6.43

0.2311***
(0.0224)
0.1916***
(0.0208)
-0.0207
(0.0166)
0.0178*
(0.0095)
0.0325***
(0.0120)

0.0085
0.0095**
(0.0099)
(0.0038)
0.0236
0.0157**
(0.0204)
(0.0063)
-0.0373***
0.0226***
(0.0126)
(0.0062)

-0.0122
(0.0185)
0.76
11.26

-0.0011
(0.0050)
0.24
114.44

10643
10643
10643
10643
10643
10643
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent level, respectively. Model1 indicates one-way (year) fixed effect and model2 represents two-way
(year and firm) fixed effects.
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Table18. Performance (ROA) Regression-One Way Fixed Effect and IV Model
Dependent Variable:
Variable/Model
Intercept
Indicator for MA
Natural log of Assets
Equity Capital/Total Assets
% of Premium Written in PP Line
% of Premium Written in PL Line
% of Premium Written in CP Line
Geographic Herfindahl Index
Product Line Herfindahl Index
Direct Marketing
Brokerage
Mixed Distribution
Mutual
Unaffiliated Single Firms
Firm Licensed in New York

Return On Assets
Year Fixed
Year Fixed
-0.0884***
-0.0848***
(0.0125)
(0.0123)
-0.0153***
-0.0152***
(0.0042)
(0.0042)
0.0059***
0.0050***
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
0.0857***
0.0827***
(0.0037)
(0.0036)
-0.0084*
-0.0037
(0.0043)
(0.0041)
-0.0061
-0.0088*
(0.0046)
(0.0045)
0.0166***
0.0198***
(0.0032)
(0.0030)
0.0018
0.0010
(0.0025)
(0.0025)
0.0177***
0.0150***
(0.0033)
(0.0032)
0.0105***
0.0081***
(0.0022)
(0.0022)
-0.0043
-0.0051
(0.0036)
(0.0036)
-0.0025
-0.0035
(0.0036)
(0.0035)
-0.0127***
-0.0141***
(0.0019)
(0.0019)
0.0059***
0.0052**
(0.0021)
(0.0021)
-0.0094***
-0.0100***
(0.0029)
(0.0029)

Revenue efficiency
Standard Deviation of Returns over past 5 years

-0.0211**
(0.0101)

IV
-0.0936***
(0.0117)
-0.0120***
(0.0040)
0.0049***
(0.0005)
0.1049***
(0.0035)
-0.0052
(0.0039)
-0.0067
(0.0043)
0.0146***
(0.0028)
-0.0031
(0.0024)
0.0159***
(0.0031)
0.0085***
(0.0021)
0.0016
(0.0034)
0.0034
(0.0034)
-0.0130***
(0.0018)
0.0089***
(0.0020)
-0.0061**
(0.0027)
0.1713***
(0.0051)
-0.0248**
(0.0096)

Firm Portfolio Risk

-0.1077***
(0.0288)
Adjusted R-square
0.10
0.11
0.19
F-Statistic for fixed effect
41.64
45.01
82.13
Observations
10643
10643
10643
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent level, respectively.
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Table19. Performance (ROE) Regression-One Way Fixed Effect and IV Model
Dependent Variable:
Variable/Model
Intercept
Indicator for MA
Natural log of Assets
Equity Capital/Total Assets
% of Premium Written in PP Line
% of Premium Written in PL Line
% of Premium Written in CP Line
Geographic Herfindahl Index
Product Line Herfindahl Index
Direct Marketing
Brokerage
Mixed Distribution
Mutual
Unaffiliated Single Firms
Indicator for Firm Licensed in New York

Year Fixed
-0.1587***
(0.0313)
-0.0363***
(0.0106)
0.0155***
(0.0014)
0.0193
(0.0092)
-0.0197*
(0.0107)
-0.0116
(0.0114)
0.0281***
(0.0081)
0.0056
(0.0064)
0.0582***
(0.0082)
0.0245***
(0.0055)
-0.0017
(0.0090)
-0.0162*
(0.0090)
-0.0168***
(0.0048)
0.0206***
(0.0054)
-0.0233***
(0.0073)

Return On Equity
Year Fixed
-0.1023***
(0.0311)
-0.0349***
(0.0105)
0.0121***
(0.0013)
-0.0049
(0.0093)
-0.0132
(0.0102)
-0.0177
(0.0113)
0.0308***
(0.0075)
0.0066
(0.0064)
0.0536***
(0.0081)
0.0182***
(0.0055)
-0.0048
(0.0089)
-0.0159*
(0.0089)
-0.0239***
(0.0048)
0.0195***
(0.0054)
-0.0249***
(0.0072)

Revenue efficiency
Standard Deviation of Returns over past 5 years

-0.1337***
(0.0131)

IV
-0.1184***
(0.0298)
-0.0272***
(0.0101)
0.0118***
(0.0013)
0.0456***
(0.0090)
-0.0173*
(0.0098)
-0.0128
(0.0108)
0.0178**
(0.0071)
-0.0030
(0.0061)
0.0557***
(0.0078)
0.0187***
(0.0052)
0.0114
(0.0085)
0.0009
(0.0085)
-0.0217***
(0.0045)
0.0286***
(0.0051)
-0.0155**
(0.0069)
0.4083***
(0.0129)
-0.1489***
(0.0126)

Firm Portfolio Risk

-0.2932***
(0.0719)
Adjusted R-square
0.05
0.06
0.14
F-Statistic for fixed effect
18.42
23.26
55.67
Observations
10643
10643
10643
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent level, respectively.
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Table20. Combined Ratio Regression-One Way Fixed Effect Model
Dependent Variable:
Variable/Lines of Business
Intercept

Combined Ratio
PP
PL
CP
CL
1.1706***
1.2226***
1.0152***
0.8240***
(0.0480)
(0.0601)
(0.0457)
(0.0587)
Indicator for MA
0.0492***
0.0093
-0.0021
0.0362*
(0.0148)
(0.0184)
(0.0150)
(0.0195)
Natural log of Assets
-0.0167***
-0.0114***
-0.0012
0.0128***
(0.0022)
(0.0028)
(0.0021)
(0.0027)
Equity Capital/Total Assets
0.0093*
-0.0844***
-0.0560***
-0.0467**
(0.0138)
(0.0180)
(0.0131)
(0.0185)
Geographic Herfindahl Index
-0.0274***
-0.0657***
-0.0693***
-0.0376***
(0.0106)
(0.0136)
(0.0099)
(0.0129)
Product Line Herfindahl Index
-0.0827***
-0.0397
-0.0348***
-0.1641***
(0.0174)
(0.0256)
(0.0129)
(0.0150)
Direct Marketing
-0.0205**
0.02314*
-0.0172*
-0.0303***
(0.0095)
(0.0118)
(0.0088)
(0.0111)
Brokerage
0.0138
0.0105
-0.0093
-0.0052
(0.0145)
(0.0185)
(0.0137)
(0.0170)
Mixed Distribution
-0.0660***
0.0111
0.0010
0.0145
(0.0166)
(0.0231)
(0.0148)
(0.0168)
Mutual
0.1003***
0.0232**
0.0060
-0.0036
(0.0069)
(0.0092)
(0.0070)
(0.0090)
Unaffiliated Single Firms
-0.0357***
-0.0555***
-0.0463***
-0.0515***
(0.0087)
(0.0111)
(0.0083)
(0.0110)
Firm Licensed in New York
0.0181*
0.0573***
-0.0105
0.0911***
(0.0103)
(0.0148)
(0.0104)
(0.0149)
Adjusted R-square
0.08
0.05
0.05
0.08
F-Statistic for fixed effect
25.24
9.62
13.72
25.28
Observations
7259
5176
7786
7314
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent level, respectively. PP represents personal property line, PL personal liability line, CP commercial
property line, and CL commercial liability line.
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Table21. Expense Ratio Regression-One Way Fixed Effect Model
Dependent Variable:
Variable/Lines of Business
Intercept

Expense Ratio
PP
PL
CP
CL
0.6121***
0.5561***
0.9522***
0.7736***
(0.0252)
(0.0242)
(0.0275)
(0.0281)
Indicator for MA
0.0274***
0.0085
-0.0110
0.0166*
(0.0078)
(0.0074)
(0.0090)
(0.0093)
Natural log of Assets
-0.0196***
-0.0175***
-0.0271***
-0.0190***
(0.0011)
(0.0011)
(0.0012)
(0.0013)
Equity Capital/Total Assets
0.0528***
-0.0330***
0.0207***
0.0273***
(0.0072)
(0.0072)
(0.0078)
(0.0089)
Geographic Herfindahl Index
-0.0278***
-0.0078
-0.0605***
-0.0315***
(0.0055)
(0.0054)
(0.0060)
(0.0061)
Product Line Herfindahl Index
-0.0511***
-0.0228**
0.0172*
-0.1575***
(0.0091)
(0.0103)
(0.0077)
(0.0071)
Direct Marketing
-0.0419***
-0.0219***
-0.0642***
-0.0607***
(0.0050)
(0.0047)
(0.0052)
(0.0053)
Brokerage
-0.0082
0.0089
-0.0624***
-0.0079
(0.0076)
(0.0074)
(0.0082)
(0.0081)
Mixed Distribution
-0.0687***
-0.0150
-0.0188**
-0.0182**
(0.0087)
(0.0092)
(0.0089)
(0.0080)
Mutual
0.0515***
0.0012
-0.0301***
0.0376***
(0.0036)
(0.0037)
(0.0042)
(0.0043)
Unaffiliated Single Firms
-0.0254***
-0.0300***
-0.0308***
-0.0170***
(0.0045)
(0.0045)
(0.0050)
(0.0052)
Firm Licensed in New York
0.0198***
0.0019
-0.0382***
0.0251***
(0.0054)
(0.0059)
(0.0062)
(0.0071)
Adjusted R-square
0.15
0.23
0.13
0.18
F-Statistic for fixed effect
49.78
59.80
44.80
60.02
Observations
7259
5176
7786
7314
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent level, respectively. PP represents personal property line, PL personal liability line, CP commercial
property line, and CL commercial liability line.
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Table22. Risk-Adjusted Performance Regression-One Way Fixed Effect and IV Model
Dependent Variable:
Variable/Model
Intercept

Risk-Adjusted ROA
Risk-Adjusted ROE
Fixed Effect
IV
Fixed Effect
IV
-2.7869***
-2.9044***
-1.7294*
-1.8406**
(0.3393)
(0.3364)
(0.8862)
(0.8857)
***
***
*
Indicator for MA
-0.4430
-0.4071
-0.4559
-0.4218*
(0.1171)
(0.1161)
(0.3058)
(0.3056)
Natural log of Assets
0.1962***
0.1951***
0.1877***
0.1866***
(0.0153)
(0.0152)
(0.0401)
(0.0400)
Equity Capital/Total Assets
0.9913***
1.2646***
0.5820**
0.8415***
(0.1015)
(0.1025)
(0.2651)
(0.2698)
% of Premium Written in PP Line
0.2341**
0.2184*
0.2020
0.1870
(0.1133)
(0.1123)
(0.2960)
(0.2957)
% of Premium Written in PL Line
0.0484
0.0867
0.8926***
0.9289***
(0.1250)
(0.1239)
(0.3265)
(0.3262)
% of Premium Written in CP Line
0.5875***
0.5311***
0.8107***
0.7571***
(0.0826)
(0.0820)
(0.2158)
(0.2159)
Geographic Herfindahl Index
0.2825***
0.3350***
0.5284***
0.5782***
(0.0709)
(0.0704)
(0.1852)
(0.1853)
Product Line Herfindahl Index
0.7735***
0.7960***
1.1055***
1.1270***
(0.0903)
(0.0895)
(0.2359)
(0.2356)
Direct Marketing
0.0604
0.0762
-0.0593
-0.0442
(0.0606)
(0.0601)
(0.1584)
(0.1583)
Brokerage
0.1144
0.1966**
-0.0413
0.0367
(0.0990)
(0.0983)
(0.2587)
(0.2589)
Mixed Distribution
-0.3367***
-0.2493**
-0.4389*
-0.3559
(0.0988)
(0.0981)
(0.2581)
(0.2584)
Mutual
-0.0564
-0.0409
0.0874
0.1021
(0.0529)
(0.0524)
(0.1382)
(0.1381)
Unaffiliated Single Firms
0.0339***
0.3835***
0.1896
0.2316
(0.0598)
(0.0593)
(0.1562)
(0.1562)
Firm Licensed in New York
-0.1259
-0.0803
-0.1827
-0.1394
(0.0800)
(0.0793)
(0.2089)
(0.2089)
Revenue efficiency
2.0749***
1.9698***
(0.1481)
(0.3900)
Adjusted R-square
0.06
0.07
0.02
0.03
F-Statistic for fixed effect
21.94
28.13
5.60
6.28
Observations
10643
10643
10643
10643
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent level, respectively.
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